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Foreword 
This book has had a long and tormented history. A version that is not too different from the one you are 
currently reading was ready in the early summer of 2009. All I wanted to add at that point was a few more 
scientific case studies to illustrate the various aspects of my account. Then, a health problem in my family 
caused a significant reduction in the time I could devote to my research and this book ended up on the 
back burner for a few years, as I tried to work on new and more stimulating projects in the time I had. 
When I finally was able to came back to the book, I realized that I would have to re-write large swaths of 
the book to incorporate the huge literature on the topic that has accumulated since 2009 and I decided 
that perhaps the best thing would be to make this version of the manuscript available in its current form. 
I believe that the book makes some contributions that are still relevant today and I hope the readers will 
think so too. Please feel free to circulate and cite this version of the manuscript with proper attribution. 
However, this manuscript cannot be used for any commercial purposes. If you would like to cite the 
manuscript, please do so as follows:  
 
Contessa, Gabriele (2013). Models and Maps: An Essay on Epistemic Representation, unpublished manuscript, 
Carleton University, Ottawa, ON. 
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
In Le Cittá Invisibili, Italo Calvino describes the city of Eudoxia. Eudoxia is a chaotic maze of ramshackle 
buildings and narrow, winding alleyways. Somewhere in the city, however, lies a carpet whose colourful 
threads interweave so as to form a symmetric geometrical pattern. Despite the fact that the carpet and the 
city do not resemble each other much, the narrator assures us that, if you were to carefully contemplate 
the carpet, you would be able to discern in it “the true form” of the city.  
The representations of the world that science provides us with are not unlike the carpet in Eudoxia. 
The world is a complicated and multifarious place that does not contain any of the point masses and 
frictionless planes that inhabit our models of it, and yet those models often prove themselves surprisingly 
successful at guiding our actions in the world. Moreover, although the world does not appear to us 
anything like how our most fundamental theories represent it to be, many tend to think that those 
theories provide us with a truer image of the world than our naïve conception of it.  
This book is about the relation between those (and other) representations and the portions or aspects 
of the world they represent. Initially, it may be tempting to think that representation is a binary relation 
that holds between two objects in virtue of the way those objects are and independently of us, like the 
mysterious, almost magical relation that holds between the carpet and Eudoxia in Calvino’s story. 
However, few today would take this magical view of representation seriously. As Hillary Putnam (1981: 1) 
famously argued, if an ant is crawling on the sand on a desert island and, in so doing, it leaves tracks in 
the sand that, by pure coincidence, would look to us like a caricature of Winston Churchill, the ant does 
not seem to have thereby produced a representation of Churchill. Representing is not something things 
do on their own; it is something we do with them. This book tries to explain how we do that—how we 
turn something into a representation of something else, and what it is that makes that something a more 
or less accurate representation of that something else. 
This book is the culmination of a long research project, which started when I was in graduate school. 
It is hard to overestimate my intellectual debt to my then-supervisor, Nancy Cartwright. Ever since 
coming across her book How the Laws of Physics Lie as an undergraduate student in Rome, I became 
fascinated with Nancy’s view of the relationship between our theories and the world. I couldn’t believe 
my luck when, a few years later, Nancy agreed to supervise my doctoral thesis. Nancy turned out to be the 
ideal supervisor, somehow managing to be both my biggest supporter and my staunchest critic. Although 
I am responsible for all of the shortcomings of this book, if there are any good ideas in it, I owe them 
mostly to Nancy.  
Beside Nancy, I also owe substantial debts to many others, including Otávio Bueno, Anjan 
Chakravartty, Mauro Dorato, Steven French, Roman Frigg, Ken Gemes, Ron Giere, Robin Hendry, 
Elaine Landry, Eleonora Montuschi, Mary Morgan, Matteo Morganti, Margaret Morrison, Martin 
Thompson-Jones, Chris Pincock, Mauricio Suárez, Bas van Fraassen, and John Worrall, as well as Daniela 
Bailer-Jones and R.I.G. Hughes, who, unfortunately, are no longer with us. 
Portions of the Introduction, portions of Chapters 1 and 2, and the entirety of Chapter 3 are adapted 
from, respectively, (Contessa 2011), (Contessa 2007), and (Contessa 2010). I am grateful to the editors 
and publishers for permission to use those materials. 
I am very grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for supporting 
my research through a Standard Research Grant. I would also like to thank Eli Shupe for her invaluable 
assistance in the preparation of this book and for many helpful comments. 
 
 
Gabriele Contessa 
 
Toronto 
July 2013 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
My daughters would love to go tobogganing down the tobogganing hill by themselves, but they 
are young and I am an apprehensive parent, so, before letting them do so, I want to make sure 
that they wouldn’t go too fast. But how can I find out how fast they would go? At first, it might 
be tempting to think that I could approach the question in a purely empirical manner. Simply 
sending my daughters down the hill on their toboggan a number of times and trying to measure 
their velocity would probably be the most accurate empirical method to find an answer to my 
question but, of course, that would miss the whole point of the exercise. If, on the other hand, I 
were to ride the toboggan myself or let it slide empty down the hill, the question would be 
whether the toboggan would go as fast if my daughters were to ride it instead. So it would seem 
that, short of (self-defeatingly) sending my daughters down the hill to find out whether it would 
be safe to do so, I cannot find an answer to my question in a purely empirical manner—I have to 
appeal (to some extent) to theoretical considerations. In particular, in this case, I would have to 
turn to our best theory of the motion of mid-sized physical objects moving at relatively low 
velocities—i.e. classical mechanics. But what does classical mechanics tell us about my daughters 
and their possible journey down the hill? 
One way to try to answer the question theoretically would be to try to apply the theory to the 
situation directly. Since my daughters and their toboggan are currently at rest at the top of the 
hill, classical mechanics tells us that their velocity would be determined by the forces they would 
be subjected to after the toboggan is released at the top of the hill. The problem is that, during 
their downhill journey, my daughters and their toboggan would be subjected to an extraordinarily 
large number of forces—from the gravitational pull of distant stars to the weight of the 
snowflake sitting on the tip of one of my younger daughter’s eyelashes—so that any attempt to 
apply the theory directly to the real-world situation in all its complexity would seem doomed to 
failure. 
Since applying the theory to the real-world situation directly seems to be practically impossible, 
I might try to apply it indirectly instead—that is, I might apply the theory to a simplified model of 
the real-world situation. Luckily, in this case, I might even be able to use a simple stock model 
from classical mechanics—the inclined plane model. In the inclined plane model, a box sits at 
top of an inclined, frictionless plane, where its potential energy, Ui, is equal to mgh (where m is 
the mass of the box, g is its gravitational acceleration, and h is the height of the plane) and its 
kinetic energy, KEi, is zero. When the box is released, it will slide down the plane and, at the 
bottom of the slope, all of its initial potential energy will have turned into kinetic energy (Ef = 
KEf + Uf = ½mvf
2 + 0 = 0 + mgh). The final velocity of the box, vf, will thus be (2gh)
½ and 
depends only on its initial height and on the strength of the gravitational pull. If, for example, we 
set h to 10 m and g to 9.8 m/s2 the final velocity of the box will be 14 m/s or about 50 km/h. 
But what does this tell me about how fast my daughters would go on their toboggan? And why 
should I believe what the model tells me anyway? 
The practice of using models to predict, explain, investigate, or understand the behaviour of 
aspects or portions of the real world is ubiquitous. Models are widely used by natural and social 
scientists, engineers, policy-makers, as well as ordinary people (as my example illustrates). 
However, it is only relatively recently that philosophers of science have started to take models 
seriously. The received view, which we might call ‘the descriptive view’, was that scientific theories 
were sets of sentences or propositions that related to the world by describing it truly or falsely 
(or, at least, by entailing other sentences or propositions that describe aspects or portions of it 
truly or falsely). According to the descriptive view, the principles of the theory and deductive 
reasoning do all the real work; scientific models play at most an ancillary, heuristic role. 
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However, as my example shows (and as the critics of the descriptive view have convincingly 
argued), even the simplest real-world systems are way too messy and complicated for us to be 
able to apply the abstract concepts of our theories (and the mathematical apparatus that often 
comes with them) directly to them. Usually, we can only apply these theoretical concepts to 
simplified and idealized models of those systems.1 In light of these and other considerations, 
most philosophers of science have now come to abandon what I have called the descriptive view 
in favour of what I call ‘the representational view’.  
Supporters of the representational view come in (at least) two varieties. Those who adopt 
what we could call ‘the model view’ (or, as it is often misleadingly called, the “semantic view”) deny 
that scientific theories are collections of sentences or propositions and prefer to think of them as 
collections of models.2 Those who opt for what we could call ‘the hybrid view’, on the other hand, 
are still happy to think of theories as collections of sentences or propositions but deny that 
models play an ancillary role and maintain, instead, that models play crucial mediating role 
between our theories and the world.3 Despite their disagreements, all supporters of the 
representational view seem to agree on two crucial points. The first is that it is scientific models 
(not sentences or propositions) that relate directly to the world. The second is that, unlike 
sentences or propositions, and like tables, apples and chairs, models are not truth-apt—i.e. they 
are not capable of being true or false. So, whereas according to the descriptive view, scientific 
theories related to the world just like (declarative) sentences or propositions do (i.e. by being true 
or false of it), according to the representational view they relate to the world more like maps and 
pictures do (i.e. by representing aspects or portions of it). 
As models gained centre stage in the philosophy of science, a new picture of science emerged 
(or, perhaps, an old one re-emerged)4, one according to which science provides us with (more or 
less faithful) representations of the world as opposed to (true or false) descriptions of it.5 So, to a 
first approximation, the representational view holds that theories do not relate to the world 
directly by describing it but indirectly by describing families of models, which, in turn, are used 
to represent (parts or portions of) the world. 
Now, the problem is that, while a philosopher of science who adopts the descriptive view 
could reasonably hope to outsource the task of providing an account of how theories relate to 
the world to philosophers working in other areas by relying on their accounts of semantic 
notions such as reference, meaning, truth, etc., it is not as easy to do so when it comes to the 
notion of (non-linguistic) representation used by the representational view. While supporters of 
the representational view may find very helpful insights and suggestions in the burgeoning 
literature on mental or pictorial representation, it is not clear whether they can find exactly what 
they need—i.e. an account of what I call ‘epistemic representation’. This book develops and 
defends one such account, which can be used by supporters of the representational view as well 
as by other philosophers who, in other areas or contexts, may find the notion of epistemic 
representation useful. 
This book has three parts. In Part I, I distinguish three relevant uses of the term 
‘representation’ and explain in what sense models represent real-world systems. In Chapters 1 
                                                
1 This point has been pressed most forcefully by Nancy Cartwright (see, in particular, Cartwright 1983 and 
Cartwright 1999). 
2 The so-called semantic view originated with the work of Patrick Suppes in the 1960s (see, e.g., (Suppes 1960) 
but also (Suppes 2002)) and can be safely considered the new received view of theories, counting some of the most 
prominent philosophers of science among its supporters (see, e.g., (van Fraassen 1980), (Giere 1988), (Suppe 1989), 
(da Costa and French 1990)). How exactly the so-called semantic view of theories relates to the view that theories 
are collections of models is an exegetical question that is beyond the scope of this book. 
3 This view, sometimes referred to as the models-as-mediators view, is developed and defended, for example, by 
many of the contributors to (Morgan and Morrison 1999). 
4 See, e.g., (van Fraassen 2008, Ch. 8). 
5 How solid the contrast between representing and describing is obviously depends on one’s views on language 
and truth. 
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and 2, I introduce the notions of denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic 
representation as well as a number of related notions and I discuss some ordinary examples of 
epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation. In Chapter 3, I offer an account 
of what scientific models are. 
Part II is devoted to the question of what makes a vehicle an epistemic representation of a 
certain target. In Chapter 4, I discuss two accounts of epistemic representation—i.e. the 
denotational account and the inferential account—and argue that neither provides us with a 
satisfactory answer to that question. In Chapter 5, I develop and defend a third account of 
epistemic representation—the interpretational account. According to the interpretational 
account, a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user) only if the 
user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. 
Part III focuses on the question of what makes an epistemic representation of a certain target 
a more or less faithful one. In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine, respectively, the similarity and the 
structural accounts of faithful epistemic representation and I find them both wanting. In Chapter 
8, I develop what I call ‘the structural similarity account’, which, I argue, combines the strengths 
of the similarity account with those of the structural account without sharing their respective 
weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Untangling Representation
 
 
1 Epistemic Representation 
1.1 DENOTATION AND EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
It’s your first time in London and you just got off the train at Liverpool Street railway station. 
You know your hotel is near Holborn station but you don’t know how to get there yet. You 
follow the signs with the London Underground logo to the entrance of Liverpool Street subway 
station and, just as you are about to ask someone for directions, you notice a pile of folded 
pieces of glossy paper with coloured lines, small circles, and names printed on them. You pick 
one of these papers up and, after examining it for a couple of minutes, you conclude that to get 
to Holborn station you need to take a westbound Central Line train and get off at the fourth 
stop. But how did you acquire this information? How could examining a small piece of paper 
covered in symbols provide you with such detailed piece of knowledge? 
The short answer is, of course, that the piece of paper is a map of the London Underground 
network. If the piece of paper were instead a map of Toronto’s subway system, a reproduction 
of one of Francis Bacon’s self-portraits, or a £10 banknote, it wouldn’t have been of any use in 
finding your way around the London Underground network. But what is it that makes a piece of 
paper into a map of the London Underground network (as opposed to, say, a portrait of Francis 
Bacon or a banknote)? One tempting answer is that the piece of paper is a map of the London 
Underground network because the marks it bears constitute a representation of the London 
Underground network (rather than of Toronto’s subway network or of Francis Bacon). A 
problem with this answer, however, is that it tries to explain the obscure with the more obscure, 
as we are still left asking what it is for one thing to count as a representation of another.  
So, what does representation mean (in this context)? In many ways, ‘representation’ is an 
ambiguous term, and before we can make any progress in understanding what it takes for 
something to represent something else, we must be clear about which sense (or senses) of 
‘representation’ are relevant here. For our purposes, it is important to initially distinguish 
between two different senses of ‘representation’. In the first sense, both the London 
Underground logo and the London Underground map can be taken to “represent” the London 
Underground network. In the terminology I use here, we can say that they both denote the 
network. The London Underground map, however, does more than merely denoting the 
London Underground network. It also represents the network in a second, stronger sense—viz. 
in the sense that it is (in my terminology) an epistemic representation of the network.  
It is in virtue of the fact that the map of the London Underground is an epistemic 
representation of the London Underground network that (to use the terminology introduced by 
Chris Swoyer (1991)) one can perform surrogative inferences from the map to the network, where: 
 
(1) if v and t are two distinct objects, a surrogative inference from v to t is an inference 
whose only premise is a proposition about v and whose conclusion is a proposition 
about t. 
In our example, the map and the network are clearly two distinct objects. One is a piece of glossy 
paper, while the other is an intricate network of trains, tunnels, railways and platforms.6 Yet their 
users frequently perform surrogative inferences from the one to the other. For example, from ‘a 
red line connects the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ to the circle labelled ‘Liverpool Street’’ (which 
                                                
6 Or so I assume here. For some issues in the metaphysics of subway systems see Myrtle Willoughby’s seminal 
(2012). 
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expresses a proposition about the map) a user can validly infer ‘Central Line trains operate 
between Holborn and Liverpool Street’ (which expresses a proposition about the network). The 
same does not apply to the London Underground logo. Users of the London Underground 
network do not usually use the London Underground logo to perform surrogative inferences 
from it to the network and there seems to be no obvious way to do so. The logo may denote the 
network, but the logo itself is not an epistemic representation of the network.7 
1.2 EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
The notion of epistemic representation can be defined as follows: 
 
(2) v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), if and only if: 
[2.1] u is able to perform (valid though not necessarily sound) surrogative 
inferences from v to t. 
In what follows, I call v, t, and u respectively ‘the vehicle’, ‘the target’, and ‘the user’ (of the epistemic 
representation), and I call condition [2.1] (valid) surrogative reasoning. So, (2) thus tells us that (valid) 
surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic representation. But 
what exactly does this mean? 
First, let me explain ‘for u’. According to (2), an object, in and of itself, is not an epistemic 
representation of anything—it is an epistemic representation of something else only for someone. 
Epistemic representation is therefore not a dyadic relation between two objects but (at least) a 
triadic relation between a vehicle, a target and a (set of) user(s).8 For the sake of simplicity, in 
what follows I often omit mention of the users of an epistemic representation unless it is 
required by the context. However, this does not mean that a vehicle can be an epistemic 
representation of a target for no one in particular or in its own right. It should always be 
understood that a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target only if there is some 
user for whom it is an epistemic representation of that target.9 
Second, let me clarify ‘is able to’. The fact that someone actually performs a specific 
surrogative inference from a certain object to another is perhaps the clearest “symptom” of the 
fact that, for that person, the former object is an epistemic representation of the latter. However, 
there may be “asymptomatic” cases of epistemic representation. That is, a user does not need to 
perform any actual piece of surrogative reasoning in order for the vehicle to be an epistemic 
representation of the target for her. For example, even if a user has never performed and will 
never perform any actual inference from the London Underground map to the London 
                                                
7 I say more about denotation in Section 1.4 below. 
8 That what I call epistemic representation is (at least) a triadic relation seems to be one of the few issues on 
which most contributors to the literature on scientific representation agree (see, e.g. Suárez 2002 and 2003, Frigg 
2002, Giere 2004). Suárez (2002) however does not seem to think that this is the case. He thinks that the supporters 
of the similarity and structural accounts of epistemic representation are trying to “naturalize” epistemic 
representation in the sense that they are trying to reduce representation to a dyadic relation between the vehicle and 
the target. Whereas, in the past, some contributors to the debate may have given the impression that they conceived 
of representation as a dyadic relation, I do not think that this is their considered view. Giere (2004), for example, 
dispels any doubt by declaring: ‘The focus on language as an object in itself carries with it the assumption that our 
focus should be on representation, understood as a two-place relationship between linguistic entities and the world. 
Shifting the focus to scientific practice suggests that we should begin with the activity of representing, which, if 
thought of as a relationship at all, should have several more places. One place, of course, goes to the agents, the 
scientists who do the representing’’ (Giere 2004, p.743). 
9 This is particularly important when the epistemic representation has a large set of users (such as the London 
Underground map). In those cases, we usually tend to disregard the fact that the vehicle is an (epistemic) 
representation for those users, not in its own right. The fact that a vehicle is an epistemic representation for many people 
or even for everyone does not imply that it is an epistemic representation in and of itself. 
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Underground network, the map may still be an epistemic representation of the network for her 
insofar as she would be able to perform surrogative inferences from the map to the network. 
Third, let me turn to the parenthetic qualification ‘valid though not necessarily sound’. First of 
all, a surrogative inference is sound if and only if it is valid and its conclusion is true (or, at least, 
approximately true10). But when is a surrogative inference valid? Since a precise answer to this 
question would require the use of concepts that I will not be in a position to introduce until 
Chapter 5, for the moment we will have to rely on an informal (and somewhat vague) 
characterization of ‘valid surrogative inference’. The intuitive idea behind the notion of a valid 
surrogative inference is that a surrogative inference is valid only if it is in accordance with a 
systematic set of rules. For example, according to the set of rules associated with what I call ‘the 
standard interpretation of the London Underground map’, from the fact that the circles marked 
‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal Green’ are connected by a red line, it is valid to infer that Central Line 
trains operate between Holborn and Bethnal Green. According to the same set of rules, 
however, from the fact that the circles marked ‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal Green’ are three inches 
apart it is not valid to infer that the distance between Holborn and Bethnal Green station is three 
miles (or anything else about the London Underground network, for that matter). The standard 
set of rules associated with the map licenses the former inference but not the latter.11 
The qualification that the set of rules be systematic is meant to ensure that the result of 
applying a given rule does not depend on who applies the rule or the circumstances in which the 
rule is applied but only on the way the vehicle is and what the rule states. A systematic set of 
rules, for example, cannot include rules such as: ‘If the circles marked ‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal 
Green’ are connected by a red line, conclude the first thing that goes through your mind’ because 
this kind of rule might (and presumably would) give different results when different users apply 
it or even when the same user applies it on different occasions. 
The valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target do not need to be sound in 
order for the vehicle to be an epistemic representation of the target—i.e. the conclusions that 
that user validly draws (or would draw) from the vehicle to the target do not need to be true (or 
even just approximately true) in order for the vehicle to be an epistemic representation of the 
target for that user. Insofar as a user is able to perform (valid) inferences from a certain vehicle 
to a certain target, that vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target for that user, 
independently of whether or not the conclusions drawn by the user are (approximately) true of 
the target. 
Unless otherwise specified, whenever talking about a surrogative inference from a certain 
vehicle to a certain target in what follows, I always assume that the inference is valid—i.e. that 
there is a set of rules standardly associated with the vehicle and that the inference in question 
conforms to those rules. Whether there are any such rules, what they are, and how they arise are 
all crucial questions, but I save these questions for Chapter 5, where I outline my account of 
epistemic representation and introduce the notion of interpretation on which it relies. 
Finally, the fact that epistemic representation is defined in terms of surrogative reasoning may 
misleadingly suggest that v is an epistemic representation of t for u because u is able to perform 
surrogative inferences from v to t. However, just the reverse is true—as I argue, it is because u 
can interpret v in terms of t, and in doing so, make v an epistemic representation of t, that u is 
able to perform surrogative inferences from v to t. 
                                                
10 I say more about what I mean by ‘approximately true’ in §2.2 below. 
11 Of course, it is possible to come up with a non-standard set of rules, according to which the latter inference is 
valid and the former is not (although no set of rules can make the latter inference sound, as the two stations are not 
three miles apart). 
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1.3 REPRESENTATION AND EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
The notion of epistemic representation introduced in the previous section is primarily a technical 
one. However, I intend it to be an explication of what I take to be one of the ordinary meanings 
of ‘representation.’ By ‘epistemic representation’ I mean a representation that is used (or can be 
used) for epistemic purposes—i.e. a representation that can be used to try to learn something 
about its target. Although the primary purpose of some representations may not be epistemic 
(the main purpose of, say, Pablo Picasso’s Portrait of Dora Maar, for example, seems to be 
aesthetic and the main purpose of a toy car is presumably ludic), I think it is a positive result that, 
according to (2), the vast majority of what we ordinarily consider representations (including the 
two I just mentioned) turn out to be epistemic representations of their targets. Portraits, 
photographs, maps, graphs, and other representational devices typically do allow their users to 
perform (valid) inferences about their targets and, as such, according to (2), they are epistemic 
representations of their targets (for us). For example, according to (2), if we are able to draw 
(valid) inferences from a portrait to its subject (as we are usually able to do in the case of 
traditional portraits), then the portrait is an epistemic representation of its subject (for us). 
However, there is also a sense in which the notion of epistemic representation seems to be 
somewhat weaker than the ordinary notion of representation. This, I think, is due to an 
ambiguity in the ordinary notion of representation. ‘Represent’ is sometimes used as a success 
verb and sometimes not. This is probably why we usually tend to conflate two distinct issues: the 
issue of whether a certain vehicle is an (epistemic) representation of a certain target, and the issue 
of the degree to which that vehicle is a faithful (epistemic) representation of that target.  
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Suppose that Jack has never met Jill. 
Nevertheless, Jack has seen a portrait of Jill, from which he was able to infer a description of 
Jill’s appearance. In order to do so, Jack had to perform a number of inferences from the portrait 
to the subject of the portrait. But why should Jack assume that the description he has inferred 
from the portrait is an accurate description of Jill? For all we know, the portrait may not be an 
accurate representation of Jill (the painter might have never met Jill or might be mistaken about 
her appearance). The portrait may even be a deliberately misleading representation of Jill’s 
appearance (for whatever reason, the painter might have intended to mislead the viewers about 
Jill’s appearance). Alternatively, the portrait may be a “figurative” rather than “literal” 
representation of Jill (the painter, for example, might have represented Jill as she did to allude to 
a trait of Jill’s personality rather than to reflect Jill’s visual appearance).  
Whatever the case may be, the painting is an epistemic representation of Jill (for Jack)—what 
is to be determined is the extent to which it is a faithful epistemic representation of Jill. 
Nevertheless, the painting cannot be an unfaithful epistemic representation of Jill unless it is an 
epistemic representation of Jill in the first place. To put it in a slogan, ‘there is no misrepresentation 
without representation.’ Unless Jack is ready to infer from the portrait a description of Jill’s 
appearance, the portrait cannot mislead Jack about Jill’s appearance and, insofar as Jack is ready 
to infer from the portrait a description of Jill, the portrait is, according to (2), an epistemic 
representation of Jill for him. As this example illustrates, in addition to the notion of epistemic 
representation, we need a notion of a faithful epistemic representation. In the next chapter, I 
introduce this notion more precisely. 
1.4 DENOTATION 
In the last century or so, the notion of denotation (or reference) has played a central role in 
analytic philosophy, so much so that surveying all the major philosophical accounts of 
denotation would lead us far astray from the focus of this book. Nevertheless, since denotation 
plays an important role in what follows, a few remarks are in order.  
Models and Maps 
 
13 
The notion of denotation is a central notion in the philosophy of language, where it is 
(minimally) construed as a relation that holds between certain kinds of linguistic expressions—I 
call them ‘denoting expressions’—and objects (in the broadest sense of the word).12 To consider a 
typical example, the proper name ‘Napoleon’ denotes (or refers to) Napoleon.  
In the analytic philosophy of art, however, the notion of denotation has a broader use. On 
this broader use, the first relatum of the denotation relation does not need to be a linguistic 
expression. Any two objects (in the broadest sense of the word) can be the relata of the 
denotation relation. Of course, these two uses are compatible insofar as we assume that linguistic 
expressions are only some of the objects that can be used to denote other objects. In this book, I 
adopt this broader use of ‘denotation’ according to which anything can be used to denote 
anything else. 
But the question remains: what exactly is denotation? What is required for something to 
denote something else? Here I do not try to answer these questions. Instead, I treat denotation 
as a primitive notion. This is not because I doubt that philosophers or scientists can provide a 
deeper account of denotation, but only because the details of any such account are unlikely to 
affect the view that I develop and defend in this book. 
Here, I assume that a vehicle denotes a certain target for a user if and only if the user takes 
the vehicle to denote (stand for, refer to) the target (I treat these three expressions as 
synonymous). I take it that it is uncontroversial that, as human beings, we happen to be able to 
use some objects to denote other objects. In the absence of this ability, it would be difficult to 
explain even our most basic linguistic and symbolic practices. If there is any disagreement 
surrounding denotation, the disagreement is about how some things get to denote other things 
for us, and not about whether some things do denote other things (for us). Nothing in what I say 
here, however, depends on how some things denote other things for us. It only depends on the 
fact that some things do denote other things (for us), which, as far as I can see, is a widely shared 
assumption. 
1.5 REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT AND REPRESENTATIONAL SCOPE 
I will now introduce a few more notions that will be useful in what follows. The first is the 
notion of ‘representational content’. 
 
(3) The representational content of an epistemic representation is the set of propositions 
about its target, t, that it is valid to infer from its vehicle, v. 
So, for example, since, according to the rules standardly associated with the London 
Underground map, it is valid to infer from it that Holborn station and Liverpool Street station 
are connected by Central Line trains, the proposition expressed by ‘Holborn station and 
Liverpool Street station are connected by Central Line trains’ is part of the representational 
content of the map (given the standard set of rules ordinarily associated with it). On the other 
hand, since it is not valid to infer from the map anything about the distance between those two 
stations, ‘Holborn station is three miles from Liverpool Street station’ is not part of the 
representational content of the map (given the standard set of rules ordinarily associated with it). 
It is important to emphasize that an object in and of itself does not have a representational 
content; an object has a representational content only insofar as it is used as the vehicle of an 
epistemic representation of some target by some users. Since we often use the same term (e.g. 
‘map’) to refer both to epistemic representations and to the objects that serve as their vehicles 
(‘The map has a few rips on it’), it is easy to get confused about this. However, in any ambiguous 
                                                
12 I say ‘minimally’ because I take it that most philosophers of language do not conceive of the denotation 
relation simply as a dyadic relation. 
Models and Maps 
 
14 
cases, context should help the reader determine whether terms such as ‘map’ refer to an 
epistemic representation or to its vehicle. For example, whenever I talk about the 
representational content of a map, I intend ‘map’ to refer to the epistemic representation, not to 
the material object that serves as its vehicle. 
Let me now introduce the notion of incompatible representations. 
 
(4) v and v* offer incompatible epistemic representations of (a certain aspect of) the target t if 
and only if: 
[4.1] The representational content of v includes at least one proposition that is the 
negation of a proposition included in the representational content of v*. 
So, for example, an old 1930s London Underground map and a new map offer incompatible 
representations of the London Underground network because, among other things, from the 
new map it is valid to infer that a direct train service operates between Euston station and 
Oxford Street station, while, from the old one, it is valid to infer the opposite. Two different 
copies of the new map, on the other hand, will not offer incompatible representations of the 
network, as everything that can be inferred from one of them can also be inferred from the 
other. 
I now define the notion of ‘representational scope’. 
 
(5) v and v* have the same scope if and only if: 
[5.1] v and r* are both epistemic representations of t for u, and 
[5.2] for every proposition p about t, p is part of the representational content of v if 
and only if p or its negation is part of the representational content of v*, and 
vice versa. 
(6) v and v* have different scopes if and only if: 
[6.1] v and v* are both epistemic representations of t for u, and 
[6.2] for some proposition p about t, p is part of the representational content of v 
but neither it nor its negation is part of the representational content of v* or 
vice versa. 
(7) v has (strictly) broader scope than v* if and only if: 
[7.1] v and v* are both epistemic representations of t for u, 
[7.2] for every proposition p about t, if p is part of the representational content of 
v*, p or its negation is part of the representational content of v, and 
[7.3] for some proposition p, p is part of the representational content of v but 
neither p nor its negation is part of the representational content of v*. 
(8) v* has (strictly) narrower scope than v if and only if: 
[8.1] v has broader scope than v*. 
(9) v and v* have overlapping scopes if and only if: 
[9.1] v and v* are both epistemic representations of t for u, 
[9.2] for some proposition p about t, p or its negation are part of the 
representational content of both v and v*. 
(10) v and v* have partially overlapping scopes if and only if: 
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[10.1] for some proposition p about t, p or its negation are part of the 
representational content of v and v*, and 
[10.2] neither v nor v* has broader scope than the other. 
 
For example, even if, as we have seen, an old 1930s London Underground map and a new 
map offer incompatible representations of the London Underground network, they still have the 
same scope insofar as, for every proposition about the network that can be validly inferred from 
the one, it or its negation can be inferred from the other. In other words, any question about the 
network that can be answered by using one of the two maps (e.g. ‘Does a direct train service 
operate between Euston and Oxford Circus?’, ‘Is there a station named ‘Holborn’?’) can also be 
answered by using the other, even if the two maps provide us with different answers to some of 
those questions. 
London Underground maps from the 1910s, on the other hand, had different scope from 
more recent ones. Their scope included information about the geographic locations of stations, 
which falls outside of the scope of standard London Underground maps produced after the 
1930s. So, the scope of a 1910s map is both different and broader than the scope of a new map, 
for there are propositions that are validly inferred from the 1910s map that are such that neither 
they nor their negations can be validly inferred from new map. 
Although the 1910s map has broader scope than the new map, it is not necessarily the case 
that one of two epistemic representations of the same target will always have broader scope than 
the other, even in cases where their scopes overlap. For example, although their scopes partially 
overlap, a postcard with a view of Rome and a map of Rome have largely different scopes. Most 
of what can be validly inferred about Rome from the postcard cannot be inferred from the map 
and vice versa. From the postcard we can infer a great deal about what Rome looks like but very 
little about its topography, while the reverse is true of the map. In other words, the relation 
‘having the same or broader scope than’ is a partial order—i.e. it is possible for neither of two 
epistemic representations of the same target to have the same or broader scope than the other. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
So far, I have distinguished between three senses of the ordinary notion of ‘representation’, 
which I have called denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. 
In this book, I take the notion of denotation to be primitive and focus instead on the notions of 
epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation. In this chapter, I have defined the 
notion of epistemic representation and related notions. In the next chapter, I turn to the notion 
of faithful epistemic representation. 
 
 
 
 
2 Faithfulness 
2.1 FAITHFUL EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, both an old 1930s London Underground map and a new map are 
epistemic representations of the London Underground network (for us) because from either 
map we can perform valid surrogative inferences to the network. However, the two maps offer 
largely incompatible representations of the London Underground network (as it is today) 
because, from one map, it is valid to infer propositions that are the negations of propositions 
that can be validly inferred from the other. For example, from the old map, one would validly 
infer that there is no direct train connection between Euston and Oxford Circus, while from the 
new map one would infer that Victoria Line trains operate between those two stations. Because 
these are incompatible states of affairs, both maps cannot be right. As it turns out, all valid 
surrogative inferences from the new map to today’s network are sound—i.e. have true 
conclusions13—but only some of the inferences from the old map to today’s network are 
sound.14 In this sense, we can say that the old map misrepresents some aspects of today’s network. 
But how can the old map both represent and misrepresent today’s network? 
As I argued in Section 1.3 above, in order to misrepresent the network, a map must represent 
it in the first place. To avoid confusing the different senses of ‘representation’, it is thus crucial 
to carefully distinguish two separate issues. The first is the issue of whether a certain vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user). The second is the issue of 
whether (and to what degree) that vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation of that target.15 
To this end, alongside the definition of ‘epistemic representation’, we need to introduce the 
following notions: 
 
(11)v is a completely faithful epistemic representation of t (for a user u) if and only if: 
[11.1] v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), and 
[11.2] all valid surrogative inferences from v to t are sound (i.e. have true (enough) 
conclusions). 
(12) v is a partially faithful epistemic representation of t (for a user u) if and only if: 
[12.1] v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), and  
[12.2] some (but not all) valid inferences from v to t are sound. 
                                                
13 Or so I assume here. 
14 Presumably the reverse would be true of the 1930’s London Underground network. 
15 The distinction between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation is inspired by and 
closely related to the distinction Mauricio Suárez (2004) has drawn between representation and ‘accurate, true and 
complete representation’ (Suárez 2004, p.767). The importance of such distinctions when doing philosophical work 
on representation cannot be overestimated. In fact, I think no real progress can be made in our understanding of the 
notion of representation until these two notions are carefully distinguished. Unfortunately, even Suárez seems to 
have failed to fully appreciate the importance of those distinctions (but more on this later). I am heavily indebted to 
Nancy Cartwright for helping me to fully appreciate their importance.  
Models and Maps 
 
17 
According to (11) and (12), the new map is thus a completely faithful representation of today’s 
network, while the old map is only a partially faithful one. Note that in order to be a completely 
faithful epistemic representation of its target, an epistemic representation does not need to be a 
complete epistemic representation of its target. The new London Underground map, for example, 
is a completely faithful epistemic representation of today’s network because, from it, one can 
validly draw only true conclusions about today’s network. However, the map is not a complete 
epistemic representation of the network, as there are innumerably many aspects of the London 
Underground network that fall outside of its representational scope (e.g. the internal structure of 
the stations or the distances between them). 
Note also that the same vehicle can be a faithful epistemic representation of some aspects of a 
certain target while misrepresenting others. This seems to be the case with the old London 
Underground map, which is a partially faithful epistemic representation of the London 
Underground network. From the old map, we can validly draw many true conclusions about 
today’s network as well as many false ones. 
2.2 CLOSENESS TO THE TRUTH 
In Section 1.2, I defined a sound surrogative inference as one that is valid and whose conclusion 
is true (or approximately true). Although I am unable to offer anything even remotely close to a 
full-fledged account of approximate truth, in this section I try to clarify what I mean by 
‘approximately true’ and introduce the notion of closeness to truth that plays an important role 
in what follows. 
Intuitively, a proposition is approximately true if it is “close enough” to the truth, where in 
most cases what counts as “close enough” depends on a number of contextual factors. As I use 
it here, the expression ‘approximately true’ applies only to propositions concerning some 
quantity—e.g. the height of a building, the mass of a stone, or the age of a person. Suppose, for 
example, that I am describing a room to a friend and I tell her that it is 6 meters wide. If it turns 
out that the room is actually only 5.9 meters wide, the proposition expressed by my sentence 
would be strictly speaking false. However, in most ordinary contexts, a difference of 10 
centimetres is negligible. Although my description of the room is strictly speaking false, it seems 
that in most ordinary contexts it would be unreasonable for my friend to protest that my 
description was false if she were to find out that the room is actually 5.9 meters wide. In those 
contexts, the sentence ‘The room is 6 meters wide’ expresses an approximately true proposition. 
In other contexts, however, a difference of 10 centimetres might be crucial. If my friend wanted 
to know whether a bookshelf that is exactly 6 meters wide would fit in that room, the difference 
between 6 metres and 5.9 metres would be crucial. In that context, the sentence ‘The room is 6 
metres wide’ does not express an approximately true proposition (but it would probably do so if 
the room were 6.1 metres wide instead). 
While the notion of approximate truth (as I use it here) is context-dependent, it seems 
possible to introduce a notion of closeness to the truth that it is not context-dependent. If ‘The room 
is 5.9 meters wide’ expresses a strictly true proposition, then, for any two real numbers, r and r* 
such that r* > r ≥ 5.9 or r* < r ≤ 5.9, the proposition expressed by ‘The room is r metres wide’ is 
closer to the truth than the one expressed by ‘The room is r* metres wide’. The reason why the 
notion of closeness to truth is not context-dependent is that, while there may be contexts in 
which the proposition expressed by ‘The room is r metres wide’ is approximately true but the 
one expressed by ‘The room is r* metres wide’ is not, there seem to be no contexts in which the 
reverse is the case. If the proposition expressed by ‘The room is r* metres wide’ is “true 
enough”, then so is the one expressed by ‘The room is r metres wide’. 
While the above is just a rough sketch of how the notion of closer to the truth can be 
analysed in simple cases, I think it is easy to see how this approach can be extended to cover 
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similar or simpler cases. For example, if p* is a (strictly) true proposition and p* and p are 
contrary or contradictory propositions, it seems natural to say that p* is closer to the truth than p. 
Much work would be needed to turn this sketch into a full-fledged, general account of ‘closer to 
the truth’. However, I hope that this sketch can provide us with a sufficiently clear grasp of 
‘closer to the truth’ for our present purposes.  
2.3 COMPARATIVE FAITHFULNESS 
Whether something is an epistemic representation of something else for someone is an all-or-
nothing matter. Whether something is a faithful epistemic representation of something else, on 
the other hand, is a matter of degree. An epistemic representation can be a more or less faithful 
to its target, and, of two epistemic representations of the same target, one may be more faithful 
(overall) than the other. At first, it might be tempting to think that (overall) faithfulness is a 
matter of how many true conclusions can be validly drawn from the vehicle to the target. 
However, this proposal does not stand up to scrutiny. First, this criterion allows for a completely 
faithful representation of a certain target to be less faithful than a partially faithful one (all it 
would take is for the partially faithful epistemic representation to have broader scope and for the 
set of true conclusions validly drawn from the completely faithful one to be a proper subset of 
the set of true conclusions validly drawn from the partially faithful one). Second, it seems to be 
the case that infinitely many true conclusions can be drawn from any partially faithful epistemic 
representation. From the 1930s London Underground map, for example, it is possible to draw 
infinitely many true conclusions about the London Underground network (e.g. ‘It is not the case 
that the network includes 1,000 stations’, ‘It is not the case that the network includes 1,001 
stations’, ‘It is not the case that the network includes 1,002 stations’, and so on). 
It therefore seems preferable to adopt the following definitions instead: 
 
(13) v and v* are (overall) equally faithful epistemic representations of t (for u) if and 
only if: 
[13.1] v and v* are epistemic representations of t (for u), 
[13.2] v and v* have the same scope, and 
[13.3] : 
[13.3.1] : 
[13.3.1.1] Every true proposition that can be validly inferred from v 
can also be validly inferred from v*, and 
[13.3.1.2] Every true proposition that can be validly inferred from v* 
can also be validly inferred from v, and 
[13.3.2] : 
[13.3.2.1] No false proposition that can be validly inferred from v is 
closer to the truth than the corresponding proposition that can be 
validly inferred from v*, and 
[13.3.2.2] No false proposition that can be validly inferred from v* is 
closer to the truth than the corresponding proposition that can be 
validly inferred from v. 
(14) v* is (overall) a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than v if and 
only if: 
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[14.1] v and v* are epistemic representations of t (for u), 
[14.2] v and v* have the same scope, and 
[14.3] : 
[14.3.1] : 
[14.3.1.1] Every true proposition that can be validly inferred from v 
can also be validly inferred from v*, and 
[14.3.1.2] Some true proposition that can be validly inferred from v* 
cannot be validly inferred from v, or 
[14.3.2] : 
[14.3.2.1] Some false proposition that can be validly inferred from v* 
is closer to the truth than the corresponding proposition that can be 
validly inferred from v, and 
[14.3.2.2] No false proposition that can be validly inferred from v is 
closer to the truth than the corresponding proposition that can be 
validly inferred from v*. 
(15) v is (overall) a (strictly) less faithful epistemic representation of t than v* if and 
only if: 
[15.1] v* is a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than v, 
A few remarks are in order here. First, the above definitions require that two epistemic 
representations have the same scope in order for them to be comparable in terms of faithfulness. 
This entails that the predicate ‘x is (overall) a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than y’ 
denotes a relation that is a partial order—i.e. it is possible that neither of two representations of 
the same target is (overall) a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of it than the other. The 
postcard of Rome and the map of Rome that I mentioned in Section 1.5, for example, have 
largely different scopes and there seems to be no clear sense in which either can be considered a 
more faithful epistemic representation of Rome than the other. By requiring that two 
representations have the same scope in order for them to be compared, these definitions also 
avoid situations (such as the one mentioned above) in which a partially faithful representation of 
a certain target turns out to be more faithful than a completely faithful one with a narrower 
scope. 
Second, (14) only defines what it is for an epistemic representation of a certain target to be 
strictly more or less faithful than another. So, for example, a new London Underground map is 
strictly more faithful than an old 1930s map because there are no true conclusions that can be 
drawn from the latter but not from the former. However, there are probably cases in which an 
epistemic representation is more faithful than another without being strictly more faithful. If, for 
example, from one map of Rome it were valid to infer only true conclusions about a small area 
of Rome (say, Trastevere) while from another it were valid to infer only true conclusions about 
all areas of Rome except Trastevere, it might be tempting to regard the latter as an overall more 
faithful epistemic representation of Rome than the former, even if neither representation would 
be a strictly more faithful epistemic representation of Rome than other. However, with the 
exception of extreme cases like the one I just described, whenever neither of two representations 
is a strictly more faithful epistemic representation of a certain target than the other, we do not 
seem to have clear intuitions as to how the two compare in terms of overall faithfulness. 
Although I doubt that there are any general rules, the account I propose focuses on 
uncontroversial cases while leaving open the possibility that some of the more controversial 
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cases may still be cases in which one epistemic representation is overall more faithful than the 
other (even if it is not strictly more faithful). 
Third, the above definitions are only concerned with what I call ‘the overall faithfulness of an 
epistemic representation’. However, we are often interested in whether an epistemic 
representation is specifically faithful—i.e. it represents faithfully some specific aspect of the target 
in which we happen to be interested. So, for example, although one of the two maps of Rome 
mentioned above may be more faithful than the other overall (even if not strictly so), it may not 
be the most faithful epistemic representation for our specific purposes. If the only thing we are 
interested in is finding our way through Trastevere, for instance, the map that is the less faithful 
overall might happen to be the one that is the most faithful for our purposes. Unless otherwise 
stated, in what follows I am concerned with the overall faithfulness of epistemic representations.  
2.4 CONCLUSION: “THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION” 
In the literature about models, the question of how models represent real-world systems is often 
referred to as “the problem of scientific representation”. From what I have said in the last two 
chapters, however, it should be clear that I take this to be a misnomer for at least two reasons. 
The first reason is that the problem does not seem to be specifically a problem about scientific 
representation—in fact, at best it is unclear whether there is something specific about how 
scientific models represent real-world systems that sets “scientific” representation apart from 
epistemic representation more generally. In other words, it seems advisable to assume that the 
question ‘In virtue of what does a certain scientific model represent a certain real-world system?’ 
seems to be just an instance of the more general question ‘In virtue of what is a certain vehicle 
an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user)?’. The second reason is that the 
problem is really not a single problem (as the definite article seems to suggest). There are at least 
two questions we should address in trying to solve “the problem of scientific representation”—
i.e. (a) ‘In virtue of what is a certain vehicle an epistemic representation of a certain target?’ and 
(b) ‘In virtue of what is a certain vehicle a faithful epistemic representation of a certain target (to 
the extent that it is)?’. In Part II and Part III of this book, I address each question in turn. Before 
doing so, however, in the next chapter I try to clarify what I mean by ‘scientific models’ here. 
 
 
 
3 Models 
3.1 SCIENTIFIC MODELS AS EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATIONS 
How does what I have said so far relate to scientific models and the so-called problem of 
scientific representation? One of the main theses underlying this book is that scientific models 
are epistemic representations of certain portions or aspects of the world and, as such, we can use 
them to perform surrogative inferences about those portions or aspects of the world. This thesis 
is nicely illustrated by my initial example. In it, I used a stock model from classical mechanics as 
an epistemic representation of my daughters going downhill on their toboggan. In Part II and 
Part III of this book, I develop and defend general accounts of, respectively, epistemic 
representation and faithfulness that apply to models as well as other epistemic representations. 
But, before trying to account for what models do, it will be helpful to have a clearer grasp on 
what models are. In this chapter, I explain what I mean by ‘model’ and briefly discuss the 
relationship between what I call ‘epistemic representation’ and what is usually called ‘scientific 
representation’. Before proceeding, however, I should note that what follows is only a sketch of 
an account of the ontological status of models; developing a full-fledged account would involve 
delving into a number issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of 
mathematics that fall far outside the scope of this book. Nevertheless, I hope that this sketch 
provide us with a better grasp of my use of ‘model’. 
3.2 MATHEMATICAL MODELS, MATERIAL MODELS, FICTIONAL MODELS 
Scientists often refer to models in journal articles, textbooks, class notes, conference 
presentations, and conversations with colleagues, and they make assertions about those models, 
assertions that they seem to deem capable of being true or false. The author of a physics 
textbook, for example, might use apparently referring expressions such as ‘the ideal pendulum’ 
and ‘the Rutherford model of the atom’, and assert sentences such as: ‘The ideal pendulum is not 
affected by friction’ and ‘In Rutherford model of the atom, the electrons move in well-defined 
orbits’. 
Scientists do not seem to take the practice of referring to models and making assertions about 
them to be much more problematic than the practice of referring to apples and asserting they are 
red. And, indeed, this practice displays all the external indicators of being a successful linguistic 
practice. When talking about a certain model, scientists generally seem to agree about which 
object they are referring to, and they rarely seem to disagree about the truth or falsity of their 
claims about those objects. Yet, in most cases, it is far from clear what the entities supposedly 
referred to by those expressions are, what makes propositions about them true or false (if such 
propositions actually are capable of being true or false), or how one can find out which of them 
are true and which of them are false. 
Given all the attention that philosophers of science have devoted to scientific models in the 
last few decades, one would expect to find in the literature some attempt to shed light on these 
questions. Somewhat surprisingly, however, this is not the case. Questions concerning the 
Models and Maps 
 
22 
ontology and epistemology of scientific models are only rarely raised in the literature,16 and 
serious attempts to answer those questions are rarer still. This phenomenon is even more 
surprising if one considers the amount of interest generated by analogous questions about the 
ontology and epistemology of mathematical objects in the philosophy of mathematics. 
This lack of interest, I suspect, is partly explained by the fact that it is commonly believed that 
‘scientific models’ is a catchall phrase for what is actually a heterogeneous collection of objects. It 
is commonly assumed that, if all scientific models have something in common, this is not their 
ontological nature but rather their function. As R.I.G. Hughes puts it, ‘[…] perhaps the only 
characteristic that all [representational] models have in common is that they provide 
representations of parts of the world’ (Hughes 1997, S325). 
In the literature, one finds two main functional characterisations of what models are, which 
Ronald Giere (1999) dubs, respectively, the instantial and the representational conception of 
scientific models. The instantial conception characterises a model of a certain theory as anything that 
satisfies that theory—that is, as anything of which that theory is a true description. The 
representational account, on the other hand, conceives of a scientific model as something that is used 
by us to represent some system in the real world.17 Both the instantial and the representational 
accounts of scientific models, however, remain almost completely silent as to what kinds of 
entities do in fact perform the relevant function. 
Personally, I do not object to functional characterizations of scientific models. In fact, I take 
the representational conception to be a step in the right direction. However, even if, from an 
ontological point of view, scientific models are a mixed bag and the best general characterization 
that one can give of them is a functional characterization, it does not follow that it is impossible 
to develop an informative account of the ontology of scientific models. Even if not all scientific 
models belong to a single ontological “kind”, they might nonetheless belong to a few such kinds 
and we might be able to formulate satisfactory accounts of each of these. In other words, the 
heterogeneity of models certainly makes the task of formulating an account of their ontology 
more difficult, but it does not exempt us from that task.  
Nor does it follow that the questions concerning the ontology of scientific models are any less 
pressing. To the contrary, even if models are characterized purely functionally, it is difficult to 
understand how a certain object can perform the relevant function, if we have no idea of what 
that object is.18 Moreover, it seems that, if models play a central role in science, as most 
contemporary philosophers of science seem to agree that they do, we need at least the sketch of 
an answer to questions such as ‘What is a scientific model?’ in order to be able to answer 
questions such as ‘What makes claims about a certain model true or false?,’ ‘How do we learn 
about models?’ or ‘How do we use models to represent the world?’ 
3.3 A (PROVISIONAL) TAXONOMY 
What kind of object, then, is a scientific model? At least in some cases, the answer to this 
question seems to be relatively straightforward. When my high-school biology teacher was 
talking about the model of DNA that still stands on one of the shelves in the school lab, for 
instance, she was referring to an actual concrete object that is about a meter tall, stands on a 
wooden pedestal, and consists of coloured plastic balls and thin metal rods arranged in a certain 
way around a metal pole. If we were in my high-school laboratory, I could point the model out 
                                                
16 For an exception see (da Costa and French 2003). 
17 The instantial account has been championed by the likes of Patrick Suppes (1960) and Bas van Fraassen (1989, 
Ch. 9), among others. Despite coming under attack from various fronts, it is still widely popular among the 
supporters of the semantic view of theories. Supporters of the representational account, which is becoming 
increasingly popular, include Ronald Giere (1988) and R.I.G. Hughes (1997). 
18 See, for example, (Martin Thomson-Jones 2010).  
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to you. We could touch it or take photographs of it. If we were to accidentally drop it on the 
floor, it might break. However, it would be possible to replace it by buying a new one for about a 
thousand dollars. In other words, the DNA model is a material object, just like the shelf on 
which it stands. I call models of this kind ‘material models’. Since material models do not seem to 
pose any ontological questions that are not already posed by other ordinary material objects, I 
will not focus on them here. 
In the case of mathematical models, however, answering the above question is slightly more 
problematic. When talking about the logistic growth model, for example, biologists usually seem 
to be referring to an equation of the form: 
 
In this and other cases, scientists seem to be referring to a mathematical object (often an 
equation, or a set of equations). If it is harder to say what kind of object a mathematical model is, 
that is because, from an ontological point of view, mathematical objects (if there even are any) 
are more elusive than material objects. If, when talking of mathematical models, scientists are 
just referring to mathematical objects, then the philosopher of science can delegate the task of 
investigating the nature of mathematical models to the philosopher of mathematics. 
The vast majority of scientific models, however, do not seem to fall into either of the two 
above-mentioned categories. Consider a homely example from classical mechanics: the ideal 
pendulum. When referring to the ideal pendulum, scientists apparently refer to an object whose 
description can be found in many basic physics textbooks. This object is usually described as a 
point mass of mass m suspended from an inextensible, massless string of length l, which when 
displaced from its rest position of an angle θ, swings back and forth under the influence of a 
uniform gravitational field and which, not being affected by frictional forces, will continue to 
oscillate back and forth indefinitely. 
The ideal pendulum is obviously not a material object. One cannot point at it, nor break it, 
nor photograph it (even if, in some textbooks, it is possible to find drawings of it). As the name 
suggests and the textbooks are usually keen to remark, no real pendulum has all the 
characteristics attributed to the ideal pendulum—no real pendulum bob (no matter how small) is 
a point particle; no real string (no matter how light and strong) is completely massless or 
inextensible; no pendulum (no matter how well lubricated) is absolutely frictionless, and so on. 
Yet the ideal pendulum model is not just a mathematical object either. Although equations 
(and other mathematical objects such as state-space diagrams) can be used to describe some 
aspects of the behaviour of the ideal pendulum, the equations (or state space representation) 
should not be mistaken for the ideal pendulum itself. For example, the oscillations of the ideal 
pendulum can be described by means of the differential equation 
 
However, this equation itself is not the pendulum (contrary to what people seem to think)—
the equation is one way to describe the way the pendulum moves—and, if the pendulum moves 
in the way described by that equation, it is because of the characteristics that the pendulum is 
said to have—it is because the bob of the pendulum has a mass and it is in a gravitational field, 
that it oscillates in the characteristic way described by the above equation. The pendulum is not a 
set of trajectories in a state-space either (as, for example, van Fraassen (1989, p. 223) seems to 
suggest). A trajectory in a state-space is just a perspicuous way to represent certain aspects of the 
behaviour of the pendulum. 
To sum up, scientific models such as the ideal pendulum can be described, can be drawn, are 
said to have characteristics that are typically ascribed to concrete objects, and yet they are not 
actual concrete objects. These features make models such as the ideal pendulum very similar to 
another sort of entity philosophers puzzle over—i.e. fictional characters. Fictional characters 
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such as the Gruffalo are not actual concrete objects and yet they are said to have characteristics 
that only actual concrete objects seem to be capable of having (the Gruffalo, for example, is said 
to have curled out toes and a poisonous wart at the end of its nose). Also, it is not unusual to 
find drawings of the Gruffalo printed on the covers of books. Additionally, both fictional 
characters and scientific models seem to be human artefacts created by one or more people at 
some time (although it is not always easy or possible to identify who their authors are or when 
the entities in question were created). The Gruffalo, for example, was created by Julia Donaldson 
and Axel Scheffler sometime in the late 1990s and the Bohr model of the atom was created by 
Niels Bohr in the early 1910s. Due to these striking resemblances here I call models such as the 
ideal pendulum, the inclined plane, and the Bohr model of the atom ‘fictional models’. 
The claim that there is a striking resemblance between some scientific models and fictional 
characters is not entirely novel. Nancy Cartwright, for one, famously claimed (though, I suspect, 
somewhat figuratively) that “[a] model is a work of fiction” (Cartwright 1983, p.153—but see 
also (Giere 1985), (Giere 1988) and (Godfrey-Smith 2006) for similar remarks). In this chapter, I 
argue that the resemblance between fictional models and fictional characters is not accidental—it 
is, so to speak, a family resemblance. Fictional models and fictional characters are two species of 
the same ontological genus—that of fictional entities. 
In the absence of a specific account of fictional entities, however, the claim that models are 
fictional entities risks being an instance of explaining the obscure by way of the more obscure. In 
the philosophical literature, one can find a number of rival accounts of the nature of fictional 
entities. So, unless one specifies what one means by the claim that fictional models are fictional 
entities, that claim is condemned to remain little more than a stimulating metaphor. In this 
chapter, I intend to sketch such an account. 
Two remarks are in order here. First, to say that both fictional entities and scientific models 
belong to the same ontological genus is not to say that there is no difference whatsoever between 
fictional models and fictional characters. To the contrary, there are many differences between 
them. For example, these two kinds of objects are found in completely different contexts (i.e. 
fictional literature and scientific discourse) and perform largely distinct functions. Therefore, 
when claiming that both fictional models and fictional characters are fictional entities, I do not 
mean to claim that the scientific practice of modelling is a form of fictional literature. Nor do I 
mean to claim that talking about models and talking about fictional entities serve the same 
purposes. Rather, I am claiming that that talking about models and talking about fictional entities 
are analogous linguistic practices, concerning objects that belong to the same ontological genus 
but that are used for largely different purposes. 
Second, the claim that fictional models belong to the same ontological kind as fictional 
entities is to be clearly distinguished from the variety of scientific antirealism that is usually 
referred to as fictionalism (see (Fine 1993)). I take it that fictionalism is a form of 
instrumentalism according to which theories should not be construed literally but only as fictions 
aimed at “saving the phenomena” (whatever that means). So, a fictionalist believes that, when a 
theory states that, say, there are electrons, we should not take that statement literally. Rather, we 
should take the statement as part of a useful fiction that allows us to make certain empirical 
predictions. While a fictionalist might want to espouse the thesis that fictional models belong to 
the same ontological category as fictional entities, one does not need to be a fictionalist to do so. 
In fact, one can be a scientific realist and still believe that the models that we use to represent 
atoms or protons are fictional entities even if the atoms and protons themselves are actual 
concrete entities. 
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3.4 ACTUAL CONCRETE OBJECTS 
In this and the next two sections, I consider three unsatisfactory proposals about the nature of 
fictional models. The first proposal is that fictional models are actual concrete systems, which we 
pretend have different characteristics than those they in fact have. According to this view, for 
example, ‘the ideal pendulum’ refers to some real pendulum or other whose string we pretend to 
be massless and whose bob we pretend to have no extension. If we were to take this proposal 
seriously, however, it would seem legitimate to ask which actual concrete pendulum is the ideal 
pendulum—is it the pendulum of the grandmother’s clock in the hallway, or the one that stands 
on the table in one of the labs in the physics department? This is clearly a ludicrous question, for 
there seems to be no single concrete pendulum that is the referent of the expression ‘the ideal 
pendulum’ (or, at least, if there is one such pendulum, the vast majority of the users of the 
expression ‘the ideal pendulum’ ignore which concrete actual pendulum that expression refers 
to). 
A more plausible variant of this proposal is that ‘the ideal pendulum’ does not always refer to 
the same actual concrete pendulum but to different actual concrete pendula on different 
occasions. So, for example, if we are investigating the behaviour of the tire-swing hanging from 
the tree in the backyard, we might pretend that the swing is an ideal pendulum. In doing so, we 
pretend, among other things, that the rope from which the swing hangs is inextensible and 
weightless, that the swing is not affected by frictional forces, and so on. This proposal seems to 
be quite plausible in those circumstances in which we use a model to investigate some specific 
concrete system or other. However, this is not always the case. In many cases, we talk and think 
about a certain model without having any specific concrete system in mind. In those cases, it 
seems to be questionable to assume that there is some actual concrete pendulum or other that 
we pretend is the ideal pendulum. For example, if a textbook exercise asks readers to determine 
when the tension of the rope in the ideal pendulum reaches its maximum, the readers will not 
typically think of some concrete actual pendulum or other and pretend that it is an ideal 
pendulum in order to answer the question. They simply need to think of a pendulum that fits the 
description of the ideal pendulum.  
3.5 POSSIBLE CONCRETE OBJECTS 
The second proposal about the nature of fictional models is that ‘the ideal pendulum’ does not 
refer to any actual concrete system but rather to some merely possible but non-actual pendulum. 
On this proposal, even if no actual pendulum fits the description of the ideal pendulum, there 
could have been a pendulum that fitted that description—i.e. there could have been a pendulum 
whose string is massless and inextensible and whose bob is a point mass, and so on. It is this 
merely possible pendulum that is the referent of the expression ‘the ideal pendulum’.  
Many, I suspect, are likely to shrug off this proposal as unpalatable because of its reliance on 
merely possible objects. However, this, in and of itself, does not seem to be a good reason for 
dismissing it. Even if talk of merely possible objects is far from being uncontroversial or 
philosophically unproblematic, most of us seem to believe that there could have existed things 
that do not actually exist. For example, we seem to believe that, even if Richard Nixon did not 
actually have a son, he could have had one; or that, even if there is no solid gold sphere 20 miles 
in diameter, there could be one. Admittedly, making philosophical sense of these beliefs is not an 
easy task. However, with the possible exception of the most radical actualists, everyone seems to 
agree that we need to have some account of talk of merely possible objects. If this is correct, the 
thesis that fictional models are merely possible systems does not seem to pose any novel 
philosophical challenge. 
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One, however, might worry that fictional models could not have existed in the same sense in 
which Nixon’s son or a huge golden sphere could have existed. The existence of Nixon’s son 
and that of the huge golden sphere seem both metaphysically and nomically possible; the 
existence of a pendulum that fits the description of the ideal pendulum, on the other hand, does 
not seem to be nomically (or perhaps even metaphysically) possible. For one, it is not clear if it is 
nomically possible for there to be a pendulum whose bob is a point mass because all nomically 
possible massive objects are extended in space. 
It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss whether inextended massive objects are 
nomically or metaphysically possible. Whatever the case may be, however, the existence of a 
pendulum that fits the description of the ideal pendulum seems to be at least broadly logically 
possible. That is, there seems to be no straightforward contradiction in conceiving of a world in 
which there is a pendulum whose bob is a point mass and whose string is massless and 
inextensible, which is in a uniform gravitational field. And this sense of possibility might be all 
we need for this proposal to be viable. 
This proposal, however, is still not satisfactory. First, this proposal faces a few problems 
analogous to those that beset the first proposal—i.e. the description of the ideal pendulum does 
not fit just one possible pendulum but many possible pendula. For example, although the 
description of the ideal pendulum tells us that its bob has a certain mass m and its string has a 
certain length l, it does not specify what the values of m and l are. We usually take this to mean 
that the bob of the ideal pendulum can have any mass and that its string can have any length. 
That description fits uncountably many possible pendula and, since all of them equally satisfy the 
description of the ideal pendulum, none of them has a better claim than the others to being the 
referent of ‘the ideal pendulum’.  
To avoid this difficulty, it might be tempting to suggest that ‘the ideal pendulum’ does not 
refer to the same possible pendulum in all contexts but to different possible pendula in different 
contexts. For example, if we are considering a tire-swing whose rope is 1.5m long and whose 
seat, together with the child sitting on it, has a mass of 15kg, we will set m and l to be respectively 
15 and 150. In that context, the ideal pendulum would refer to (one of) the possible pendulum(s) 
whose string is 150 cm long and whose bob has a mass of 15 kg. 
As we have already seen, however, we often think of the ideal pendulum without thinking of 
its string as having any specific length or its bob as having any specific mass. For example, we 
know that, no matter what the specific length of the string is, the period of the pendulum is 
given by 2π(l/g)½. One could suggest that in this case we are just making a general claim about all 
of the possible pendula that fit the ideal pendulum description. In this case, the ideal pendulum 
refers to an arbitrary possible pendulum that fits the description of the ideal pendulum. This is 
somewhat analogous to the way in which we can use an arbitrary triangle to demonstrate some 
fact about triangles in general, disregarding the specific characteristics of the triangle we are using 
(such as the length of its sides or the width of the angles between them). 
The suggestion that ‘the ideal pendulum’ refers to different possible individual pendula in 
different contexts may successfully avoid the above difficulties. However, it does not square 
particularly well with the linguistic practice of talking about the ideal pendulum as if it was a 
unique object—not different objects in different contexts. 
The view that fictional models are possible concrete objects, however, faces a more serious 
general objection, which is analogous to Kripke’s objection to the view that ‘the Gruffalo’ refers 
to a possible but not actual creature. According to this objection, fitting the description of, say, 
the Rutherford model of the atom is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for something 
to be the Rutherford model of the atom. Consider sufficiency first. Suppose that it were possible 
for atoms to be exactly as Rutherford’s model represents them to be. In spite of that, the 
objection goes, none of those possible atoms could possibly be the referent of the expression 
‘the Rutherford model of the atom’. ‘The Rutherford model of the atom’ refers to a model of the 
atom proposed by Ernest Rutherford in the 1910s in order to account for certain atomic 
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phenomena and not to a possible concrete object (let alone some possible atom satisfying 
Rutherford’s description of an atom). If Rutherford created something by creating his model of 
the atom, he certainly did not create a concrete object (let alone a concrete object that is an 
atom.) So, it is not sufficient that something fit the description of the Rutherford model of the 
atom in order for it to be the Rutherford model of the atom. 
If fitting the description of the Rutherford model of the atom is not sufficient to be the 
Rutherford model of the atom, it does not seem to be necessary either. Although most of us 
agree that it is in some sense true that the electron in the Rutherford model of the atom circles the 
nucleus in well-defined orbit, few take it to be literally true of the model, which, if anything, is an 
object created by Rutherford sometime in the 1910s and not a possible atom. 
3.6 ACTUAL ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
The third proposal about the nature of fictional models is that, while there is an obvious sense in 
which the Rutherford model of the atom does not actually exist (i.e. it is not an actual physical 
system), there is another sense in which the Rutherford model of the atom does actually exist 
(i.e. it is one of the best-known scientific models in the history of physics, which Ernest 
Rutherford devised in the 1910s to account for the phenomenon known as Rutherford 
scattering). According to this proposal, insofar as ‘the Rutherford model of the atom’ refers to 
anything, it refers to an actual abstract entity, not to a possible concrete one. It is, therefore, 
neither necessary nor sufficient for something to fit the description of the Rutherford model of 
the atom in order to be the Rutherford model of the atom. In fact, on this view, the description 
of the Rutherford model of the atom is literally false of it, for the model is an abstract object that 
does not literally have any of the concrete properties attributed to it in its description. 
If the view that fictional models are possible concrete systems seems to take the descriptions 
of models too seriously, however, the view that fictional models are actual abstract objects does 
not seem to take the descriptions of models seriously enough. Even if we might not think that it 
is literally true that, say, the ideal pendulum has a bob that swings back and forth (for abstract 
objects don’t have a mass, are not subject to forces, and don’t move), we still seem inclined to 
believe that that description is, in some sense, true of it. It is because the pendulum, in some 
sense, “has” a bob that behaves in a certain characteristic way that we can use it to predict or 
explain the behaviour of certain real systems. However, if a fictional model is just an abstract 
entity, it is not clear how to make sense of the intuition that those descriptions, although not 
literally true of the ideal pendulum, are “in some sense” true of it. 
3.7 THE DUALIST ACCOUNT AND THE DUAL NATURE OF FICTIONAL MODELS 
Both the view that fictional models are possible concrete systems and the view that they are 
actual abstract systems seem to capture some of our intuitions about fictional models. However, 
neither of them seems to be entirely satisfactory. What is interesting is that the two views seem 
to complement each other—one view seems to be successful where the other is not. One way to 
see this is to consider the distinction between external and internal sentences. Sentences about 
fictional models seem to fall into one of two categories, which, adopting a distinction sometimes 
used in the literature on fictional entities, I call ‘internal sentences’ and ‘external sentences’. 
External sentences, such as (1) ‘The Rutherford model of the atom was created by Ernest 
Rutherford at the turn of the 20th century’, talk of fictional models as models. Whether a 
sentence such as (1) is true or false seems to depend crucially on how the actual world is, and 
evidence for its truth or falsity is largely empirical evidence. An historian of physics, for example, 
might argue that (1) is false. Ernest Rutherford, she might argue, did not originally propose the 
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model of the atom we usually refer to as ‘the Rutherford model of the atom’. It had already been 
proposed and investigated by others, including the Japanese physicist Nagaoka, whose work 
Rutherford was familiar with and explicitly acknowledged in (Rutherford 1911). 
Internal sentences, on the other hand, talk of the model as if it were a concrete physical system. 
Internal sentences include, for example, (2) ‘In the Rutherford model of the atom, electrons orbit 
around the nucleus in well-defined orbits.’ We seem to take sentences such as (2) to be true only 
“in some sense” (if true at all). If, for example, a physics student who takes a true-or-false physics 
test answers that (2) is true her answer will be correct; if she answers that it is false, her answer 
will be incorrect. Yet, we would probably tend to maintain that (2) is not literally true. For (2) is 
not about any actual concrete physical system—the “electrons” and “the nucleus” mentioned in 
(2), for example, are not the electrons and the nucleus of any actual atom, because, as we now 
believe, actual electrons do not move in well-defined orbits around the nucleus. So, whereas (2) 
may not be literally true, there is a sense in which we would be inclined to say that it is true. 
Now, the view that fictional models are actual abstract systems seems to be successful in 
accounting for our intuitions that some internal sentences are literally true and that some external 
sentences are literally false. However, in and of itself, it does not seem to be able to 
accommodate the intuitions that some internal sentences are nevertheless “in some sense” true. The 
view that fictional models are possible concrete systems, on the other hand, seems to be partially 
successful in accounting for the fact that some internal sentences are “in some sense” true. 
However, it seems to take those sentences too seriously for, on that view, those internal 
sentences that are true are literally true not just “in some sense” true. Moreover, on that view, it is 
not clear how to vindicate the intuition that some external sentences are literally true.  
This, I think, is to be ascribed to the fact that both views refuse to acknowledge that fictional 
models (as well as other fictional entities) have a dual nature. I will now sketch an account that 
by acknowledging the dual nature of fictional model combines the advantages of both the 
abstract object and the possible object views. I call this account ‘the dualist account’.19 
3.8 THE DUALIST ACCOUNT 
According to the dualist account, a fictional model is an abstract object that stands for one or 
another of a set of possible concrete systems.20 External sentences such as (1) are apt to be 
literally true or false because they say something about the abstract object to which ‘the 
Rutherford model of the atom’ refers. Internal sentences such as (2), on the other hand, are 
literally false because the Rutherford model of the atom is an abstract object, which has neither 
an electron nor a nucleus as its proper parts. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the abstract 
object referred to as ‘the Rutherford model of the atom’ acts as a stand-in for one of the possible 
systems that satisfy the description of the Rutherford model (i.e. possible systems in which an 
electron orbits a nucleus in a well-defined orbit and…) and, so, (2) can be considered to be true 
of the Rutherford model “in some sense” even if it is literally false of it. We could say that a 
sentence like (2) is true “by proxy”. This is not unlike when we talk of an actor as if she were 
actually her character. Although our assertions are typically literally false of the actor, we take 
them to be in some sense true because they are true of the character the actor is playing. If we 
are watching a play and I say that one of the characters is really cruel and you ask me which one, 
I might point to one of the actors and say ‘That one’. In this case, I am treating the actor as a 
proxy for the character she plays and I seem to be asserting something about her (i.e. that she’s 
cruel) when, in fact, I’m only asserting something about the character she plays. 
                                                
19 Elsewhere I argue that the dualist account is equally successful in dealing with more typical examples of 
fictional entities such as Sherlock Holmes (see (Contessa 2009)). 
20 Here, I ignore the possibility of some models describing impossible systems. 
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Three remarks are in order here. The first two concern ontological economy. Admittedly, the 
dualist account is ontologically inflationary, for it requires that we include both abstract and 
possible objects in our ontology. However, in and of itself, this is not a reason to reject the 
dualist account. We are not supposed to accept the dualist account in virtue of its ontological 
austerity, but rather in virtue of its descriptive adequacy—it vindicates a large number of 
intuitions that underlie the way we think and talk about fictional models. Ockham’s razor urges 
us not to postulate entities unless they are indispensable. So, according to Ockham’s razor, if there 
were an account of fictional models that was as descriptively adequate as the dualist account but 
more ontologically austere, then we should prefer it to the dualist account. In the absence of such 
an account, however, Ockham’s razor does not prevent us from accepting the dualist account 
with all its ontological baggage. 
The second remark that is order is that the ontological baggage of the dualist account may not 
be as weighty as it first appears. The dualist account does not commit us to any specific view 
about abstract and possible objects and most philosophers agree that, since we often speak as if 
there were abstract and possible objects, we need some philosophical account of that way of 
speaking. For example, it might be possible to combine the above account with a fictionalist 
account of abstract objects and possible worlds. If this were the case, one might be able to reap 
some of the benefits of the dualist account without paying any of the associated ontological 
costs.  
The third remark concerns the standing-for relation. Here, I only want to note that the relation 
that holds between the abstract object that is the model and the possible systems for which it 
stands is not an especially mysterious relation. Most philosophers accept that some objects stand 
for other objects. For example, a blue area on a map stands for an expanse of water, and, when 
we count five objects on fingers, each finger stands for one of the objects. The relation that 
holds between the abstract and the possible object according to the dualist account seems to be 
just another instance of the standing-for relation. So a satisfactory philosophical account of that 
relation that applies to those other ordinary cases should also apply to our case. 
3.9 GENERATIVE DESCRIPTIONS 
So far, I have maintained that, in some sense, scientific models have the characteristics we 
attribute to them. But where do these characteristics come from? In this section, I sketch an 
answer to this question. On the dualist account, a scientist creates a scientific model by publicly 
describing a possible system in an appropriate context and manner and proposing it as a model 
of a certain kind of actual system. For example, Rutherford created his model of the atom by 
describing a certain possible physical system in his 1911 paper and by proposing it as a model for 
the atom. (However, it is important to note that, according to the dualist account I defend here, 
the model is not the possible system described by Rutherford but the abstract object that stands 
for it, and which was actually generated by Rutherford’s speech act.)  
In what follows I call the original description by means of which a model is created ‘the 
generative description (of that model)’. The generative description, I think, is important but not 
sacred—subsequent users of the model can modify the model by re-describing it. One important 
way to modify the model is its specification. The specification of the model occurs whenever one 
of its users substitutes some indefinite values of some characteristics of the model with definite 
values or specifies some boundary conditions. For example, one can set the length of the string 
of the ideal pendulum to some specific length or the initial conditions of the kinetic model of a 
gas as having low entropy. 
Another important modification of the model is its alteration. The alteration of the model 
occurs whenever a user explicitly attributes to the model some characteristic that was not present 
in its original description, or a characteristic that slightly differs from the one in the original 
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description. For example, in the kinetic model of gases, the container in which a gas is enclosed 
can have different designs. It can be a completely energetically isolated or it can be in contact 
with a constant heat source. It can have a removable partition or a piston at one end. 
Modifications of a model are particularly important both for the application of the model to 
specific situations, and for the investigation of the model. In principle, it is possible to regard 
each description of a modified version of the model as the generative description of a new 
model. This proliferation of models does not seem problematic insofar as the “family relations” 
among the models are clear. Different versions of a model are all related to each other and, as 
such, they have clear “family resemblances”: they share the most relevant characteristics of the 
original version of the model (where the user can decide which characteristics of the basic model 
are most relevant for the purposes at hand). For example, we usually tend to see Bohr model of 
the atom and Rutherford model of the atom as distinct models, while we tend to see the so-
called Sommerfeld model of the atom (in which the orbit of the electrons is elliptical) as only a 
generalized version of the Bohr model of the atom. 
Moreover, different versions of a model are related to each other in the sense that there are 
“family ties” between them: each version is a more or less explicitly acknowledged modification 
of an original model. For example, in his groundbreaking paper ‘On the Constitution of Atoms 
and Molecules’, after describing the Rutherford model of the atom, Niels Bohr proposes some 
crucial modifications to it. In the new model, electrons are confined to specific orbits and they 
do not radiate energy except when they “jump” from one orbit to another. This modified model 
has come to be known as the Bohr model of the atom, and it is a clear descendant of the 
Rutherford model of the atom.  
The more an original model is modified, the more likely it is that the resulting model will be 
regarded as a different model. Personally, I do not think there is a clear-cut answer as to whether, 
say, the damped pendulum is a modified version of the ideal pendulum or is a different model 
altogether. The two models are closely related, and whether one sees them as two versions of the 
same model or two different models depends only on how one assesses their family 
resemblances.  
According to this story, the generative description is necessarily a correct description of the 
possible systems for which the model stands—by hypothesis, the model “has” all the 
characteristics the description ascribes to it. But is the generative description also a complete 
description of the model? In other words, even if we assume that the model “has” all the 
characteristics that the generative description explicitly ascribes to it, does it “have” only those 
characteristics?  
In his seminal work on scientific models (on whose insights the account I defend so heavily 
relies), Ronald Giere seems to answer this question affirmatively. Giere repeatedly maintains that 
“[a model] has all and only those characteristics explicitly specified” (Giere 1985, p.78; emphasis 
mine). I am not sure whether this is Giere’s considered view on the subject, but it seems to me 
that it does not do justice to what we might call ‘the openness of scientific models’. Scientific 
models have more characteristics than those that are explicitly attributed to them by their 
generative descriptions—and this “openness” is one of the reasons that models are so interesting 
for us.  
The most obvious (though least interesting) examples of “surplus” characteristics are those 
that are implicitly attributed to the model. These are those characteristics that the model must have, 
in order to have the characteristics that are explicitly attributed to it. For example, an object 
cannot be 3cm long without being less than 10cm long. Nor can an object have mass and 
momentum without also having a velocity. Once certain characteristics are explicitly attributed to 
a scientific model by its generative description, other characteristics are attributed implicitly, as 
any system that has the former characteristics necessarily has the latter characteristics as well 
(where the necessity here is of the logical or metaphysical kind). 
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However, models are open also in a more interesting sense. Often models turn out to have 
characteristics that were neither explicitly nor implicitly attributed to the model by its generative 
description. For example, in the Rutherford model, electrons orbit around a small but massive 
positive nucleus.21 But is such a system stable? In his 1911 article, Rutherford sets this question 
aside (Rutherford 1911, p.671) but seems to believe that the system would be stable (at least 
from a mechanical point of view). However, as Niels Bohr pointed out, the system described by 
Rutherford is not stable. According to classical electrodynamics, the orbiting electron, being both 
accelerated and charged, would radiate energy in the form of light, rapidly spiral towards the 
nucleus, and ultimately collapse into it. Irrespective of whether Rutherford foresaw this 
characteristic of the model, it is clearly not a characteristic that was explicitly attributed to it by 
him and yet it seems to be a characteristic that no one (not even Rutherford) denied the model 
had after Bohr had pointed it out. 
Cases like this, I think, are the rule and not the exception in the history of science. Almost 
every model of scientific interest turns out to have characteristics other than those explicitly (or 
even implicitly) attributed by its generative description. Upon investigation, scientific models 
often turn out to “have” characteristics that were unforeseen to their authors. In some cases, like 
the one we have considered, these characteristics are undesirable. However, this need not be so. 
In many cases models turn out to have unforeseen characteristics which make them even more 
interesting (Poisson’s famous bright spot is one such case). Scientific models thus are open in the 
sense that they are capable of having more characteristics than the ones explicitly attributed to 
them by their generative descriptions or foreseen by their authors and it is partly because of this 
openness that it is worth creating and investigating models. 
But if fictional models have characteristics that are not explicitly attributed to them by their 
generative descriptions, where do these additional characteristics come from? Here, I only sketch 
an answer to this question. As we have seen, some of the additional characteristics simply come 
from the characteristics of the model that are explicitly attributed to it as a matter of logical or 
metaphysical necessity. However, other additional characteristics stem from the ones explicitly 
attributed to the model and the laws that govern the behaviour of the objects in the model. For 
example, the possible systems for which the ideal pendulum stands all obey the laws of classical 
mechanics. So, for example, the bob of the pendulum could not have, say, a (non-zero) 
acceleration explicitly attributed to it without a force acting upon it. Analogously, the Rutherford 
model of the atom is governed by the laws of classical electrodynamics and therefore, since 
according to those laws a negatively charged particle cannot accelerate without radiating energy, 
the electron in the model will ultimately collapse into the nucleus. This sketch of an answer will, 
I hope, prove a fruitful first step towards a better understanding of what I have called ‘the 
openness of models’. Still, much work remains to be done before this can be developed into a 
truly satisfactory answer (for example, my answer does not account for those models in which 
some objects obey classical laws and others obey quantum mechanical laws). 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have developed and defended an account according to which one important 
class of models, which I have called fictional models, belongs to the same ontological genus as 
fictional characters. According to this account, a model is an actual abstract object that stands for 
                                                
21 It is not clear whether Rutherford was completely unaware of the instability of his model of the atom (as 
might be suggested by Rutherford 1911, p.688) or whether he just thought that at that stage the question of stability 
was premature (Rutherford 1911, p.671). In a later paper, Rutherford attributed to Bohr the realisation that “[…] the 
stable positions of the external electrons cannot be deducted from the classical mechanics” (Rutherford 1914, 
p.498). Whatever the case may be, even if Rutherford foresaw that his model of the atom might have been unstable, 
its instability was certainly not among the characteristics that he explicitly attributed to it. 
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one of the many possible concrete objects that fit the generative description of the model. My 
hope is that a better understanding of what models are (which I hope this account will be able to 
provide) will lead to a better understanding of what is it that we do when we use models in 
science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Epistemic Representation
 
 
4 The Denotational Account and the Inferential 
Account 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Part I, I distinguished between two questions—the question of what makes a vehicle an 
epistemic representation of a certain target and the question of what makes it a more or less faithful 
epistemic representation of that target. Part II is devoted to answering the first of these 
questions and Part III the second. Part II comprises two chapters. In the first, I consider two 
possible accounts of epistemic representation, which I call, respectively, ‘the denotational account 
(of epistemic representation)’ and ‘the inferential account (of epistemic representation)’, and explain 
why I do not find them satisfactory. In the second chapter (Chapter 5), I develop and defend an 
alternative account of epistemic representation, which I call ‘the interpretational account’.  
4.2 THE DENOTATIONAL ACCOUNT 
What I call ‘the denotational account’ is inspired by a proposal by Craig Callender and Jonathan 
Cohen (2006), who themselves rely explicitly on the work of Paul Grice. A similar and widely-
discussed proposal in the philosophy of art is often attributed to Nelson Goodman (1968). 
However, since it is not completely clear if that is the correct interpretation of Goodman’s views, 
in this section, I focus exclusively on Callender and Cohen’s version of the proposal. 
According to Callender and Cohen, there is a general strategy to reduce a variety of forms of 
representation to a single fundamental form of representation (most likely, mental 
representation, which is the representational relation that, supposedly, holds between mental 
states and what they represent). If successful, this strategy would reduce a number of distinct, 
though interrelated, problems to a single fundamental problem—i.e., the problem of providing 
an account of mental representation: 
[…] the representational status of most [representational entities (cars, cakes, equations, etc.)] is 
derivative from the representational status of a privileged core of representations. The advertised 
benefit of this […] approach to representation is that we won’t need separate theories to account 
for artistic, linguistic, representation, and culinary representation; instead, [those who adopt this 
general approach propose] that all these types of representation can be explained (in a unified 
way) as deriving from some more fundamental sorts of representations, which are typically taken 
to be mental states. (Callender and Cohen 2006, p.70) 
According to Callender and Cohen, the representational relation between a vehicle and a 
target is ultimately a matter of convention or stipulation. If the appropriate conventions are in 
place, virtually anything can be used to represent virtually anything else. 
Can the saltshaker on the dinner table represent [Michigan]? Of course it can, so long as you 
stipulate that the former represents the latter. Then, when your dinner partner asks you what is 
your favorite [U.S. state], you can make the salt shaker salient with the reasonable intention that 
your doing so will activate in your audience the belief that [Michigan] is your favorite [U.S. state] 
(obviously, this works better if your audience is aware of your initial stipulation; otherwise your 
intentions with respect to your audience are likely to go unfulfilled). […] On the story we are 
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telling, then, virtually anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything […]. (Callender and Cohen 2006, pp.73–74; emphasis added) 22 
From our vantage point, the problem with Callender and Cohen’s proposal should already be 
obvious. Callender and Cohen fail to distinguish between what I called epistemic representation 
and denotation and, although their proposal may provide a satisfactory account of denotation, it 
completely misses the mark as an account of epistemic representation.  
Although Callender and Cohen do not frame their proposal in these terms, the following 
would seem to be a fair formulation of their proposal in the terminology adopted here: 
(A) v is an epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(A.1) u takes v to denote t. 
 
(A) is what I refer to as the denotational account of epistemic representation. According to it, denotation 
(i.e. (A.1)) is a necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic representation. Since Callender and 
Cohen do not use this terminology and since nothing hangs on such terminological issues, 
however, I use as much as possible their terminology here and continue to refer to their proposal 
as ‘Callender and Cohen’s proposal’ and leave it to the reader to determine whether (A) is a fair 
interpretation of their proposal. 
There are few better illustrations of why Callender and Cohen’s proposal is unsatisfactory 
than one of their own examples. Apparently, people who are familiar with the geography of 
Michigan often exploit the similarity between the shape of the state and the shape of an upturned 
right hand to convey information about the geography of Michigan. So, if you were to ask 
Ahmed who lives in Port Austin, MI, where the village is located, he might point to the tip of the 
thumb of his upturned hand and say ‘here’. Of course, the village is not on the tip of his 
thumb—it’s just that the village is in the area of Michigan that roughly corresponds to the point 
of his hand he indicated. In order to extract that piece of information from his seemingly 
mysterious speech act, you have to perform a surrogative inference from Ahmed’s upturned 
hand to the state of Michigan.  
It seems clear that your and Ahmed’s agreement that his right hand is to be taken to 
“represent” (i.e. denotes) Michigan is not sufficient to explain your exchange of information. 
Had you and Ahmed agreed that the saltshaker “represented” (i.e. denoted) Michigan, it is hard 
to see how Ahmed could have answered your question simply by pointing to a spot on the 
surface of the saltshaker and saying ‘here’. This is because, if all you and Ahmed did was stipulate 
that the saltshaker “represented” (i.e. denoted) the state of Michigan, there would be no obvious 
way for you to perform the relevant piece of surrogative reasoning from the saltshaker to the 
state of Michigan. In other words, while both the hand and the saltshaker might well be equally 
good candidates for denoting the state of Michigan, they do not seem to be equally good 
candidates for being epistemic representations of (the geography of) the state of Michigan. 
The point I am making is not that it would not be possible for you and Ahmed to use the 
saltshaker as an epistemic representation of (the geography of) the state of Michigan. According 
to the account of epistemic representation I defend in Chapter 5, if the appropriate conditions 
were in place, nothing would prevent the saltshaker from being (the vehicle of) an epistemic 
representation of the geography of the state of Michigan. The point I am making is that the mere 
stipulation that the saltshaker “represents” (i.e. denotes) the state of Michigan would not turn the 
saltshaker into an epistemic representation of (the geography of) Michigan (or of anything else 
for that matter).  This is because the mere fact that the saltshaker denotes the state of Michigan 
                                                
22 Here I took the liberty of combining two distinct examples used by Callender and Cohen and that, in order to 
do this, I had to slightly modify the saltshaker example by substituting ‘Michigan’ for ‘Madagascar’ and ‘US state’ for 
‘landmass’ in the quotation to which this note is appended. As far as I can see, these modifications do not have any 
substantial philosophical consequences. 
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does not license any valid surrogative inferences from the saltshaker to the geography of 
Michigan. 
Now, Callender and Cohen would probably try to dismiss our preferences as a matter of 
pragmatics (as opposed to, presumably, semantics):  
[…] it should be clear that the constraints ruling out these choices of would-be representational 
vehicles are pragmatic in character: they are driven by the needs of the representation users, 
rather than by essential features of the artefacts themselves. (Callender and Cohen 2006, p. 76) 
What Callender and Cohen are claiming is that, even if it is in principle possible to use anything 
to represent anything else, in practice pragmatic constraints make some vehicles more suitable than 
others. But what is meant here by ‘pragmatic constraints’? I think it is highly plausible to 
maintain that pragmatic constraints play a decisive role in our preferring, say, a light, foldable 
paper map of the London Underground over one in which the same marks are reproduced on a 
very large and heavy slate of stone. Even if the two maps were equally faithful epistemic 
representations of the London Underground network, the paper map would still be preferable 
on the grounds that it is much easier to carry around and consult than the stone map. However, 
I do not think that the constraints that make us favour the hand over the saltshaker can be as 
easily dismissed as merely pragmatic. And, ultimately, Callender and Cohen don’t seem to think so 
either. In a particularly revealing passage, they write: 
 […] the geometric similarity between the upturned human right hands and the geography of 
Michigan make the former a particularly useful way of representing relative locations in Michigan, 
and it normally would be foolish (but not impossible!) to use [a saltshaker] for this purpose since 
a more easily interpreted representational vehicle is typically available. (Callender and Cohen 
2006, p.76) 
In conceding this much, however, Callender and Cohen have given away the game. As 
Dominic Lopes (1996 pp.132–133), following David Lewis’ analysis of convention (Lewis 1969, 
p.76), notes against (what is usually taken to be) Nelson Goodman’s view of artistic 
representation, a choice is entirely conventional (with respect to a certain set of alternatives) only 
if those who make it have no intrinsic reason to prefer one of the available alternatives to any of 
the other alternatives in that set. For example, the choice of using ‘gatto’ (as opposed to ‘cane’ or 
‘Katz’) to refer to cats seems to be entirely conventional—there seems to be no intrinsic reason 
why it should be so and not, say, the other way around (i.e. there seems to be no intrinsic 
property of the word ‘gatto’ that makes it a more suitable candidate than, say, ‘cane’ or ‘Katz’ for 
the job designating cats). If, on the other hand, as it is sometimes suggested, the prevalence of 
certain means of transportation together with the fact that most people are right-handed 
originally affected the choice between driving on the right-hand or left-hand side of the road, 
then the choice between those two options is not as conventional as is usually assumed. 
Going back to our example, if we want to show someone the location of the village of Port 
Austin, Michigan, our preferences seem to be entirely clear: we would prefer a map to an 
upturned right hand and an upturned right hand to a saltshaker (or any other random object, for 
that matter). Callender and Cohen not only acknowledge our preferences, but go so far as to 
speculate about the reasons behind them. The reasons they suggest seem to be intrinsic reasons: it 
is because the hand has a certain intrinsic property—its shape—that we prefer it to the 
saltshaker. To maintain, as Callender and Cohen do in the above passage, that our choice of a 
hand rather than a saltshaker as a representation of the geography of Michigan is merely 
conventional because, though foolish, it would not be impossible to choose the saltshaker seems to 
be as disingenuous as maintaining that, if we were offered the choice between a happy life and a 
miserable one (with all else being equal), our choice would be conventional because, though it 
might be foolish, it would not be impossible for us to choose the miserable life over the happy 
one. 
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But then what exactly underpins our preference of the hand over the saltshaker? I think that, 
as it happens, Callender and Cohen’s explanation of our preference is, by and large, correct and it 
is similar to the explanation a supporter of the interpretational account (which I develop and 
defend in Chapter 5) would give—the saltshaker would be a poor choice as a vehicle exactly 
because ‘a more easily interpreted representational vehicle [(i.e. an upturned right hand)] is 
typically available’. Callender and Cohen, however, take great pains to avoid acknowledging that 
we prefer the hand to the saltshaker because the former is more easily interpreted as an epistemic 
representation of Michigan than the latter, as this undermines their claim that all it takes for 
something to “represent” the geography of Michigan is for us to stipulate that it does. If the 
saltshaker is to serve as the vehicle of an epistemic representation of Michigan, we must also 
come up with an interpretation of the saltshaker in terms of the geography of the state of 
Michigan, an interpretation that is already readily available in the case of the hand but not in the 
case of the saltshaker. In Chapter 5, I argue that such an interpretation is the missing ingredient 
for turning the saltshaker into an epistemic representation of Michigan. Before turning to that, 
however, I examine another unsuccessful proposal: the inferential account of epistemic 
representation. 
4.3 THE INFERENTIAL ACCOUNT 
In the previous section, I argued that the main shortcoming of the denotational account of 
epistemic representation is that denotation by itself is not sufficient for epistemic representation, 
because it is not sufficient for a user to take a vehicle to denote a target in order for that user to 
be able to perform surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target. The inferential account 
of epistemic representation tries to overcome this problem simply by adding the further 
requirement that the user be able to perform surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the 
target. According to the inferential account of epistemic representation: 
(B) v is an epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(B.1) u takes v to denote t, and 
(B.2) u is able to perform (valid though not necessarily sound) surrogative 
inferences from v to t. 
 
So, for example, according to (B), the difference between the upturned right hand and the 
saltshaker would be that, even if both can be taken to denote the state of Michigan equally well, 
we are able to perform surrogative inferences about the geography of Michigan from one but not 
from the other. 
Terminological issues aside, (B) is meant to convey the spirit of the account of representation 
developed and defended by Mauricio Suárez (see (Suárez 2004), (Suárez 2005), (Suárez and Solé 
2006)). However, I should note that there are two substantial differences between (B) and 
Suárez’s proposal. The first is that Suárez puts forward his proposal as an account of what he 
calls ‘scientific representation,’ while (B) is meant to be an account of epistemic representation. 
Personally, I suspect that this is merely a terminological difference and that we should not take 
the label used by Suárez to suggest that non-scientific epistemic representations fall outside of 
the scope of his account. Indeed, Suárez often discusses what we would call non-scientific 
epistemic representations as examples of what he calls ‘scientific representation’. Even if my 
interpretation of the inferential account does not reflect Suárez’s actual views, it still seems 
plausible to interpret it as an account of epistemic representation. And, in any case, since my 
criticisms of it apply independently of what interpretation one adopts, I do not think that much 
hangs on this interpretive question. 
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The second substantial difference is that, according to (B), denotation (i.e. (B.1)) and surrogative 
reasoning (i.e. (B.2)) are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient for epistemic representation, 
while according to Suárez’s original proposal, denotation and surrogative reasoning are necessary but 
not sufficient for epistemic representation. Part of the reason why I ignore this aspect of Suárez’s 
proposal is that Suárez’s position and his reasons for adopting it are neither entirely clear nor 
always consistent.23 As such, addressing this aspect of Suárez’s proposal would needlessly 
complicate our discussion, distracting us from its most significant and interesting features. In any 
case, regardless of whether Suárez would subscribe to (B) because of the sufficiency issue, (B) 
does not seem to be any less plausible to me for that reason24, and my own issues with (B) have 
nothing to do with the fact that it takes denotation and surrogative reasoning to be both necessary and 
sufficient for epistemic representation. My criticism would apply as well to a version of the inferential 
account that takes denotation and surrogative reasoning to be necessary but not sufficient for 
epistemic representation. 
For the sake of clarity and consistency, in what follows I use ‘the inferential account (of 
epistemic representation)’ to refer exclusively to (B) and not to Suárez’s own proposal. However, 
I take it that almost everything I’ll say about the former also applies to the latter (but I leave it to 
the reader to decide whether that is actually the case in each particular instance). 
One of the most prominent features of the inferential account of epistemic representation is 
that it is meant to be a deflationary account. According to the inferential account, there is 
nothing deeper to epistemic representation than its surface features. My main problem with the 
inferential account is not that it is inadequate (how could I think so if I have defined epistemic 
representation in terms of surrogative reasoning?) but rather that it is uninformative. In other 
words, even if, in some cases, it is advisable to adopt a deflationary account of a philosophical 
notion, I doubt epistemic representation is one of those cases. My key reason for thinking so is 
that I think there is in fact something deeper to epistemic representation than its surface features. 
If there is something deeper to epistemic representation than surrogative reasoning, then 
deflationism about epistemic representation is unwarranted. Unfortunately, I cannot argue this 
point until I have specified what deeper feature of epistemic reasoning I have in mind, which I 
do in the next chapter. For the time being, I just mention two (somewhat related) considerations 
that should make us suspicious of the inferential account’s deflationary approach to epistemic 
                                                
23 Suárez offers two possible interpretations of the non-substantiality of the inferential account. On the one 
hand, Suárez claims that one should not look for further conditions because there are ‘[…] no deeper features to 
scientific representation other than its surface features’ (Suárez 2004, p.769). According to Suárez, these features are 
surface features in the sense that they are features of the concept of scientific representation (Suárez 2004, n. 4). On 
this interpretation, Suárez claims, the inferential account would be a deflationary account of scientific representation 
(Suárez 2004, pp.770–771). On the other hand, Suárez seems to think that there are further, more concrete 
conditions by virtue of which the concept of scientific representation applies to cases of scientific representation, 
but that these further conditions differ from case to case. For example, Suárez claims that: ‘in every specific context 
of inquiry, given a putative target and source, some stronger conditions will typically be met; but which one 
specifically will vary from case to case. In some cases it will be isomorphism, in other cases it will be similarity, etc.’ 
(Suárez 2004, p.776). According to this interpretation, Suárez would be claiming that an account of representation 
can spell out a set of necessary conditions for the concept of scientific representation but it cannot spell out a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. On this interpretation, the inferential account would be, 
Suárez says, a minimalist account of scientific representation. 
24 In fact, I think it is more plausible (see (Contessa 2007) for an argument that denotation and surrogative reasoning 
are sufficient for epistemic representation). In a joint paper with Albert Solé (Suárez and Solé 2006), Suárez goes so 
far as to suggest that denotation and surrogative reasoning may well be both necessary and sufficient for the 
definition of the concept of scientific representation, but that this does not exclude that some further conditions (such 
as similarity or isomorphism) must be met in each concrete application of that concept. Even if this were the case, 
argue Suárez and Solé, the inferential account would not be a substantial account of scientific representation 
because, even if they were both necessary and sufficient, denotation and surrogative reasoning would only be surface 
features of scientific representation and a substantial account of scientific representation is one that identifies non-
trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific representation. 
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representation, considerations that, I think, help to point us in the direction of the deeper feature 
of epistemic representation that I have in mind.  
The first source of suspicion about the inferential account is that it seems to get the 
relationship between epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning the wrong way around. 
If a certain vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user, it does not 
seem to be one in virtue of that user’s ability to perform surrogative inferences from the vehicle to 
the target. In fact, it seems like just the opposite is the case—it seems that a user is able to 
perform surrogative inferences from a vehicle to a target in virtue of the fact that that vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of that target for that user. For instance, it is in virtue of the fact that 
the map is an epistemic representation of the London Underground network (for me) that I can 
use it to perform surrogative inferences from it to the London Underground network, and not 
the reverse. If I did not already take this piece of glossy paper with coloured lines printed on it to 
be an epistemic representation of the London Underground network, it would never cross my 
mind to use it to find my way around the London Underground network in the first place. So, 
surrogative reasoning presupposes epistemic representation and cannot account for it on pain of 
circularity, as epistemic representation seems more fundamental than surrogative reasoning.  
The second consideration is that the inferential account makes surrogative reasoning 
unnecessarily mysterious. On the inferential account, the user’s ability to perform valid 
surrogative inferences from a vehicle to a target seems to be a brute fact that cannot be further 
explained in terms of more fundamental facts that ground it. This makes the connection between 
epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning needlessly obscure and the performance of valid 
surrogative inferences an activity as mysterious and incomprehensible as soothsaying or 
divination. Moreover, the inferential account does not seem to provide us with any principled 
way to distinguish between valid and non-valid surrogative inferences. What makes some 
surrogative inferences valid and others not? Why does it seem that under normal circumstances 
it would be valid for me to infer from the London Underground map that Central Line trains 
operate between Liverpool Street and Holborn but not that the Queen was born in 1926 or that 
there are no eggs left in my fridge? 
The relationship between epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning is analogous to 
the relationship between measles and Koplik spots. Even assuming that all and only the people 
who contracted measles develops Koplik spots, one does not have measles in virtue of the fact 
that one has developed Koplik spots. One both has measles and develops a measles rash in virtue 
of some underlying fact—i.e. the fact that one has contracted the measles virus. Analogously with 
epistemic representation, although surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
epistemic representation, this should not be taken to mean that one obtains in virtue of the other. So, 
if there are any deeper conditions in virtue of which both epistemic representation and surrogative 
reasoning obtain, and in virtue of which epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning are so closely 
related, it behoves any suitable account of epistemic representation to try to identify what those 
conditions might be. It is only if no such deeper conditions can be found that a deflationary 
stance towards epistemic representation is warranted. Otherwise, a non-deflationary account of 
epistemic representation is preferable to a deflationary account simply on the grounds of being 
more informative and illuminating. In the next chapter, I develop and defend an account of 
epistemic representation that, I claim, identifies a deeper condition in virtue of which both 
epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning obtain. I think establishing the existence of such a 
condition is the best argument I can offer against the inferential account or against any other 
deflationary approach to epistemic representation. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have examined two possible accounts of epistemic representation and found 
them both wanting. The denotational account fails to identify the distinguishing property of 
epistemic representations, namely that they afford their user rules for drawing valid surrogative 
inferences. The inferential account avoids this problem, but it does so by taking the 
phenomenon of surrogative inference as basic and explaining epistemic models in terms of it. I 
believe this gets things the wrong way around. We want to understand why and how epistemic 
representations make valid surrogative inference possible—so it is inadequate for our purposes 
to simply stipulate that they do so. In the next chapter, I develop an account of epistemic 
representation, the interpretational account, which, unlike the denotational account and the 
inferential account, sheds light on the connection between epistemic representation and 
surrogative reasoning. 
 
 
5 The Interpretational Account 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, I defined what it is for a vehicle to be an epistemic representation of a target (for a 
user) in terms of the user’s ability to perform valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the 
target. This definition tells us that surrogative reasoning is both necessary and sufficient for epistemic 
representation. However, in Chapter 4, I argued that an account of epistemic representation that 
stops at this level of analysis is not satisfactory, for it suggests that the user’s ability to perform 
surrogative inferences is a brute fact that cannot be further explained in terms of more 
fundamental facts. A satisfactory account of epistemic representation should, if possible, identify 
the deeper conditions in virtue of which the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target 
for a user and, as such, can be used by that user to perform valid surrogative inferences to the 
target. In this chapter, I develop and defend an account of epistemic representation, which I call 
‘the interpretational account of epistemic representation’ and which, I claim, does just that.25 
The interpretational account of epistemic representation maintains that: 
(C) v is an epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(C.1) u takes v to denote t, and 
(C.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i(v→t). 
 
According to the interpretational account of epistemic representation, denotation (i.e. (C.1)) and 
interpretation (i.e. (C.2)) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for epistemic 
representation. More importantly, according to the inferential account it is in virtue of the fact that 
denotation and interpretation obtain that epistemic representation obtains, or so I argue here.  
The next two sections (5.2 and 5.3) are devoted to clarifying what denotation and interpretation 
amount to. Section 5.2 explains informally how, when denotation and interpretation obtain, the 
vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target. Section 5.3 gives a more formal definition of 
what it takes for a user to adopt a specific but very common kind of interpretation of a vehicle in 
terms of a target. 
5.2 DENOTATION AND INTERPRETATION: AN EXAMPLE 
Suppose that you are commissioned to design a map of a subway network ex novo. One way to go 
about this would be as follows. First, before even knowing what the actual network looks like, 
you could identify what types of objects on the network and what types of properties of and 
relations among those objects are relevant to your map based on what aspects of the subway 
system the map is supposed to represent. Let me call these types of objects, properties and 
                                                
25 Although the interpretational account of epistemic representation somewhat resemble the DDI account of 
representation sketched by R.I.G. Hughes (1997), due to the lack of detail in Hughes’ proposal, I am not sure if the 
interpretational account should be considered a development of the DDI account or a distinct account. I leave it to 
the reader to determine which of these two interpretations is correct. 
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relations, respectively, ‘the t-relevant objects’, ‘the t-relevant properties’, and ‘the t-relevant 
relations’ (i.e. the objects, properties, and relations in the target that are relevant to your 
representation). Given that, in our example, the map is supposed to represent which stations are 
connected by the network’s train lines, the t-relevant types of objects will include the stations on 
the network, the t-relevant properties of those objects will include the names of those stations, 
and the t-relevant relations among them will include the train services operating between those 
stations. However, not all objects, properties, and relations are t-relevant. For example, if your 
map is not supposed to represent the distances between stations, the distances between the 
stations will not be among the t-relevant relations your map is intended to capture. 
The second step in designing your map of the subway network consists in selecting which 
types of objects on the map and which types of properties and relations among them will denote 
the t-relevant objects, properties and relations. For example, you can decide that, on your map, 
stations will be denoted by small black circles, that a circle bearing a name will denote the station 
with that name, and that direct train services operating between two stations will be denoted by 
coloured lines connecting the corresponding circles, with each train line distinguished by a 
different colour. I call ‘v-relevant’ the sorts of objects, properties, functions, and relations on the 
map that denote t-relevant types of objects, properties, and relations. 
After completing these two steps, you will have developed what I call an ‘interpretation’. An 
interpretation has two interesting features. First, in an interpretation, which types of objects, 
properties, and relations are t-relevant depends on which aspects of the target the epistemic 
representation is supposed to represent. In other words, this is contingent on what I have called 
the scope of the representation. Had you been interested in representing other aspects of the 
subway network, you would have selected other types of objects, properties, and relations as t-
relevant. For example, had you been interested in designing a map of the subway system useful 
to train drivers rather than passengers, the t-relevant objects might have included tracks, 
interchanges, signals, and platforms, rather than stations and train lines. 
Second, in an interpretation, it is to some extent arbitrary which objects, properties, and 
relations on the map are v-relevant. Within the limits of common sense, it would have been 
possible for you to use different types of objects, properties, and relations on the map to denote 
the t-relevant types of objects, properties, and relations in the world. For example, nothing would 
have prevented you from using small black squares instead of small black circles to denote 
stations on the map. Pragmatic constraints, however, do set some clear limits to the arbitrariness 
of your choices in these matters. For example, it would be highly impractical to use elephants 
and extremely expensive to use precious stones. Notwithstanding sheer impracticality and animal 
rights issues, however, nothing would prevent you from producing an epistemic representation 
of a subway network in which stations are denoted by elephants and direct train services 
operating between two stations are denoted by the corresponding elephants being tied together 
by a coloured ribbon. 
Once you have developed a general interpretation like the one above, you can use it to design 
an actual map of the specific subway system in which you are interested. You first turn to the 
actual subway system, making note of all and only those objects that are tokens of the t-relevant 
types of objects, and of any of the objects’ properties or relations that are tokens of the t-relevant 
types of properties and relations. In our case, you would compile a list of stations and their 
names, and make note of the train lines directly connecting them to one another. 
Then, you would draw on your map one and only one small black circle for each station on 
your list and draw coloured lines between any two stations that are connected by a direct train 
service (using a different colour for each line). As a result of this process, you will have designed 
a map of the subway system in question. Here, I call the interpretation on the basis of which you 
designed the map ‘the intended interpretation of the map’. 
Now consider the map you have just designed from the perspective of one of its users. In and 
of itself, the map is not an epistemic representation of anything—it is just a piece of paper with 
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small circles and coloured lines printed on it. If the map is to become an epistemic 
representation for a user, the user must take some of the objects, properties, and relations on 
that piece of paper to denote something else—i.e. the user has to adopt some interpretation or 
other of the map.  
If the user is familiar with interpreting other maps of subway systems, it will probably be easy 
for her to realize that that piece of paper she is holding in her hands is meant to be a map of a 
subway system, and furthermore that the small black circles on the map denote the stations of 
that system, and that the coloured lines between the circles denote direct train connections 
between stations. In other words, a user who is familiar with general interpretations of other 
subway maps is likely to swiftly grasp the standard interpretation of your map. 
However, the user need not adopt the standard interpretation of the map in order for it to be 
an epistemic representation for her. For example, the user can take the circles to denote cities 
and towns, the coloured lines to denote highways, and the relative positions of the circles to 
denote the relative positions of the corresponding cities. Under a non-standard interpretation 
such as this one, the map would still be an epistemic representation for its user—although it 
would be an epistemic representation of a highway system rather than a subway system. 
Suppose, however, that the user in question does in fact adopt the standard interpretation of 
your map. According to the interpretational account, the map is now an epistemic representation 
of a subway system for that user. So it might seem that interpretation is not only necessary but also 
sufficient for epistemic representation. Therefore, one might wonder whether denotation is superfluous 
after all. The reason why denotation is needed in addition to interpretation is that, if the user only 
adopts an interpretation of the map without taking the map to denote any specific subway 
system, the map will only be a representation of some subway system or other and not an 
epistemic representation of any specific subway system. It is only when the user takes the map to 
stand for a specific subway system that the map becomes an epistemic representation of that 
subway system for that user. So for example, a user who adopts the standard interpretation of 
the map but does not know that the map is a map of the Toronto subway network (and is 
unfamiliar with the city of Toronto and its subway network) can still infer that one of the 
stations on the subway network represented by the map is called ‘Bathurst’ even if, from this, she 
cannot infer that that station is part of the Toronto subway network. 
Somewhat schematically, we could say that, when a user adopts an interpretation of a certain 
vehicle in terms of a generic target, the vehicle becomes an epistemic representation of some target 
or other for that user. However, it is only when the user takes that epistemic representation to 
denote a specific target, that the epistemic representation becomes an epistemic representation of 
that target for that user. In our example, whenever a user adopts an interpretation of this piece of 
paper, the piece of paper becomes a map of a subway system for that user; however, the map 
becomes a map of the Toronto subway system only when the user also takes the map (qua epistemic 
representation) to stand for the Toronto subway system. 
A user’s interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target is not an interpretation of the vehicle 
in terms of any specific target, unless the vehicle is also taken by the user to denote a specific 
target (i.e. unless denotation also obtains). For the sake of simplicity, in what follows I will usually 
talk of a vehicle’s interpretation in terms of the target, thus assuming that the user already takes 
the vehicle to denote some specific target. However, this is only a loose way of speaking, for, as I 
have argued in this section, interpretation does not entail or presuppose denotation. 
5.3 ANALYTIC INTERPRETATIONS 
In the previous section, I provided a specific example of what I mean by ‘interpretation’. But 
what does it mean in general for a user to adopt an interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target? 
According to a general, though somewhat loose, characterisation of the notion of interpretation, 
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a user interprets a vehicle in terms of some target only if she takes facts about the vehicle to 
stand for (putative) facts about a target. One specific way to interpret a vehicle—though by no 
means the only way—is to adopt what I call ‘an analytic interpretation of the vehicle’.  
In order for a user to adopt an interpretation of a certain target, the user must identify a (non-
empty) set of v-relevant objects in the vehicle (ΩV={o1V, …, onV}), a (possibly empty) set of v-
relevant properties of and relations among the v-relevant objects in the vehicle (PV={nR1V, …, 
MRrV}, where 
nR denotes an n-ary relation and properties are construed as 1-ary relations), and a 
(possibly empty) set of v-relevant functions, ΦV={nF1V, …, MFrV} (where 
nF denotes an n-ary 
function), either from (ΩV)n to ΩV. The user must also assume that, in the target, there is a 
(possibly empty) set of t-relevant objects in the vehicle (ΩT={o1T, …, onT}), a (possibly empty) set 
of v-relevant properties of and relations among the v-relevant objects in the vehicle (PT={nR1T, 
…, MRrT}) and a (possibly empty) set of v-relevant functions (ΦT={
nF1T, …, MFrT}) either from 
(ΩT)n to ΩT.26  
 
(16) u adopts an (analytic) interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), if and only if: 
[16.1] The user takes27 every object in ΩV to denote one and only one (putative) 
object in ΩT and every (putative) object in ΩT to be denoted by one and only 
one object in ΩV, 
[16.2] The user takes every n-ary relation in ΡV to denote one and only one n-ary 
relation in ΡT and every n-ary relation in ΡT to be denoted by one and only one 
n-ary relation in ΡV, 
[16.3] The user takes every n-ary function in ΦV to denote one and only one n-ary 
function in ΦT and every n-ary function in ΦT to be denoted by one and only 
one n-ary function in ΦV. 
 
What is special about analytic interpretations is that, according to them interpretation, objects 
denote objects, properties denote properties, binary relations denote binary relations, and so on. Note, 
however, that, usually, not all prima facie objects, properties, functions, and relations in the vehicle 
or the target are relevant to some user’s interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. The 
only v-relevant objects, properties, and relations are those that denote objects, properties, and 
relations in the target, and the only t-relevant objects, properties, functions, and relations in the 
target are those that are denoted by, respectively, objects, properties, functions, and relations in 
the vehicle. For example, the relation being connected by a light blue line in the London Underground 
map is relevant (according to the standard interpretation of the map in terms of the network) 
because, on the standard interpretation of the map, it denotes a relation between stations on the 
network, but the relation being two inches to the left of is not relevant because, on the standard 
interpretation of the map, it does not denote any relation among stations in the network.  
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows I sometimes call the object, property, or relation in 
the target that is denoted by an object, property, or relation in the vehicle according to a certain 
                                                
26 I use functions mainly as stand-ins for certain properties and relations that are determinates of determinables. 
So, for example, the binary relation being ___km apart will be represented by a (partial) binary function from (ΩT)2 to 
ℝ that associates pairs of objects in ΩT with the real number that represents their distance in kilometres. So, for 
example, if the relation being 450km apart holds between Toronto and Ottawa, then the relevant function will assign 
the real number 450 to <Toronto, Ottawa>. Analogously, the property being ___m tall will be represented as a unary 
function from ΩT to ℝ that associates each object in ΩT with the real number that represents its height in meters. 
27 Let me note that ‘takes’ here does not mean ‘believes.’ A user can take one object to denote another even if 
she does not believe there is anything the object denotes.  I say more about this below. 
Models and Maps 
 
45 
interpretation ‘the corresponding object’, ‘the corresponding property’, or ‘the corresponding 
relation’. 
5.4 ANALYTIC VS. NON-ANALYTIC INTERPRETATIONS 
Most interpretations of vehicles in terms of targets that we ordinarily adopt can be construed as 
analytic interpretations. The standard interpretation of the London Underground map in terms 
of the London Underground network, for example, is an analytic interpretation. First, we take 
some objects on the map (i.e. small black circles and small coloured tabs) to denote objects on 
the network (i.e. stations) and, then, we take some of the properties of and relations among those 
objects on the map to stand for properties of and relations among stations on the network. For 
example, we take the relation being connected by a light blue line on the map to stand for the relation 
being connected by Victoria Line trains on the network. In what follows, I call any epistemic 
representation whose interpretation is analytic ‘an analytically interpreted epistemic representation’. 
In this book, my focus is exclusively on what I have called analytic interpretations. Unless 
otherwise specified, by saying that a user adopts an interpretation of the target, I always mean 
that the interpretation in question is analytic. However, I do not mean to imply that every 
interpretation of a vehicle in terms of its target is analytic. Epistemic representations whose 
standard interpretations are not analytic are at least conceivable. For example, suppose we took a 
mathematical model, such as the equation of motion for the simple pendulum, (d2θ 
/dt2)+(g/L)θ=0, to be an epistemic representation of some real pendulum. In the context of this 
epistemic representation, some objects (e.g. numbers) seem to stand for determinate properties 
of some of the objects that compose the pendulum (e.g. the length of the string from which the 
pendulum hangs, or the angle of displacement of the pendulum). In this case, our interpretation 
would not seem to be analytic. As I already mentioned in Chapter 3, however, in this book we 
assume that so-called mathematical models are not models but descriptions of the behaviour of 
objects that are part of a fictional model. So, for example, the equation of motion for the simple 
pendulum describes how the simple pendulum (which is a fictional model from classical 
mechanics) moves and is the fictional model that is used as an epistemic representation of some 
real-world system through an analytic representation of it. 
In general, however, epistemic representations whose standard interpretations are non-
analytic seem to be the exception rather than the rule. In the overwhelming majority of 
prototypical cases of epistemic representation (which include maps, diagrams, drawings, 
photographs, and, of course, models), with enough ingenuity, it seems possible to reconstruct 
the standard interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target as an analytic one, like I have just 
done in the case of the simple pendulum.28 If this is true, then restricting our attention to analytic 
interpretations will simplify our discussion without any significant loss of generality. 
If one is willing to adopt a liberal account of what can count as relevant objects, properties 
and relations, however, it seems possible to reconstruct any non-analytic interpretation into an 
analytic one. Unfortunately, I do not have a general argument to prove that any non-analytic 
interpretation can be reconstructed as an analytic one in this manner (in fact, I am not even sure 
what such a proof would look like). Whether the accounts of epistemic representation and 
faithfulness that I develop in this book can be considered perfectly general crucially hinges on 
this question. If, as I am suggesting, it is possible to reconstruct any interpretation as an analytic 
interpretation, then the account offered in this book serves as a general account of epistemic 
representation. Even if this reconstruction is not always possible, however, I think that there are 
still reasons to hope that the account offered in this book is sufficient to deal with most 
                                                
28 I talk of ‘reconstruction’ because users are often unable to spell out how they interpret the vehicle in terms of 
the target and are sometimes even unaware that they do interpret the vehicle in terms of the target. 
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prototypical cases of epistemic representation, and that extending it to cases in which the 
interpretation adopted is irreducibly non-analytic will only turn out to be technically challenging 
but not conceptually so. 
5.5 INTERPRETATION AND EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
In ordinary language, we often use the same word both to refer to an epistemic representation 
and to refer to the object that serves as the vehicle for that epistemic representation. ‘The map’, 
for instance, is sometimes used to refer to the material object that serves as a vehicle of a certain 
epistemic representation (as in ‘The map was faded and tattered’) and, at other times, to refer to 
the epistemic representation itself (as in ‘The map was very accurate’). The fact that we use the 
same word to refer to both, however, should not mislead us into believing that the material 
object, in and of itself, is an epistemic representation of something else. 
According to the interpretational account, the object (material or not) that serves as the 
vehicle of a certain representation (e.g. the piece of paper that serves as a map), in and of itself, is 
not an epistemic representation of anything. It is only when a user, more or less consciously, 
adopts an interpretation of that object in terms of some other object that the former becomes 
the vehicle of an epistemic representation of the latter for that user. 
An epistemic representation can thus be schematically represented as an ordered pair <v, i° 
(v→t)> whose first element, v, is the vehicle (i.e. the object that serves as a vehicle of the 
epistemic representation) and whose second element, i°(v→t), is an interpretation of (the v-
relevant objects, properties, and relations in) the vehicle in terms of (the t-relevant objects, 
properties, and relations in) the target. 
Users are often unaware that they are adopting an interpretation of a vehicle in terms of the 
target. Even when they are aware that they are in some sense doing so, rarely are they in a 
position to spell out exactly what their interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target 
involves. For example, people are not usually aware that they adopt an interpretation to draw 
inferences from, say, a photograph to what the photograph represents. They feel that they can 
just “see things” in the photograph. This intuition, however, does not support the view that they 
do not in fact adopt an interpretation of the photograph—it is simply that they have become so 
accustomed to adopting this kind of interpretation when interpreting a photograph that the 
process has become transparent to them. As such, they have come to believe that they can 
directly “see things” in photographs. It is only when we are less familiar with the standard 
interpretation of a certain form of epistemic representation (as when we are looking at an 
infrared photograph or an ultrasound scan), that our need for and our use of an interpretation 
becomes apparent to us. 
One of the reasons why interpretations so often become transparent to us is that, in many 
cases, the same general interpretation (or family of closely related interpretations) can be used to 
interpret different vehicles as epistemic representations of different targets when these epistemic 
representations are representations of the same kind. So, we do not need to come up with or 
learn a new interpretation every time we come across a new epistemic representation, so long as 
we are already familiar with the general interpretation associated with that form of epistemic 
representation. For example, after learning how to interpret a geographic map, we are usually 
able to use the same (or a very closely related) interpretation for other geographic maps as well. I 
call such interpretations that are used as the standard interpretation of many representations of 
the same form ‘general interpretations’. 
This feature of interpretation puts the interpretational account in a position to give some 
substance to the answer to the question raised in Chapter 4 concerning our preferences with 
respect to the map, the hand, and the saltshaker as candidate vehicles of an epistemic 
representation of the geography of Michigan. In the case of the map, we do not need to come up 
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with an ad hoc interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target because we are already familiar 
with a number of ready-made general interpretations that allow us to interpret geographical maps 
in terms of their targets, and these are likely to include one that will allow us to interpret the map 
of Michigan in terms of the geography of the state of Michigan. In the case of the upturned right 
hand, it is quite intuitive for those who are familiar with the geography of Michigan and with the 
standard interpretation of maps to come up with an interpretation of the upturned right hand in 
terms of the geography of Michigan (one according to which a point on the palm of the hand 
denotes a certain location in Michigan, the contour of the hand denotes the contour of the state, 
etc.). However, there seem to be no immediately intuitive interpretations of the saltshaker in 
terms of the geography of Michigan (let alone general ready-made interpretations) that would 
allow us to perform all the sound surrogative inferences about the geography of Michigan that 
can be performed from the map or the hand. According to the interpretational account of 
epistemic representation, our preferences can thus be explained in terms of how easily we can 
interpret the different vehicles in terms of the targets in such a way as to license as many sound 
surrogative inferences as possible. 
5.6 HOW DOES INTERPRETATION RELATE TO SURROGATIVE REASONING? 
One of my chief complaints against the denotational account and the inferential account (in 
Chapter 4) was that they do not seem to be capable of explaining (i) how epistemic 
representation is linked to surrogative reasoning and (ii) what determines which surrogative 
inferences are valid and which ones are not. The interpretational account, on the other hand, 
seems to provide excellent answers to both questions. According to the interpretational account, 
the fact that a user is able to perform surrogative inferences from a vehicle to a target and the 
fact that not all surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are valid stem from the fact 
that the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. 
Let me explain. According to the interpretational account, when adopting an interpretation of 
a vehicle, a user thereby also implicitly adopts a set of rules that determine which surrogative 
inferences from the vehicle to the target are valid and which ones are not. The rules for an 
analytic interpretation are as follows: 
 
(Rule 1) If, according to the analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), adopted by u, oiV 
denotes oiT, then it is valid for u to infer that oiT is in t if and only if oiV is in v, 
(Rule 2) If, according to the analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), adopted by u, o1V 
denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, and 
nRkV denotes 
nRkT, then it is valid for u to infer 
that the relation nRkT holds among o1T, …, onT if and only if 
nRkV holds among o1V, …, 
onV, 
(Rule 3) If, according to the analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), adopted by u, oiV 
denotes oiT, o1V denotes oT1,  …, onV denotes oTn, and 
nFkV denotes 
nFkT, then it is valid 
for the user to infer that the value of the function nFkT for the arguments o1T, …, onT 
is oiT if and only if the value of the function 
nFkV for the arguments o1V, …, onV is oiV. 
 
To illustrate how the first two rules apply to a concrete example, suppose that a user adopts 
the standard interpretation of the London Underground map in terms of the network and that 
she furthermore takes the map to stand for the network. According to (Rule 1), from the fact that 
there is a circle labelled ‘Holborn’ on the map, it is valid for her to infer that there is a station 
called Holborn on the London Underground network and, from the fact that there is no circle or 
tab labelled ‘Bathurst’ on the map, it is valid for her infer that there is no station called Bathurst 
on the London Underground network. According to (Rule 2), from the fact that a coloured line 
connects a circle labelled ‘Holborn’ to a tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’, one can infer that a direct 
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train service operates between Holborn and Bethnal Green stations. Conversely, from the fact 
that no coloured line connects the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ to the tab labelled ‘Highbury & 
Islington’, one can infer that no direct train service operates between Holborn and Highbury & 
Islington stations. 
We are now finally in a position to give a definition of validity for epistemic representation 
whose interpretations are analytic.  
(17) If u adopts an analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), then a 
surrogative inference from v to t is valid (according to i°(v→t)) if and only if it is in 
accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3). 
So, if a user is able to perform inferences from a vehicle to a target when the former is an 
analytically interpreted epistemic representation of the latter, it is because (a) an analytic 
interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target subtends a set of rules to draw valid surrogative 
inferences from the vehicle to the target; and (b) a vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target only when a user adopts an analytic interpretation of it in terms of 
the target. 
Before concluding this section, let me note that an analytic interpretation subtends a set of 
rules in the sense that the adoption of a certain set of rules is part and parcel of the adoption of 
the underlying analytic interpretation—one cannot adopt an interpretation without, thereby, 
adopting the rules that determine what surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are 
valid given that interpretation. So, for example, it is part and parcel of what it means to take the 
circle labelled ‘Holborn’ on the London Underground map to denote Holborn station that, in 
doing so, one takes the map to be representing the London Underground network as containing 
a station named ‘Holborn.’ 
5.7 DENOTATION AND EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION 
The notion of denotation plays a crucial role in all of the accounts of epistemic representation 
we have examined. All of them agree that in order for a vehicle to be an epistemic representation 
of a target for a certain user, the user has to take the vehicle to denote (stand for) the target. On 
the interpretational account, however, denotation plays a second crucial role. According to the 
interpretational account, it is not sufficient for a user to take the vehicle as a whole to stand for 
the target; the user must also take some of the objects, properties, and relations that are part of 
the vehicle to denote some objects, properties, and relations that are part of the target. Only then 
does the user adopt an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. 
What is crucial to note, however, is that this claim is a very far cry from claiming that 
epistemic representation amounts to denotation, as the advocate of the denotational account 
would maintain. Consider for example the sentence token. 
 
The Tube is the oldest subway system in the world 
 
While we take the first two sets of ink marks (i.e. those that look like ‘The Tube’) to denote the 
London Underground network, that is not enough to make them an epistemic representation of 
the network. According to the denotational account, this is because, even if we take those ink 
marks to denote the London Underground network, we have not adopted any interpretation of 
those marks in terms of the London Underground network. If, in addition to taking those marks 
to stand for the London Underground network, we also took some of those marks, or some of 
their properties or relations, to stand for some of the objects, properties, or relations that are 
part of the network (if, for example, we took each letter to stand for a station in the network and 
the order of the letters to denote certain relations among the corresponding stations), however, 
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then those marks would in fact constitute an epistemic representation of the network. So, in 
order to have an epistemic representation, it is not sufficient that we take the vehicle to stand for 
the target; we also need to take some of the components of the vehicle to stand for some of the 
components of the target. 
Before concluding this section, let me note that, in order for a user to take an object in the 
vehicle to denote a (putative) object in the target, a user does not need to believe that the 
(supposedly) denoted object exists. For example, on old 1930s London Underground maps, one 
can find a tab labelled ‘Dover Street’. According to the standard interpretation of the map in 
terms of the network, that tab denotes a station whose name is ‘Dover Street’. However, since 
there is no longer a Dover Street station on today’s London Underground network, that tab on 
the old map fails to denote any station today. Even if I know this to be the case, however, I can 
still take the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ to denote the Dover Street station according to the standard 
interpretation of the network that I am using. In other words, if I adopt the standard interpretation of 
the map in terms of the network, I can take every circle and every tab on the map to denote a 
(putative) station even if I know that some circles and tabs fail to denote a station. (This is 
somewhat analogous to the case in which I take the name ‘Santa Claus’ to denote Santa Claus 
according to a child who believes in the existence of Santa Claus even if, personally, I do not take that 
name to denote any real person).  
It is therefore important to distinguish between what the user believes about the target and 
what the epistemic representation itself “tells” her about the target. The latter is what I have 
previously called the representational content of the map (under its standard interpretation). In 
some cases, the user’s beliefs about the target might conflict with what the epistemic 
representation “tells” her about the target. In such cases, the user has three options: (i) she can 
change her beliefs about the target; (ii) she can take the epistemic representation of the target to 
be only a partially faithful epistemic representation of the network; or (iii) she can adopt a 
different interpretation of the network. Which of these options the user chooses depends on a 
number of factors, including how confident she is in her beliefs about the target, in the reliability 
of the epistemic representation, and in the appropriateness of the interpretation she has adopted. 
5.8 MODELS AND INTERPRETATION 
According to the interpretational account of epistemic representation, a model is an epistemic 
representation of some real-world system for a user in virtue of the fact that (1) the user takes 
the model to denote the system and (2) the user adopts an interpretation of the model in terms 
of the system. We often go through the process of interpreting a model in terms of a certain 
system so effortlessly that we do not even realize that we are at all interpreting the model in 
terms of the system. For example, in the case of the inclined plane model and the tobogganing 
hill system, we take a simple model from classical mechanics and use it as an epistemic 
representation of a certain system by interpreting it in terms of that system. As I believe is 
usually the case with fictional models, our interpretation in this example is analytic—i.e. we take 
the inclined plane model to denote the system formed by my daughters, their toboggan, and the 
tobogganing hill; we take the box in the model to denote my daughters on their toboggan; we 
take the inclined plane to denote the hill; we take some relevant properties of the plane (e.g. its 
being frictionless or its exerting a force on the box) to stand for some properties of the hill; and, 
finally, we take some relevant properties of the box such as its position or its velocity to denote 
the position and velocity of my daughters on their toboggan.29 
                                                
29 Here I talk of the position of the box at a certain time and that of the racer as a property to keep in line with 
the language ordinarily used by philosophers. However, it is more convenient to regard certain properties such as 
the position and the velocity of the box at a certain time as functions rather than properties. So the velocity function 
is a function that associates with a certain object its velocity at a certain time.  
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Now, as we have already seen in the case of the map of the London Underground, an 
interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target subtends a set of rules that license certain (valid) 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target. So, whenever a user adopts an 
interpretation of a model in terms of a real-world system, the user will be able to perform (valid) 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target. In the case of the inclined plane model, for 
example, according to the above interpretation, from the fact that final velocity of the box in the 
model is about 50 km/h, one can validly infer that, according to the model (on its standard 
interpretation), the final velocity of my daughters on their toboggan would be about 50 km/h. 
Of course, I do not need to believe this to be exactly the case in order to draw that (likely 
unsound) surrogative inference from the model to the system. In this case, as in other cases, we 
need to distinguish carefully between what the models “tells” its user (which is what I have called 
the representational content of the model) and what the user herself believes. From a model, I 
can draw all sorts of surrogative inferences that I take to be false or inaccurate, and yet these 
inferences are still valid to draw given how the model is interpreted in terms of the system.  
Consider a more extreme case. According to the Ptolemaic model of the cosmos, the universe 
is a system of concentric crystal spheres. The Earth lies at the centre of the sublunary region, 
which is the innermost sphere. Outside the sublunary region are the heavens: eight tightly fit 
spherical shells, the outermost of which, the sphere of the fixed stars, hosts the stars. Each of the 
other spherical shells hosts one of the seven “planets,” which, in the Ptolemaic model, include 
the Moon and the Sun. Each spherical shell rotates around its centre with uniform velocity. 
According to the standard interpretation of the model, the crystal spheres in the model denote 
the crystal spheres that supposedly host the planet in the system. However, one does not need to 
believe that there actually are crystal spheres that host the planets and stars in order to adopt an 
interpretation of the model according to which crystal spheres host the planets. A user of the 
model may firmly believe that planets are not hosted by crystal spheres and yet believe that what 
the model “tells” her is that the planets are hosted by crystal spheres. So, for example, an early 
16th century user and a contemporary user of the Ptolemaic model do not need to adopt different 
interpretations of it (and consequently do not need to disagree as to which surrogative inferences 
from the model to the solar system are valid); rather, they may only disagree in their epistemic 
attitudes toward the conclusions of some of those inferences. 
Analogous remarks apply also to scientific realists and anti-realists (or at least those scientific 
anti-realist who construe theories literally). Scientific realists and anti-realists do not need to 
adopt different interpretations of the same model, and consequently do not need to disagree as 
to which surrogative inferences from the model to the solar system are valid; rather, they may 
only disagree in their epistemic attitudes toward the conclusions of some of those inferences. 
However, some scientific anti-realists might be inclined to adopt non-standard interpretations of 
scientific models. For example, an instrumentalist might be tempted to adopt an interpretation 
according to which the only aspects of models that stand for something are those that stand for 
observable or measurable features of the target system. 
5.9 REPRESENTATION ON THE CHEAP? 
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to consider a potential worry about the 
interpretational account. The worry is that, on the interpretational account, epistemic 
representation comes too cheaply. After all, nothing seems to prevent me from adopting an 
interpretation of a ripe tomato in terms of the system formed by my daughters tobogganing 
down the hill, one according to which, say, the deeper the red of the tomato, the faster the 
toboggan will go. To some, this may seem to be a troubling conclusion. But what exactly is 
wrong with it?  
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The objection might be that from the tomato I would likely infer only false conclusions about 
the system. This may well be the case, but the interpretational account is meant to be an account 
of what makes a vehicle an epistemic representation of a certain target, not an account of what 
makes it a more or less faithful epistemic representation of the target. Further conditions need to 
be in place for the tomato to be a faithful epistemic representation of the system, conditions 
which the tomato would be unlikely to meet. 
Maybe the objection is that, if denotation and interpretation are all that is needed for epistemic 
representation, then using models for prediction is much like using tarot cards. Of course, there is 
an enormous difference between using a good model and using tarot cards to discover whether 
my daughters will be safe on their toboggan—but the difference is not due to the fact that tarot 
cards are not an epistemic representation of the situation (after all, tarot cards are used to 
perform surrogative inferences about other things). Rather, the difference is likely that the good 
model provides me with what (one would hope) is a much more faithful representation of the 
situation than the tarot cards, and that (again, one would hope) I have good reason to think that 
this is so.  
If epistemic representation seems to come too cheaply on the interpretational account, it may 
be because, after all, epistemic representation is cheap. It doesn’t take much for someone to be 
able to perform surrogative inferences from one thing to another (although, at the same time, it 
does seem to take more than the denotational account and inferential account suggest). What 
does not come cheaply, however, is faithful epistemic representation. It is to accounts of 
faithfulness that I turn my attention in the last part of this book. 
5.10 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have developed and defended an interpretational account of epistemic 
representation. According to it, in order for a vehicle to be an epistemic representation of a 
target (for a user), the user has to take the vehicle to denote the target and adopt an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. That interpretation subtends a set of rules that 
determine which surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are valid and which ones 
are not. However, the fact that a certain inference is valid—i.e. that it is in accordance with the 
set of rules subtended by the interpretation—does not imply or guarantee that the inference is 
sound—i.e. that its conclusion is true (or even just approximately true). If a vehicle is to be a 
somewhat faithful epistemic representation of a certain target some further conditions need to 
hold beside the ones that make the vehicle into an epistemic representation of the target. Part III 
of this book is devoted to developing an account of what makes an epistemic representation of a 
certain target more or less faithful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III: Faithfulness 
 
 
6 The Similarity Account  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the theses underlying this book is that the so-called “problem of scientific 
representation” is neither a single problem nor specifically a problem about scientific 
representation, and that the handful of solutions to the so-called problem that are often 
discussed in the literature are in fact attempts to answer two distinct, general questions, namely: 
  
(a) In virtue of what is a vehicle an epistemic representation of a target (for some user)? 
(b) In virtue of what is a vehicle a faithful epistemic representation of a target (for some 
user)? 
 
In Part II, I have considered three possible answers to question (a) and defended one of them, 
which I called the interpretational account of epistemic representation. Now, in this chapter and 
the next, I consider two possible answers to question (b), which I call ‘the similarity account (of 
faithful epistemic representation)’ and ‘the structural account (of faithful epistemic 
representation)’. Although both of these accounts seem to have many supporters among 
philosophers of science, one is hard pressed to find a clear formulation of either account in the 
literature. This has given rise to many misunderstandings as to what each account exactly claims. 
The thesis underlying this and the following chapter is that, contrary to what is often assumed, 
the similarity account and the structural account are best understood as accounts of faithful 
epistemic representation (as opposed to accounts of epistemic representation simpliciter) and that 
these two accounts do not offer incompatible answers to question (b) above. In fact, in Chapter 
8, I argue that the best account of faithful epistemic representation combines aspects of both the 
similarity account and the structural account. Before doing so, however, in this chapter, I briefly 
discuss the similarity account and some of the standard objections against it. In particular, I 
argue that, although many of the objections that target the similarity account are mistargeted, 
there is some truth to the accusation that similarity might be too vague a notion on which to 
ground the notion of faithfulness. 
6.2 SIMILARITY AND REPRESENTATION 
One of our most deep-seated intuitions about the notion of representation is that representation 
is closely related to similarity. Pre-theoretically, we seem inclined to think that there is a direct 
relation between representation and similarity, and that, for example, a portrait represents its 
subject in virtue of the similarity between the two. As tempting as this view may at first seem, 
however, it does not withstand scrutiny. Since the arguments against this view are well-known, I 
only briefly mention a few here.30 First of all, similarity and representation do not share all of the 
same “logical” properties—similarity is both a reflexive and symmetric relation, but, in most 
ordinary cases, representation is neither reflexive nor symmetric. Although a map may be similar 
to itself, it does not seem to represent itself. Rather, it represents some city. If the map is similar 
to the city, then the city is also similar to the map. However, although the map is a 
                                                
30 (Goodman 1968) is perhaps the best-known source of arguments against the naïve account of representation 
that links it directly with similarity. 
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representation of the city, the city is not usually taken to be a representation of the map.31 
Furthermore, similarity seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. If 
similarity were sufficient for representation, then how could one take a picture of one of a pair of 
identical twins that is not equally a representation of the other twin? If similarity were necessary 
for representation, how would it be possible for an unskilled artist to paint a portrait of a person 
that doesn’t look at all like that person?  
While the above arguments are far from conclusive, taken together they seem to suggest that 
the connection between similarity and representation is not as direct as we might initially assume. 
In particular, once we distinguish between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation, it becomes apparent that what the above arguments show is that similarity is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic representation. However, those arguments do not 
preclude similarity for being necessary for faithful epistemic representation. On this 
interpretation, the supporters of the similarity account maintain that, if a certain vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of a certain target, then the vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation 
of that target only insofar as it is similar to the target. Or, to put it more precisely, the similarity 
account of faithful epistemic representation states that: 
(D) v is a completely faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(D.1) v is an epistemic representations of t (for u), and 
(D.2) v is perfectly similar to t in all relevant respects. 
(E) v is (overall) a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than v* if and only if: 
(E.1) v and v* are epistemic representations of t (for u), 
(E.2) v is more similar to t than v* in some relevant respect(s) and to a relevant 
degree, and 
(E.3) v* is no more similar to t than v in any (relevant) respect to any relevant 
degree. 
Note that in claiming that the similarity account is an account of account of faithfulness (and not 
an account of epistemic representation, as is often assumed (see, e.g., (Suárez 2003)) I am not 
claiming that the supporters of the similarity account intend the similarity account as an account 
of what I call ‘faithfulness’. To my knowledge, the supporters of the similarity account do not 
even distinguish between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation. Rather, 
my claim is that, once we draw the distinction between epistemic representation and faithful 
epistemic representation, it is natural to interpret the similarity account as an account of faithful 
epistemic representation and not as an account of epistemic representation simpliciter. 
One of the consequences of interpreting the similarity account in this way is that the account 
does not constitute an alternative to the accounts of epistemic representation that I discussed in 
Part II. To the contrary, the similarity account is complementary to those accounts. This is because, 
according to the similarity account of faithful epistemic representation, the fact that a vehicle is 
an epistemic representation of a certain target is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to 
be a faithful epistemic representation of that target and, therefore, the supporters of the similarity 
account need to supplement their account of faithful epistemic representation with an account of 
epistemic representation simpliciter.  
As I interpret it, the similarity account attempts to identify which further condition(s) (i.e. 
which condition(s) beside the ones that make the vehicle an epistemic representation of the 
target) need to obtain in order for the vehicle to be a (more or less) faithful epistemic 
                                                
31 This of course does not mean that a city could not represent a map, but only that similarity does not seem to 
be sufficient for representation. 
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representation of the target. The similarity account of faithful epistemic representation, 
therefore, does not claim that, say, the inclined plane model is an epistemic representation of my 
daughters going downhill on their toboggan in virtue of the fact that the model is similar to the 
system (in certain respects and to a certain degree). What it does claim is that, if the inclined plane 
model is an epistemic representation of that system, then it is a faithful epistemic representation of 
that system to the extent to which it is similar to the system (in the relevant respects and to the 
relevant degree).  
Once we adopt this interpretation of the similarity account, it becomes apparent that many of 
the standard objections that have been directed against it are wide of the mark. Consider, for 
example, the arguments Suárez (2004) adduces against the account of representation he labels 
‘[sim].’ According to [sim], a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a target if and only if it is 
similar to the target. The first argument against [sim], which Suárez dubs ‘the logical argument’, is 
one we are already familiar with: while similarity is reflexive and symmetric, representation is 
usually neither reflexive nor symmetric. Unlike [sim], however the similarity account of faithful 
epistemic representation does not claim that, say, a map is an epistemic representation of a city in 
virtue of the similarity between the two. What it claims is that, if the map is an epistemic 
representation of the city, then the map is a faithful epistemic representation of the city to the 
extent to which the two are similar (in the relevant respects and to the relevant degree). And, 
since epistemic representation is not necessarily reflexive or symmetric, the fact that the further 
condition for faithful epistemic representation is both reflexive and symmetric does not make 
faithful epistemic representation reflexive or symmetric. 
The similarity account of faithful epistemic representation also avoids Suárez’s second 
argument against [sim]—the argument from mistargeting. According to that argument, [sim] cannot 
account for those cases in which a user mistakenly believes one object to be the target of a 
certain representation, when, in fact, the actual target is a different object. I may take a very 
poorly executed portrait of Queen Elizabeth II to portray Elton John, but, no matter how closely 
the portrait resembles Elton John, it is still a portrait of the Queen. According to the similarity 
account of faithful epistemic representation, however, the similarity between Elton John and the 
portrait is neither necessary nor sufficient for the portrait to be an epistemic representation of 
Elton John. Rather, the similarity account of faithful epistemic representation claims that, if the 
portrait were an epistemic representation of Elton John, it would be a faithful epistemic representation of 
him to the extent to which it was similar to him (in certain respects and to a certain degree). 
However, since the portrait is not, in fact, a portrait of Elton John, no amount of similarity 
between it and Elton John can turn it into a representation of Elton John according to the 
similarity account of faithful epistemic representation. 
Suárez’s third and the fourth arguments against [sim], the non-necessity argument and the non-
sufficiency argument, claim that similarity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
representation. As we have already seen, something can be a representation of something else 
without being similar to it and something can be similar to something else without being a 
representation of it. However, the similarity account of faithful epistemic representation does not 
claim that similarity is either necessary or sufficient for epistemic representation. According to 
the similarity account of faithful epistemic representation, similarity is a further condition that 
needs to obtain in addition to the conditions that make a vehicle an epistemic representation of 
the target if the vehicle is to be a faithful epistemic representation of it. 
I think that the above arguments show that, properly interpreted, the similarity account avoids 
many of the standard objections directed against it. In the next two sections, however, I consider 
two further objections to the similarity account, which I take to be more serious. The first is that 
the notion of similarity is too vague; the second is that, in some cases, it is not clear in what 
sense the vehicle and the target are similar. While I do not think that either objection is decisive 
on its own, taken together they suggest that the intuitions that underlie the similarity account 
might need to be formulated more clearly. 
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6.3 SIMILARITY AND VAGUENESS 
Philosophers are often suspicious of the notion of similarity. Their suspicion stems from the 
widespread belief that the notion of similarity is too vague to perform any genuine philosophical 
work. Many of the critics of the similarity account maintain that its appeal to similarity renders 
the account vacuous because anything is similar to anything else (see, e.g., Suárez 2003), or that 
similarity is little more than a blank to be filled in on a case-by-case basis (see, e.g., Frigg 2002). If 
the similarity account is to be taken seriously, its supporters should, therefore, try to dispel the 
impression that its reliance on the notion of similarity renders it vacuous or uninformative.  
I suggest that supporters of the similarity account adopt a two-step strategy. The first step is 
to note that the similarity account does not make use of the notion of overall similarity but only of 
the notion of aspectual similarity. According to the similarity account, the vehicle and the target do 
not need to be similar overall; they only need to be similar in certain respects and to a certain degree. 
The second step is to claim that, in most ordinary contexts, we seem to be fairly good at making 
aspectual similarity judgements (such as ‘the two sweaters are very similar in colour’ or ‘the two 
players are similar in height’) and that, while we often have minor disagreements about aspectual 
similarity judgements in specific contexts, major disagreements seem to be rare.  
If fully developed, this strategy might be able resolve both the vacuity worry and the informativeness 
worry in one fell swoop. Consider the vacuity worry first. Even if it were true that virtually 
everything is similar to anything else in some respect and to some degree (and I doubt that’s the case), 
clearly it is not the case that everything is similar to anything else in a specific respect and to a specific 
degree. Even if there is a sense in which this book is similar to my laptop in some respects and to 
some degree (e.g. they are both mid-sized material objects, they both have a roughly flat 
parallelepipedal shape when closed, and they both sit often on my office desk), they are not 
similar with respect to, say, their colour (one is red and the other one is silver) or the materials 
they are made of (pulp and adhesive versus various metals and plastics, respectively).  
Consider now the informativeness worry. Even if it were true that relevant respects and 
degrees of similarity have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, this does not seem to make 
an appeal to the notion of similarity necessarily uninformative, as, in most ordinary cases, the 
context determines the relevant aspects and degrees of similarity. For example, if I am about to 
buy a sweater and you advise me not to buy it because I already own many similar sweaters, what 
you likely mean is that I own many sweaters that are similar to it in colour, warmth, or cut, not 
that I own many sweaters that are similar to it in being located on planet Earth, being poor 
conductors of electricity, or being self-identical. While context might not fully and unequivocally 
determine what the relevant respects and the degrees of similarity are, it usually narrows the 
range of possibilities down significantly. The supporters of the similarity account can therefore 
concede that the term ‘similar’ is to some extent vague and context-dependent while maintaining 
that its vagueness and context-dependence are no more serious than those that characterize 
many other terms in ordinary language. Given a certain context, there are some clear cases of 
objects that are similar to each other (in certain respects and to a certain degree) and clear cases 
of objects that are dissimilar (in certain respects and to a certain degree) just like, given a certain 
context, there are clear cases of say, people who are tall and clear cases of people who are not 
tall. 
While the above only sketches a response, and more needs to be said in order to adequately 
address worries about similarity, this approach seems promising. In the next section, however, I 
argue that, while these general worries about similarity push us towards an emphasis on aspectual 
similarity, there is a more specific kind of worry that pushes us in a different direction altogether. 
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6.4 ELUSIVE SIMILARITIES 
Even if the strategy sketched in the previous section, once fully implemented, were to lay to rest 
worries about the vagueness of the notion of similarity, one might still harbour another more 
specific worry. In many cases it is not entirely clear in what respects the vehicle of an epistemic 
representation is similar to its target. I call this ‘the elusiveness worry’. In this section, I first consider 
the elusiveness worry as it applies to models and sketch a possible way to deal with this specific 
manifestation of it; I then turn to what I consider a more serious manifestation of the same sort 
of worry. It will turn out that there is some tension between the interpretation of the notion of 
similarity that is needed to placate the elusiveness worry and the one that might put to rest the 
vacuity worry and the informativeness worry.  
Consider first the elusiveness worry as it applies to models. R.I.G. Hughes, for example, 
claims: 
[…] we may model an actual pendulum, a weight hanging by a cord, as an ideal pendulum. We 
may be even tempted to say that in both cases the relation between the pendulum’s length and its 
periodic time is approximately the same, and that they are in that respect similar to each other. 
But the ideal pendulum has no length, and there is no time in which it completes an oscillation (Hughes 1999, 
p.S330; emphasis mine). 
I take it that, according to Hughes, only material objects—i.e. objects that are both actual and 
concrete—can have concrete properties such as having a certain length or completing an 
oscillation in a certain time; and, since, whatever the ideal pendulum is, it is not a material object, 
it cannot have a length and cannot oscillate. Therefore, it is not clear in what sense the ideal 
pendulum could possibly be similar to an actual pendulum, which oscillates and has a certain 
length.32 
The advocates of the similarity account, however, do not need to maintain that the ideal 
pendulum literally has the concrete properties it is ordinarily said to have in order to claim that it 
is similar to some real-world pendulum. Consider the argument that I raised in Chapter 3 from 
the analogy to fictional entities. Whatever fictional entities may be, they are not concrete actual 
objects. Yet they are often said to have properties that only concrete objects have, such as having 
a wart on the nose. Obviously, when people say things like ‘The Gruffalo has a wart on his nose’ 
in a meta-fictional context (i.e. when talking about a work of fiction), they do not mean that the 
Gurffalo literally has a wart on his nose. Rather, they mean that, according to the book The 
Gruffalo, the Gruffalo has a wart on his nose. 
The fact that fictional characters do not literally have the properties that are ordinarily 
ascribed to them does not seem to prevent us from comparing them to concrete actual objects. 
When discussing literary works, for example, people often compare fictional entities to actual 
concrete ones. Readers, for example, may discuss how closely the London of Dickens’ novels 
resembles the actual Victorian London, or whether the historical Richard III was as ruthless as 
the homonymous character in the Shakespearian play. These similarity comparisons seem 
perfectly legitimate and do not seem to presuppose that the fictional entities whose 
characteristics are being compared with those of actual concrete ones are themselves actual 
concrete objects that literally have the concrete properties ascribed to them. It would miss the 
point of the exercise entirely to object that the personalities of the historical Richard III and that 
of its fictional counterpart cannot be compared because the latter is not an actual concrete 
person, and as such does not have a personality. Those who draw the comparison do not seem 
to assume (nor need they assume) that the latter literally has a personality. 
In saying this, I do not mean to play down the difficulty of explaining how it is that an object 
that is neither actual nor concrete can, in some sense, be truly said to have concrete properties; 
                                                
32 Similar objections can also be found in (Suárez 2002) and (Callender and Cohen 2006). 
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as we have seen in Chapter 3, this is no trivial philosophical problem. I only mean to show that 
the problem of explaining how non-concrete models can be similar to concrete systems is not a 
novel philosophical problem and that any adequate account of the nature of fictional entities 
should provide us with a solution to it. If we construe non-concrete models (such as the ideal 
pendulum or the inclined plane) as fictional entities (as I have argued in Chapter 3 that we 
might), then there seems to be a sense in which models can be “truly” said to have the concrete 
properties that we ascribe to them (such as having a certain length or period of oscillation) – 
even if, in fact, they do not literally have any of these properties. As far as I can see, this is all 
that we need to ground our similarity judgements between models and real-world systems.33 
Although this specific manifestation of the elusiveness worry might be resolved in the manner 
I have just suggested, other manifestations of that same worry seem more recalcitrant to 
treatment. Consider, for example, the London Underground map and the London Underground 
network. According to the similarity account, if the map is a (completely) faithful epistemic 
representation of the network, then the map and the network should be perfectly similar in all 
relevant respects. But in what respects are the map and the network similar? The map is a piece 
of glossy paper with coloured lines printed on it, while the network is a complex system of trains, 
tracks, tunnels, platforms, and escalators. On the face of it, the two objects could hardly be more 
dissimilar from one other. So, in what respects can they possibly be perfectly similar, according 
to the similarity account?  
The advocate of the similarity account might be tempted to answer that the map is similar to 
the network in that the circles and tabs on the map are connected by a coloured line and the 
stations denoted by those circles and tabs are connected by a direct train service. However, this 
line of defence trades on the fact that we happen to use the same abstract verb (‘connect’) to 
refer to two relations that do not seem to actually be similar at all. When we say that a train line 
connects two stations, what we mean is, roughly, that certain trains stop at both of those 
stations. But this is clearly not what we mean when we say that a line connects two points. 
As far as I can see, the most (and possibly the only) plausible answer to the above question is 
that, if there is any similarity between the map and the network, it is a very global and abstract 
sort of similarity—it is what in Chapter 8 I call ‘a structural similarity’. The problem with this 
kind of answer, however, is that, unless it is coupled with a clear definition of the notion of 
structural similarity, it seems to revitalise the vacuity worry and informativeness worry. However 
structural similarity might be defined, it does not seem to be the sort of similarity we appeal to in 
ordinary contexts when we appeal to aspectual similarity. In Chapter 8, I provide a clear 
definition of the notion of structural similarity. In order to do so, however, I first need to discuss 
other structural accounts of faithful epistemic representation and explain why they are not 
entirely satisfactory either.  
                                                
33 The critics of the similarity account, however, may think that this is not sufficient to solve the problem. 
Whereas real-world pendula have definite oscillation times and real strings have definite lengths, the ideal pendulum 
has an indefinite oscillation time T, and its string has an indefinite length L. So, how can the length of the string in a 
real-world pendulum be similar to the length of the string of the ideal pendulum, if the string of the ideal pendulum 
has no definite length? To ease this worry, it should be noted that, first of all, even if the ideal pendulum has no 
definite length and no definite oscillation time, it has a length and an oscillation time and the relation between them 
is a definite relation. Secondly, nothing prevents us from setting the values of any of the parameters of the ideal 
pendulum that have an indefinite value to definite ones. This is what someone might do in order to use the ideal 
pendulum model to represent some specific pendulum. She can, for example, set the parameter L so the string in 
the ideal pendulum is exactly 30 centimetres long. In the specified ideal pendulum, the string would thus have a 
definite length, like any real string. It is important to note that, usually, by setting some of the parameters of a model, 
one also thereby fixes other parameters. In the case of the ideal pendulum, for example, by setting the values of the 
length of the string, L, and the gravitational acceleration on the bob, g, one also indirectly fixes the period of the 
pendulum, which is equal to 2π(L/g)1/2. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I sketched what I have called the similarity account of faithful epistemic 
representation and I argued that it avoids many of the objections that are usually levelled at naïve 
similarity accounts of representation. According to the similarity account of faithful epistemic 
representation, the fact that the vehicle and the target are similar (in certain respects and to 
certain degree) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the vehicle to be a faithful 
epistemic representation of the target. So, for example, the similarity account of faithful 
epistemic representation does not maintain that the portrait is an epistemic representation of its 
subject in virtue of their similarity. What it does claim is that, if the portrait is an epistemic 
representation of the subject, then it represents her faithfully to the extent to which the portrait 
and the subject are similar to each other in specified respects and to a specified degree. 
This account of faithful epistemic representation seems plausible when applied to certain 
prototypical cases of epistemic representation, such as the aforementioned case of the portrait. 
First, in that case, our intuitions about the similarity between the portrait and its subject seem 
reasonably clear. If we show someone a well-executed portrait of someone they know, they will 
usually be able to tell us whether or not it “resembles” that person. Second, in those cases, the 
advocate of the similarity account is able to tell a plausible story about why, if the portrait is a 
faithful epistemic representation of its subject, its users are able to perform sound inferences 
from the portrait to its subject. The story will go somewhat as follows. A portrait is a faithful 
epistemic representation of a certain subject only if it is similar to the subject (in certain respects 
and to a certain degree). For example, the portrait represents its target faithfully only if the 
colour of the patches of paint that stand for, say, the irises of the subject is similar to a certain 
degree to the actual colour of the subject’s irises. Then, the user can infer (in accordance with the 
standard interpretation of conventional portraits) that the irises of the subject are of the same 
colour as the patches of paint that denote them. If the colour of the patches of paint is indeed 
similar to the colour of the subject’s eyes, the user’s conclusion will be true (or at least 
approximately true). 
The similarity account, however, does not seem to do equally well in other cases of epistemic 
representation. For example, as I argued in the last section, it is far from obvious in which 
respects and to what degree, if any, the London Underground map is similar to the London 
Underground network. This is not to say that there is no sense in which they are similar. Rather, 
it is to say that the two objects do not seem to be similar in the obvious, ordinary sense of 
‘similar’. This seems to create a dilemma for the supporters of the similarity account. If, as I have 
argued, the best strategy available to placate the vacuity worry and the informativeness worry is 
to appeal to our ordinary intuitions about aspectual similarities between pairs of objects, then it is 
difficult to see how that sort of similarity can subsist between aspects of the London 
Underground map and aspects of the London Underground network. If, on the other hand, 
supporters of the similarity account appeal to the presence of a more global and abstract kind of 
similarity between the map and the network, then our ordinary intuitions about similarity seem 
simply to fail us. This abstract and global sort of similarity is what I call ‘structural similarity’. 
However, as far as I can see, there are no conclusive objections against the similarity account 
of faithful epistemic representation. In fact, I believe that there is more than a grain of truth to it 
and I take it that the structural account, which I consider in Chapter 7, and the structural 
similarity account, which I develop in Chapter 8, are, in a sense, just a subspecies of the similarity 
account of faithful epistemic representation—they are similarity accounts that focus on the 
similarity between “the structures” of the vehicle and the target. Unlike the standard similarity 
account, however, the structural account provides us with a much more solid and well-defined 
general framework for understanding faithful epistemic representation and allows us to articulate 
clearly and precisely the intuition that similarity is related to (faithful) epistemic representation. It 
is to this account that I turn in the next chapter. 
 
 
7 The Structural Account  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine what I call ‘the structural account of faithful epistemic representation’. 
While the structural account seems to have many sympathizers among philosophers of science 
(including Patrick Suppes, Bas van Fraassen, Steven French, and James Ladyman), one is hard 
pressed to find a clear and detailed formulation of what such an account holds. By a clear and 
detailed formulation, I mean the set of conditions under which a vehicle counts as an epistemic 
representation (or a faithful epistemic representation) of a target. One is similarly hard pressed to 
find in the literature any worked out example of how a structural account of representation 
might be applied to concrete cases of epistemic representation. My goal in this chapter is to 
clarify what a structural account of faithful epistemic representation would look like. Rather than 
trying to interpret what the sympathizers of the structural account might mean when talking 
about representation, I try to develop what I take to be the strongest version of the structural 
account of faithful epistemic representation and illustrate how it applies to concrete cases of 
epistemic representation. 
As I understand it, the structural account of faithful epistemic representation aims at 
accounting for the faithfulness of a representation in terms of a formal relation, a morphism, 
between two set-theoretic structures.  
(18) A set-theoretic structure is an triple S = <ΩS, ΡS, ΦS>, where: 
[18.1] ΩS is a non-empty set of objects (also called the universe of S and 
sometimes denoted as |S|), 
[18.2] ΡS={MR1S, …, oRjS}, where MR1S, …, and oRjS are relations on ΩS (where the 
left-hand superscript indicates the number of places of the relation with 
properties are construed as unary relations), and 
[18.3] ΦS={pF1S, …, rFkS}, where pF1S, …, and rFkS are functions from n-tuples of 
members of ΩS to elements of ΩS ((ΩS)n→ΩS) (where the left-hand 
superscript indicates the number of arguments of the function). 
(For the sake of simplicity, I drop all subscripts and superscripts whenever the context allows). 
Two of the best-known morphisms are isomorphism and homomorphism.  
(19) A function, f, from the universe of A to the universe of B (f: ΩA→ΩB) is a 
homomorphism if and only if:  
[19.1] for every oiA∈ΩA, there is an oiB∈ΩB such that f(oiA)=oiB, 
[19.2] for every oiA∈ΩA, if f(oiA)=oiB and f(oiA)=okB, then oiB=okB, 
[19.3] for every RiA∈ΡA, if <o1A, …, okA>∈RiA, then <f(o1A), …, f(okA)>∈RiB,  
[19.4] for every FjA∈ΦA, f(FjA(o1A, …, opA))=FjB(f(o1A), …, f(opA)). 
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(20) A function, f, from the universe of A to the universe of B (f: ΩA→ΩB) is 
an isomorphism if and only if:  
[20.1] for every oiA∈ΩA, there is an oiB∈ΩB such that f(oiA)=oiB, 
[20.2] for every oiB∈ΩB, there is an oiA∈ΩA such that f(oiA)=oiB, 
[20.3] for every oiA∈ΩA, if f(oiA)=oiB and f(oiA)=okB, then oiB=okB 
[20.4] for every oiB∈ΩB, if f(oiA)=oiB and f(okA)=oiB, then oiA=okA, 
[20.5] for every RiA∈ΡA and RiA∈ΡB, <o1A, …, oiA>∈RiA if and only if <f(o1A), …, 
f(okA)>∈RiB, and 
[20.6] For every FiA∈ΦA and FiB∈ΦB, f(FjA(a1A, …, apA))=FjB(f(a1A), …, f(apA)). 
A structure A is homomorphic to a structure B (or there is a homomorphism between A and B) if 
and only if there is a homomorphism from the universe of A to the universe of B; A and B are 
isomorphic (or there is an isomorphism between A and B) if and only if there is an isomorphism 
from the universe of A to the universe of B. Finally, A is x-morphic to B if and only if there is 
some specific but unspecified morphism (e.g. isomorphism or homomorphism) from the 
universe of A to the universe of B. 
As I interpret it, the structural account, like the similarity account, is an account of faithful 
epistemic representation, not an account of epistemic representation—it is an attempt to identify 
which further conditions (besides the vehicle being an epistemic representation of the target) 
must obtain in order for the vehicle to be a (more or less) faithful epistemic representation of the 
target.  
To a first approximation, the general template of the structural account of faithful epistemic 
representation is as follows: 
(F) v is a faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(F.1) v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), and  
(F.2) v is x-morphic to t. 
It is important to note that, as it stands, (F) is not an account of faithful epistemic 
representation but a general template from which specific versions of the structural account of 
faithful epistemic representation can be generated. First of all, (F) does not specify what kind of 
faithful epistemic representation (F.1) and (F.2) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for. Is 
it completely faithful, partially faithful, or specifically faithful epistemic representation? Second, 
according to (F.1), a vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation of a certain target for a user 
only if it is an epistemic representation of that target for that user. Therefore, any version of the 
structural account of faithful epistemic representation needs to rely on some account of 
epistemic representation or other. I believe that the interpretational account of epistemic 
representation that I developed in Chapter 4.3 is the one that best suits a structural account of 
faithful epistemic representation. Third, (F.2) leaves two crucial questions unanswered. The first 
is what morphism needs to hold between the vehicle and the target in order for the vehicle to be 
a faithful epistemic representation of that target. The second is how a morphism, which is a 
relation that holds only between set-theoretic structures, can hold between the majority of 
ordinary vehicles and targets, which do not themselves seem to be set-theoretic structures. 
Interpreted as an account of faithful epistemic representation, the structural account avoids 
many of the objections that are often aimed at the structural account (see, for example, Suárez 
(2003)’s objections against the account that he labels [iso]). Since these objections are very similar 
to the objections to the similarity account that I have discussed in Chapter 6 (§6.2) and my 
replies to those objections are, mutatis mutandis, the same, I only discuss one of them here. The 
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objection assumes that the x-morphism mentioned in (F.2) is isomorphism (which seems to be a 
plausible assumption in the case in which the vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the target) and states that isomorphism is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, 
but representation is non-reflexive (the map represents the city not itself), non-symmetric (the 
map represents the city but the city does not represent the map), and non-transitive (a 
photograph of the map on a website that sells maps represents the map, not the city). However, 
just like the similarity account of faithful epistemic representation, the structural account of 
faithful epistemic representation is immune to this sort of objection. As I interpret it, the 
structural account does not claim that, if some vehicle is x-morphic to something, then it is an 
epistemic representation of that thing; what it does claim is that, if a vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of a target (for some user), then it is a faithful epistemic representation of that target only 
if some specific morphism holds between the vehicle and the target. So, while, for example, the 
map might be isomorphic to itself (more about this below), it does not follow that, on the 
structural account, it is an epistemic representation of itself, for, according to (F), the existence 
of a morphism between a vehicle and a target is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic 
representation. 
In this chapter, I consider a number of versions of the structural account of faithful epistemic 
representation. After addressing a couple of pressing preliminary questions in Sections 7.2 and 
7.3, in Section 7.4 I develop the isomorphism account of completely faithful epistemic representation. This 
account is useful in illustrating how the structural account applies to the simplest cases of faithful 
epistemic representation—those in which the vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the target. Unfortunately, however, most cases of epistemic representation are 
not cases of completely faithful epistemic representation. If the structural account is to be taken 
seriously, it must also account for partially faithful epistemic representation and, in those cases, 
the relevant isomorphism fails to hold between the vehicle and the target. This is a well-known 
problem among the supporters of the structural account. The commonly accepted solution to 
this problem is to opt for a morphism weaker than isomorphism to account for partially faithful 
epistemic representation. The disagreement is mostly about which weaker morphism is the best 
candidate for the job. In Section 7.5, I distinguish three kinds of unfaithfulness—which I call 
‘incorrectness’, ‘incompleteness’, and ‘inexactness’—and I argue that any combination of them 
can characterize a partially faithful epistemic representation. In Sections 7.7 and 7.8, I consider 
some candidate weaker morphisms and argue that they are all inadequate as general accounts of 
partially faithful epistemic representation, for none of them can adequately account for epistemic 
representations that are both incorrect and incomplete.  
In Section 7.9, I then develop what I call ‘the partial isomorphism account of partially faithful 
epistemic representation’. This account is a refinement of the account proposed by Steven 
French and his collaborators. There I show how the account, as developed here, is successful in 
dealing with epistemic representations that are both incorrect and incomplete. In Section 7.10, 
however, I argue that the account is not equally successful in dealing with partially faithful 
epistemic representations that are inexact. I also argue that, more seriously, like all of the other 
structural accounts available, the partial isomorphism account of partially faithful epistemic 
representation fails to accommodate the fact that faithfulness is a gradable notion. 
7.2 STRUCTURE INSTANTIATION 
One of the first problems that confront the structural account of faithful epistemic 
representation is that morphisms are only defined as relations between set-theoretic structures, 
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and most vehicles and targets do not seem to be set-theoretic structures.34 For example, the 
London Underground map and the London Underground network, or the inclined plane model 
and my daughters tobogganing downhill do not seem to be set-theoretic structures. So, how 
would an account of representation that relies on the formal notion of a morphism apply to 
vehicles and targets that are not structures?  
The most promising answer to this question, I believe, is to maintain that, even if those 
vehicles and targets are not set-theoretic structures, they can instantiate set-theoretic structures. 
Two concrete objects or systems, then, could be informally said to be x-morphic if and only if 
they instantiate x-morphic structures. Roman Frigg (2006) has suggested that to say that a 
concrete object (or system of objects) instantiates a certain structure amounts to giving an 
abstract description of it, one that applies if and only if some specific, more concrete description 
of it applies. Following Nancy Cartwright (1999, Ch. 2), Frigg suggests a necessary condition that 
must obtain in order for one description to be more abstract than another. A description such as 
‘Anita is playing a game’ is more abstract than a set of descriptions—such as one that includes 
‘Anita is playing chess’, ‘Anita is playing football’, ‘Anita is playing poker’—only if (a) ‘Anita is 
playing a game’ cannot apply to a certain situation unless one or other of the more concrete 
descriptions in that set applies and (b) the fact that the more concrete description is satisfied is 
what the fact that the more abstract description is satisfied consists in on that instance. Frigg 
then claims: 
[…] for it to be the case that possessing a structure applies to a system, being an individual must apply 
to some of its parts and standing in a relation to some of these. The crucial thing to realise at this 
point is that being an individual and being in a relation are abstract on the model of playing a game. 
(Frigg 2006, p.55)  
So, for example, the London Underground network instantiates a structure N=<{Acton Town, 
Aldgate, …, Woodside Park, Woolwich Arsenal}, …,1RiN {<Blackhorse Road>, <Brixton>, 
<Euston>, <Finsbury Park>, <Green Park>, <Highbury & Islington>, <Oxford Circus>, 
<Pimlico>, <Seven Sisters>, <Stockwell>, <Tottenham Hale>, <Vauxhall>, <Victoria>, 
<Walthamstow Central>, <Warren Street>},…> if and only if an abstract description that 
includes, among other things, ‘there is a property that Blackhorse Road, Brixton, …, 
Walthamstow Central, and Warren Street stations have (and no other station on the network 
has)’ is true of the London Underground network. I call this description ‘a structural description of 
the London Underground network’. This structural description is true only if a suitable, more 
concrete description is true of the network (in this case, the more concrete description would be 
something along the lines of ‘Blackhorse Road, Brixton, …, Walthamstow Central, and Warren 
Street stations are on the Victoria Line and no other station is on the Victoria Line’).  
The structural description is more abstract because it tells us nothing about the nature of the 
objects that make up the vehicle and the target or about the nature of their properties and 
relations. All it tells us is that such-and-such objects are in the universe of the structure (and that 
some of them have some property or other or stand in some relation or other) while others are 
not. In the example above, the property is that of being on the Victoria Line, but any other more 
concrete property (say, having four escalators) will do insofar as it is shared by the 
abovementioned stations and by no other stations on the network. 
On this account, the same object or system can instantiate a number of different structures 
depending on which more concrete description of the system the structural description is based 
on—i.e. depending on which of its parts we take to be the relevant objects and which of their 
concrete properties and relations have their abstract counterparts included in the structure. The 
                                                
34 Some advocates of the semantic account of theories seem to believe that scientific models are set-theoretic 
structures (see e.g. van Fraassen 1997). However, this would solve only half of the problem because the systems that 
models represent are not set-theoretic structures but concrete systems. 
Models and Maps 
 
64 
same vehicle and the same target thus are likely to instantiate not one but many structures under 
different (true) descriptions.  
The fact that a concrete vehicle or target potentially instantiates a variety of structures under 
different descriptions, however, is not a problem for the structural account insofar as we have a 
principled way to single out one structure for the vehicle and one structure for the target as the 
relevant ones. The interpretational account of epistemic representation that I defend in Chapter 
4 allows us to do just that. According to the interpretational account, a vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of a certain target if and only if a user adopts an interpretation of that vehicle in 
terms of the target. According to that account, one way for a user to interpret a vehicle in terms 
of a target is to take some objects, properties, and relations in the vehicle to denote (putative) 
objects, properties, and relations in the target. I called these objects, properties, and relations in 
the vehicle and the target, respectively, the v-relevant objects, properties, and relations and the t-
relevant ones (according to that interpretation). 
On the standard interpretation of the London Underground map in terms of the London 
Underground network, for example, the circles and tabs on the map are v-relevant objects 
(according to the standard interpretation of the map) because they stand for stations on the 
network and the relation being connected by a light blue line in the map is a v-relevant relation 
(according to the standard interpretation of the map) because it stands for a relation between 
stations on the network. The relation being two inches left of, on the other hand, is not v-relevant 
(according to the standard interpretation of the map) because, according to that interpretation, it 
does not stand for any relation among stations on the network. Analogously, the relation being 
connected by Victoria Line trains in the network is t-relevant (according to the standard interpretation 
of the map) because there is a relation in the map that stands for that relation, while the relation 
being three miles away from is not t-relevant (on the standard interpretation of the map) because, 
according to that interpretation, no relation among objects on the map stands for that relation.  
Now suppose that there is a true description of the vehicle in terms of all and only the v- 
relevant objects and their v-relevant properties and relations (according to the user’s 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target). Suppose further that there is a true 
description of the target in terms of all and only the t-relevant objects and their t-relevant 
properties and relations (according to the user’s interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the 
target). Under those ideal descriptions, both the vehicle and the target instantiate structures, 
which I call, respectively, ‘the relevant structure of the vehicle, V, (relative to u’s interpretation of v in terms 
of t, i°(v→t))’ and ‘the relevant structure of the target, T, (relative to u’s interpretation of v in terms of t, 
i°(v→t))’.  
In general, ‘relevant structure’ can be defined as follows: 
(21) If v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), then V is the relevant 
structure of v (relative to u’s interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t)) if and only if: 
[21.1] AV={o1V, …, onV} is the universe of the structure V if and only if AV is the 
set of v-relevant objects according to i°(v→t). 
[21.2] nRkV={<o1V, …, onV>, …, <oiV, …, ojV>} if and only if , according to 
i°(v→t), some n-ary v-relevant relation holds among o1V, …, onV, …, and 
among oiV, …, ojV, but does not hold among any other n-tuple of objects in 
AV. 
[21.3] nFkV{f(o1V, …, onV)=okV, …, f(oiV, …, ojV)=ozV} if and only if, according to 
i°(v→t), some n-ary v-relevant function takes okV as its value if its arguments 
are o1V, …, onV, …., and takes ozV as its value if its arguments are oiV, …, ojV. 
(22) If v is an epistemic representation of t (for u), then T is the relevant 
structure of t (relative to u’s interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t)) if and only if: 
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[22.1] AT={o1T, …, onT} is the universe of the structure T if and only if, according 
to i°(v→t), AT is the set of t-relevant objects. 
[22.2] nRkT={<o1T, …, onT>, …, <oiT, …, ojT>} if and only if, according to 
i°(v→t), some n-ary t-relevant relation holds among o1T, …, onT, …, among oiT, 
…, ojT, but does not hold among any other n-tuple of objects in AT. 
[22.3] nFkT{f(o1T, …, onT)=okT, …, f(oiT, …, ojT)=ozT} if and only if, according to 
i°(v→t), some n-ary t-relevant function takes okT as its value for the arguments 
o1T, …, onT, …., takes ozT as a value for the arguments oiT, …, ojT. 
By singling out some objects, properties, and relations in the vehicle and in the target as 
relevant to the epistemic representation, an analytic interpretation thus allows us to specify, in a 
principled and natural way, two structures among the many that the vehicle and the target can 
plausibly be taken to instantiate. As far as I can see, given the independent plausibility of the 
interpretational account of epistemic representation and the structural account of completely 
faithful epistemic representation, the fact that they cohere with and support each other so well is 
a further reason to accept them both. 
Even if, strictly speaking, a morphism can only hold between the relevant structure of a 
vehicle and that of a target, for the sake of simplicity, in what follows, I often talk informally of 
morphisms holding between a vehicle and a target or of a vehicle and a target being x-morphic. 
This, however, should always be interpreted as a loose way of saying that a morphism holds 
between the vehicle and the target relative to the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the 
target adopted by the user. 
Before concluding this section, I should note that, while set-theoretic structures are usually 
construed extensionally, for our purposes the relevant structures of a vehicle and a target (relative 
to a certain interpretation) are better construed intensionally. This is to avoid the possibility of 
conflating distinct but coextensive relevant properties and relations. Suppose, for example, that 
being an interchange station and having elevators are both t-relevant properties of the London 
Underground network (according to an interpretation of a map in terms of the network) and that 
all and only interchange stations have elevators. In this case, the two properties are co-
extensional. However, since the two properties are distinct properties of the stations that have 
them, they should be kept distinct (because, for example, the map might be right about which 
stations are interchange stations but wrong about which stations have elevators).  
Since construing properties and relations as sets of n-tuples of objects is very convenient in 
this context, I shall continue to take properties and relations to be n-tuples of elements of the 
domain, and introduce an n-tuple of positive integers to distinguish distinct co-extensional 
properties and relations. So, for example, the fact that, say, 2R78A and 
2R143A
 stand for two distinct 
co-extensional binary relations can be reflected by adding the tuple <78, 78> to the elements of 
2R78A and the tuple <143, 143> to the elements of 
2R143A, so that 
2R78A≠
2R143A. In what follows, 
by ‘the relevant structure’ I usually mean ‘the relevant intensional structure’. 
7.3 INTENDED MORPHISMS 
In the previous section, I introduced the notions of the relevant structure of the vehicle, V, and 
the relevant structure of the target, T. It might be tempting to think that we now have all we 
need to formulate a structural account of completely faithful epistemic representation. The 
account would state that 
(G) v is a completely faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(G.1) : 
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(G.1.1) u takes v to denote t, 
(G.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
(G.2) an isomorphism holds between V (i.e. the relevant structure of v relative to 
i°(v→t)) and T (i.e. the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v→t)). 
 
As it turns out, however, (G) is not yet an adequate account of completely faithful epistemic 
representation. To see why, suppose, for example, that the printers have mistakenly inverted the 
colours of the light blue line and the red lines on the London Underground map (but not its 
legend), so that the line that is red on the regular map is light blue on the defective map and vice 
versa. If the relevant structures of the ordinary map and the network are isomorphic, so are the 
ones of the defective map and the network, for the relevant structures of the ordinary map and 
the defective map are themselves isomorphic. The defective map, however, is not a completely 
faithful epistemic representation of the network, for, from it, one could falsely infer, for example, 
that Central Line trains stop at Highbury & Islington. However, if (G) were an adequate account 
of completely faithful epistemic representation, then if the ordinary map were a completely 
faithful epistemic representation of the network, the defective map would be as well, for the 
relevant structures of the two maps are isomorphic to each other. 
 This consequence, I think, can be avoided by introducing the notion of an intended morphism. 
An intended morphism is one that associates an object, a property, or a relation in the vehicle 
with an object, a property, or a relation in the target only if the user’s interpretation of the 
vehicle in terms of the target takes the first to denote the second. Unlike the isomorphism 
between the regular map and the network, the isomorphism between the defective map and the 
network is not an intended isomorphism, for, among other things, it incorrectly associates circles 
connected by a red line with stations connected by Victoria Line trains even if, on the standard 
interpretation of the map, a red line connecting two stations is supposed to represent the fact 
that Central Line trains operate between those two stations. 
 The notion of an intended morphism is more precisely defined as follows.  
(23) A morphism, f, between the relevant structure of v and that of t is intended 
(relative to a analytic interpretation i°(v→t)) if and only if:  
[23.1] for all oiV∈ΩV and all oiT∈ΩT, if f(oiV)=oiT, then, according to i°(v→t), oiV 
denotes oiT, 
[23.2] for all nRkV∈ΡV and nRkT∈ΡT and for all <o1V, …, onV>∈(ΩV)n, if <o1V, …, 
onV>∈
nRkV and <f(o1V), …, f(onV)>∈
nRkT, then, according to i°(v→t), nRkV 
denotes nRkT, and 
[23.3] for all nFkV∈(ΦV) and nFkT∈(ΦT) and all <o1V, …, onV>∈(ΩV)n and all 
oiV∈(ΩV)
n, if nFkV(o1V, …, onV)=oiV and 
nFkT(f(o1V), …, f(onV))=f(oiV), then 
according to i°(v→t), nFkV denotes nFkT. 
I think that no version of the structural account of faithful epistemic representation can be 
successful unless it employs the notion of an intended morphism (or some similar notion). If the 
isomorphism between the vehicle and the target is not an intended one, then not only will the 
vehicle not be a completely faithful epistemic representation of the target, it might be an 
extremely unfaithful epistemic representation of it. To see why this is the case, we can imagine a 
defective map of the London Underground that is exactly like a regular map except for the fact 
that each line is randomly assigned a different colour from the one it has on the regular map and 
each tab or circle is randomly assigned the name of a different station from the one it has on the 
regular map. Such a map would be as close as possible to being a completely unfaithful epistemic 
representation of the network (if there is any such thing (see below)) and yet, since it is 
isomorphic to the standard map, if the standard map is isomorphic to the network, then so is 
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this defective map. However, whereas (at least) one of the isomorphisms that hold between the 
standard map and the network is an intended isomorphism, none of the isomorphisms that 
holds between the defective map and the network will be an intended isomorphism.  
Although supporters of the structural account have sometimes expressed the need to focus 
only on the intended morphisms between a vehicle and a target (see, for example, van Fraassen 
1997), no account of what conditions a morphism must meet in order to be intended has ever 
been specified. The notion of an interpretation, however, allows us to clearly define what 
conditions a morphism needs to meet in order to be an intended one. I am now in a position to 
formulate what I call ‘the isomorphism account of completely faithful epistemic representation’, 
which, I argue, is successful in all cases in which a vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of its target. 
7.4 ISOMORPHISM 
The isomorphism account of completely faithful epistemic representation claims that: 
(H) v is a completely faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(H.1) : 
(H.1.1) u takes v to denote t, 
(H.1.2) u adopts an (analytic) interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
(H.2) an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of v relative 
to i°(v→t), T, and the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v→t), V. 
 
The isomorphism account of completely faithful epistemic representation is successful in all 
cases in which the vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic representation of a certain target 
(relative to some analytic interpretation adopted by its user). In order to show this, I need to 
show that: 
(a) if the vehicle is an (analytically interpreted) epistemic representation of the target for a 
certain user and an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, then 
all valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound and 
(b) if the vehicle is an (analytically interpreted) epistemic representation of the vehicle in 
terms of the target and all valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are 
sound, then an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target. 
Consider (a) first. If a user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the 
target, an inference from the vehicle to the target will be valid if and only if it is in accordance 
with the rules outlined in Section 5.6. I now show that, if an intended isomorphism holds 
between the vehicle and the target, then all valid inferences—i.e. all inferences that are in 
accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3)—are sound.  
(Rule 1). Assume that there is an object oiV in the vehicle that denotes a (putative) object oiT in 
the target (according to the interpretation adopted by the user). According to (Rule 1), it is then 
valid to infer that there is an object oiT in the target. Now, if an isomorphism, f, holds between 
the vehicle and the target, then there must be an object, oxT, in the universe of the relevant 
structure of the target, AT, such that f(oiV)=oxT. If f is an intended isomorphism, it must be the 
case that oxT=oiT, because oiT is the object that is denoted by oiV according to the interpretation 
adopted by the user.  
Now, assume that there is no object oiV in the vehicle that denotes a (putative) object oiT in the 
target (according to the interpretation adopted by the user). According to (Rule 1), it is then valid 
to infer that there is no object oiT in the target. If an isomorphism f holds between the vehicle 
Models and Maps 
 
68 
and the target then every object in the universe of the relevant structure of the target must be in 
one-to-one correspondence with some object different from oiV and, if this isomorphism is 
intended, then oiT cannot be among the objects in the universe of the structure of the target 
because an intended isomorphism would associate oiT only with oiV, which is the object that 
denotes it according to the interpretation adopted by the user. Therefore, it is sound to infer that 
the object oiT is not in the target. So, if an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and 
the target, any inference that is in accordance with (Rule 1) will be a sound inference.  
(Rule 2). Assume that certain v-relevant objects in the vehicle, o1V, …, onV, are in a certain v-
relevant n-ary relation, nRkV and that, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, o1V 
denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, and 
nRkV denotes 
nRkT. According to (Rule 2), it is therefore valid 
to infer that a relation nRkT holds among o1T, …, onT. If an isomorphism f holds between the 
vehicle and the target, then a relation nRxT
 will hold among the objects f(o1V), …, f(onV). If the 
isomorphism is intended, then, since o1V denotes o1T, …, and onV denotes onV, it must be the case 
that f(o1V)= o1T, …, f(onV)= onT and, since 
nRkV denotes 
nRkT, the relation 
nRkT must be the relation 
nRkV.  
Assume now that certain relevant objects in the vehicle, o1V, …, onV, are not in a certain 
relevant n-ary relation, nRkV and that, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, o1V 
denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, and 
nRkV denotes 
nRkT. According to (Rule 2), it is therefore 
sound to infer that the relation nRkT does not hold among o1T, …, onT. Here there are two cases to 
consider. Either a different relevant n-ary relation holds among o1V, …, onV or no n-ary relation 
holds among them. If a different n-ary relation holds among o1V, …, onV and an isomorphism 
holds between the vehicle and the target, then there will be a relation nRxT
 that holds among the 
objects f(o1V), …, f(onV). If the isomorphism is intended, then, since o1V denotes o1T, …, and onV 
denotes onT, it must be the case that f(o1V)= o1T, …, f(onV)= onV but 
nRxT cannot be 
nRkV because, if 
the isomorphism is intended, <o1V, …, onV >∈RkV, and <f(o1V), …, f(onV)>∈RkT only if, according 
to the interpretation adopted by the user, RkV denotes RkT. If no n-ary relation holds among o1V, 
…, onV and an isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, then no relation holds 
among f(o1V), …, f(onV). If the isomorphism is intended, then, since o1V denotes o1T, …, and onV 
denotes onT, it must be the case that f(o1V)= o1T, …, f(onV)=o1T and therefore no relation holds 
among those objects. So, if an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, 
any inference that is in accordance with (Rule 2) is sound. 
(Rule 3). Assume that the function nFkV has oiV as its value when its arguments are o1V, …, onV, 
and, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, oiV denotes oiT, o1V denotes o1T, …, onV 
denotes onT, and 
nFkV denotes 
nFkT. According to (Rule 3), it is therefore valid to infer that the 
value of the function nFkT for the arguments o1T, …, onT is oiT. If an isomorphism f holds between 
V and T, then f(nFkV (o1V, …, onV))=f(oiV)=nFkT (f(o1V), …, f(onV)). However, since, if the 
isomorphism is intended, then f(oiV)=oiT and 
nFkT (f(o1V), …, f(onV))=
nFkT (o1T, …, onT), it must be 
the case that nFkT (o1T, …, onT)= oiT. So, if an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle 
and the target, any inference that is in accordance with (Rule 3) is sound. 
The above argument shows that, if an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and 
the target, all valid inferences from the vehicle to the target will be sound. I now turn to the 
converse claim, (b)—i.e. the claim that, if all valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the 
target are sound, then an intended isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target. The 
argument for that claim goes as follows. 
If all inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 1) are sound, then, it must be the case that, 
for every object oiV that is in the vehicle, the object denoted by oiV, oiT, is in the target and that, 
for every object oiV that is not in the vehicle, the object denoted by oiV, oiT, is not in the target.  
If all inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 2) are sound, then it must be the case that, 
for every n-tuple of objects, o1V, …, onV, that are in a n-ary relation 
nRkV, the objects denoted by 
o1V, …, onV, o1T, …, onT, are in the relation denoted by 
nRkT and that, for every n-tuple of objects, 
Models and Maps 
 
69 
o1V, …, onV, that are not in a n-ary relation 
nRkV, the objects denoted by o1V, …, onV, o1T, …, onT, 
are not in the relation denoted by nRkT. So, an n-tuple of objects o1V, …, onV is in a certain relation 
nRkV if and only if the objects denoted by o1V, …, onV are in the relation 
nRkT denoted by 
nRkV.  
Finally, if all inferences in accordance with (Rule 3) are sound, then it must be the case that for 
every n-ary function nFkV whose value for the arguments o1V, …, onV is oiV, the value of function 
denoted by nFkV, 
nFkT, is the object denoted by oiV when the arguments are the objects denoted 
by o1V, …, onV. 
From this, it follows that, if all inferences in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3) are 
sound, then it is possible to construct a function, f, from the relevant structure of the vehicle AV 
to the relevant structure of the target AT such that: 
a) for every oiV and oiT, f(oiV)=oiT if and only if oiV denotes oiT according to the 
interpretation adopted by the user. 
b) for all nRkV and nRkT, <o1V, …, onV>∈ nRkV if and only if <f(o1V), …, f(onV)>∈ nRkT 
and nRkV denotes 
nRkT according to the interpretation adopted by the user. 
c) for all nFkV and nFkT, f(nFkV (o1V, …, onV))=nFkT (f(o1V), …, f(onV)) and nFkV denotes 
nFkT according to the interpretation adopted by the user. 
Since any function that meets these conditions is an intended isomorphism, it follows that, if 
all inferences in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2) and (Rule 3) are sound, then an intended 
isomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target. 
Let me briefly illustrate how the isomorphism account applies to the case of the London 
Underground map and the London Underground network. Suppose that an intended 
isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the London Underground map and that of 
the London Underground network (relative to the standard interpretation of the map in terms of 
the network). This means that there is a bijective function that associates the circles and tabs on 
the map with the stations on the network in such a way that each circle and tab is associated with 
the corresponding station, and that each circle or tab has a certain (relevant) property (or is in a 
certain relation) if and only if the station it denotes has the corresponding (relevant) property (or 
is in the corresponding relation). For example, if an intended isomorphism holds between the 
relevant structure of the London Underground map and that of the London Underground 
network, then the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ and the tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ are connected by 
a red line if and only if Holborn and Bethnal Green stations are connected by Central Line trains 
because, according to the standard interpretation of the map, the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ and 
the tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ denote, respectively, Holborn and Bethnal Green stations and 
the relation being connected by a red line denotes the relation being connected by Central Line trains. 
Therefore, it follows that, if the user were to infer from the map that Holborn and Bethnal 
Green stations are connected by Central Line trains in accordance with (Rule 2), her inference 
would be sound. 
It is important to emphasize that the above holds only in the case that the isomorphism 
between the relevant structure of the map and that of the network is an intended isomorphism. If 
no intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the map and that of the 
network, then some valid inferences will not be sound. Consider the examples discussed in 
Section 7.3. If the standard map is isomorphic to the network, then so is the defective map, for 
the standard map and the defective one are isomorphic to each other. The defective map, 
however, is not a completely faithful epistemic representation of the network, as some of the 
inferences that one can validly perform from the map to the network are unsound. For example, 
from the defective map, it is valid to infer that Highbury and Islington station is on the Circle 
Line, when in fact Holborn is on that line but Highbury and Islington station is not. So, even if 
the defective map and the network are isomorphic, the defective map is not a completely faithful 
epistemic representation of the network because none of the isomorphisms between the relevant 
structure of the map and that of the network is an intended one. 
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7.5 INCOMPLETENESS, INCORRECTNESS, AND INEXACTNESS 
So far, I have argued that the isomorphism account of completely faithful epistemic 
representation is successful in all those cases of completely successful representation in which 
the user adopts an analytic interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target, as in the case of the 
London Underground map. However, not all epistemic representations are completely faithful. 
This is particularly true of scientific models, which are our main focus here. Scientific models are 
usually idealized and approximate representations of their targets and, as such, they are usually 
far from being completely faithful epistemic representations of the systems they are used to 
represent. In this section, I distinguish three kinds of unfaithfulness that characterise partially 
faithful epistemic representations—incompleteness, incorrectness, and inexactness—and show that the 
isomorphism account cannot account for partially faithful epistemic representation. 
(24) v is an incorrect epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
[24.1] : 
[24.1.1] u takes v to denote t, 
[24.1.2] u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
[24.2] : 
[24.2.1] for some oiV∈AV, there is no oiT∈AT such that oiV denotes oiT 
(according to i°(v→t)), or 
[24.2.2] for some nRkV, o1V, …, and okV, (according to i°(v→t)) o1V denotes o1T, 
…, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT and <o1V, …, okV>∈
nRkV but <o1T, 
…, onT>∉
nRkT.  
(25) v is an incomplete epistemic representation of t for u if and only if: 
[25.1] : 
[25.1.1] u takes v to denote t, 
[25.1.2] u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and 
[25.2] : 
[25.2.1] for some oTi∈AT, there is no oiV∈AV that denotes oiT (according to 
i°(v→t)), or  
[25.2.2] for some nRkV, o1V, …, and okV, (according to i°(v→t)) o1V denotes o1T, 
…, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT, and <o1T, …, okT>∈
nRkT but <o1V, 
…, onV>∉
nRkV. 
(26) v is an inexact epistemic representation of t for u if and only if: 
[26.1] : 
[26.1.1] u takes v to denote t, 
[26.1.2] u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and 
[26.2] for some nFVk, o1V, …, and okV, (according to i°(v→t)) o1V denotes o1T, …, 
onV denotes onT,
 nFkV denotes 
nFkT but 
nFkV (o1V, …, okV)≠
nFkT(o1T, …, onT). 
As we have seen in the previous section, if an intended isomorphism holds between a vehicle 
and a target, then the vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic representation of that target. 
Whenever at least one of the conditions for an intended isomorphism between the vehicle and 
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the target fails to obtain, the target is a less-than-completely faithful epistemic representation of 
the target. In those cases, the vehicle is what I called a partially faithful epistemic representation 
of the target. The above definitions distinguish between three kinds of unfaithfulness depending 
on which condition(s) for intended isomorphism fail(s) to obtain. In this section, I focus on 
incorrectness and incompleteness and leave inexactness aside until the next section. Informally, 
incorrectness obtains whenever a relevant object in the vehicle has no counterpart in the target 
or whenever some relevant object in the vehicle have a relevant property or is in a relevant 
relation but the corresponding object in the target does not have the corresponding property or 
is not in the corresponding relation; incompleteness obtains whenever a relevant object in the 
target has no counterpart in the vehicle or whenever some relevant object in the target has a 
relevant property or is in a relevant relation but the corresponding object in the vehicle does not 
have the corresponding property or is not in the corresponding relation. 
To illustrate the difference between incorrectness and incompleteness, consider again the 
example of the new and the old maps of the London Underground. According to the 
isomorphism account of completely successful representation, the old London Underground 
map is no longer a completely faithful epistemic representation of the London Underground 
network, for no intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the map and that 
of today’s network. There are at least two ways in which the intended isomorphism between the 
relevant structure of the old map and that of the network fails to hold and, as a consequence, the 
old map is both an incorrect and an incomplete epistemic representation of today’s network.  
The old map is an incomplete epistemic representation of today’s network because, among 
other things, some of the stations and train lines on today’s network have no counterpart on the 
map. For example, on today’s network, Victoria Line trains operate between Highbury & 
Islington station and Victoria station. In the structure instantiated by today’s network (relative to 
the standard interpretation of the old map), the ordered pair <Highbury & Islington, Victoria> 
is an element of the set of all pairs of stations connected by Victoria Line trains. However, since 
the circles that denote those stations are not connected by any coloured line on the old map, the 
ordered pair <tab labelled ‘Highbury & Islington’, circle labelled ‘Victoria’> is not an element of 
any set of pairs of circles or tabs connected by a coloured line in the structure of the map 
(relative to its standard interpretation). As a consequence, an intended isomorphism fails to hold 
between the structure of the old map and the structure of the network. 
The old map is also an incorrect epistemic representation of today’s network because (among 
other things) some of the circles, tabs, and coloured lines on the map have no counterpart in 
today’s network. For example, on the old map there is a tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ connected by 
a dark blue line to the circles labelled ‘Piccadilly Circus’ and ‘Green Park’. In the structure 
instantiated by the old map, the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ is an element of the set of circles 
connected by a blue line. Since there is no station called Dover Street on today’s network, 
however, the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ fails to denote any station on today’s network. 
Therefore, there is no intended isomorphism between the map and the network, as an intended 
isomorphism would associate every circle on the map with some station on the network bearing 
the name printed beside the circle. 
Despite the old map being an incomplete and incorrect epistemic representation of today’s 
network, however, a large number of inferences from the map to today’s network that are valid 
(according to the standard interpretation of the map in terms of the network) are still sound. 
Users could therefore draw a number of sound inferences from the map to the network without 
adopting a non-standard interpretation of the map in terms of the network. 
Cases like this are far from being exceptional. In fact, they seem to be the norm when it 
comes to scientific models. Take, for example, Ptolemaic models of the universe. Despite being 
extremely unfaithful epistemic representations of the Universe as a whole (or even of the Solar 
System), some Ptolemaic models can be used (and are still sometimes used) to draw 
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(approximately) true conclusions about the apparent motions and positions of a number of 
celestial bodies including the “fixed” stars, the Sun, the Moon, and the planets.  
I take it that a satisfactory account of faithful epistemic representation should be able to 
explain how partially faithful epistemic representations, such as the old map and the Ptolemaic 
model of the universe, can be to some extent faithful even if no intended isomorphism holds 
between the vehicle and the target, as this is often considered one of the main problems faced by 
structural accounts (see, e.g., (Suárez 2003)). An alternative approach would be to assume that, 
for every epistemic representation that is partially faithful under its standard interpretation, there 
is some ad hoc interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target under which the vehicle is a 
completely faithful epistemic representation of the target. I take this proposal to be 
dissatisfactory for a number of reasons. The main reason is that it is not descriptively adequate. 
In most cases, users of partially faithful epistemic representations of a certain target seem to 
adopt the standard interpretations of those epistemic representations and not some alleged ad hoc 
interpretation of them (on which only the sound inferences are valid). In fact, in many cases, the 
users would be unable to adopt such an interpretation, as they are unaware of which valid 
inferences are sound and which ones are not (pre-Copernican users of the Ptolemaic model, for 
example, used it to perform both sound and unsound inferences from the model, and this seems 
to suggest that they adopted its standard interpretation).  
7.6 MODELS AND INEXACTNESS 
It is widely acknowledged that scientific models are usually far from being completely faithful 
epistemic representations of their target systems. Consider again, for example, the inclined plane 
and the tobogganing hill. In that example, I intended to use the model to determine whether my 
daughters will go faster than I think it is safe. Suppose that, once we have plugged into the model 
numerical values for h and g, the final velocity of the box turns out to be sufficiently low. In 
virtue of what is this conclusion true (if it is indeed true)? The structural account of faithful 
epistemic representation would maintain that it is true in virtue of the fact that a certain 
morphism holds between the structure instantiated by the model and that instantiated by the 
system under the description of them that underlies the interpretation of the model in terms of 
the target. However, the intended morphism cannot be isomorphism.  
Since most (if not all) scientific models are idealized and approximated epistemic 
representations of their target systems, isomorphism cannot be the morphism that holds 
between the relevant structure of a model and that of its target system. In fact, to my knowledge, 
not one of the sympathizers of the structural account thinks that isomorphism can be the 
morphism that holds between most scientific models and the systems they are used to represent. 
However, it is instructive to see exactly how isomorphism fails to obtain, because the exercise 
will assist us in identifying the characteristics that a morphism should have in order to play this 
role. Furthermore, it illustrates the third kind of unfaithfulness I introduced in the previous 
section—inexactness. Before being able to turn to this matter, however, we must first discuss the 
notion of relevant structure as it applies to a model such as the inclined plane model. 
Following the work of Patrick Suppes and his collaborators (see, e.g., Suppes 2002) and of 
Wolfgang Balzer, Ulises Moulines and Joseph Sneed (Balzer, Moulines and Sneed 1987) on the 
set-theoretic structure of the models of classical particle mechanics, it is plausible to maintain 
that, on its standard interpretation, the inclined plane model instantiates a structure 
M=<ΩM={ΟM, TM, ℝ3, ℝ, ℤ+}, ΡM=∅, ΦM={rM, mM, fM, gM}>, where ΟM is a (non-empty) 
set of objects in the model (which in the case of the inclined plane contains only the box), TM is 
an interval of real numbers (which is used to represent time in the model), ℝ3 is a three-
dimensional vector space over real numbers (which is used to represent all sort of three-
dimensional vector quantities in the model), ℝ is the set of real numbers (which are used to 
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represent scalar quantities in the model), ℤ+ is the set of positive integers (which are used to label 
things in the model). Informally, the functions rM and mM are used to represent, respectively, the 
positions and the masses of the objects in the model, and the functions fM and gM are used to 
represent the “internal” and “external” forces acting on those objects. More specifically rM is a 
function whose domain is (ΟM×TM) (i.e. the Cartesian product of ΟM and TM) and whose co-
domain is ℝ3; informally, rM assigns to each object and time pair a three-dimensional vector 
representing the position of that object at that time. For every oi∈ΟM and every ti∈TM, rM is 
twice differentiable at ti. For the sake of clarity, I shall call ‘vM(oi, tj)’
 and ‘aM(oi, tj)’ the first and the 
second derivative of rM(oi, tj) with respect to t (drM(oi, tj)/dt=vM(oi, tj) and d
2rM(ai, tj)/dt
2=aM(oi, tj)), 
so that vM(oi, tj)
 and aM(oi, tj) associate each object and time pair with the three-dimensional 
vectors that represent, respectively the velocity and the acceleration of that object at that time. 
The function mM has ΟM as it s domain and the set of positive real numbers, ℝ+ as its co-domain 
and, informally, it associates each object in ΟM with the real number representing the magnitude 
of its mass in grams. The function fM has the product of ((ΟM)2×TM×ℤ+) and ℝ3 as its co-
domain and, informally, it associates every pair of objects in the domain and every time with the 
three-dimensional vector that represents one of the forces that the first object exerts on the 
second one at that time (the positive integer is just a convenient way to label different forces that 
one object may exert on the other). These forces can be construed as “internal” forces—forces 
exerted by objects that are within the system in question). The function gM has (ΟM×TM×ℤ+) as 
its domain and ℝ3 as its co-domain and, informally, it associates each object and time pair with 
the three-dimensional vector that represents one of the “external” forces acting on it at that time 
(where external forces can be informally construed as forces that are exerted by objects in the 
model that are not included in ΟM or by source-less force fields). 
There are different sort of constraints on the values these functions can have given a certain 
set of arguments. The most general set of constraints, which I call ‘the general constraints’, stem 
from the fact that the inclined plane model is a model of classical mechanics and, as such, the 
objects in it are subject to the general laws of classical mechanics, which constrain the values the 
functions can take in various ways. For example, according to Newton’s Second Law, for every 
oi∈ΟM and every tj∈TM,  
fM (oi, o1, t)+…+fM (oi, oi–1, t)+fM (oi, oi+1, t)+…+ gM(oi, t, k)=mM(oi)aM(oi, t).  
According to Newton’s Third Law, for every pair of objects, oi and ok ∈ΟM and every tj∈TM, 
 
fM (oi, ok, tj)=–fM (ok, oi, tj). 
 
A more specific set of constraints, which I call ‘the specific constraints’, stems from the specific 
features of the inclined plane model. In this particular case, the specific constraints concern the 
values of the function gM. In the model, two forces act on the box at all times. The first one is 
an external gravitational force, gM(b, ti, 1), whose magnitude is constant and equal to mM(b)g 
(where g is gravitational acceleration). The second is the normal force gM(b, ti, 2) that the plane 
exerts on the box whose direction is perpendicular to the plane and whose magnitude is constant 
and equal to mM(b)g sinθ (where θ is the angle of inclination of the plane).35 Since there are no 
other forces acting on the box, gM(b, ti, k)=0 for all k>2.  
                                                
35 Note that here I consider the box the only object in the universe of the structure of the inclined plane model 
ΟM and the normal force of the plane on the box an external force. This is because considering the plane an object 
itself would give rise to certain counterintuitive consequences. For example, if the plane was one of the objects in 
the universe of the structure of the model, the function mM would associate a certain mass with it and there is no 
obvious sense in which the plane in the model has a mass. 
∑
∞
=1k
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The general and specific constraints are all the constraints on the values of the functions in 
the structure of the inclined plane model as such. Despite these constraints, however, the 
functions in the structure of the model still do not have definite values for all arguments unless 
some additional constraints are specified. I call this further set of constraints ‘the inputs of the 
model’. In the case of the inclined plane model, one such set of constraints consists in specifying 
the mass of the box (mM(b)), its initial position and velocity (rM(b, t0) and vM(b, t0)), the 
gravitational acceleration (the values of g), and the angle of inclination of the plane (the value of 
θ). By specifying g and θ, the function gM will have a definite value for all arguments. Once we 
specify (mM(b)), aM(b, ti) will have a definite value for all arguments as well aM(b, ti)=(gM(b, ti, 
1)+gM(b, ti, 2))/mM(b). Now we need only to specify the position and velocity of the box at some 
ti such as t0 in order for rM(b, t0) to have definite values at all other times as well ((vM(b, ti)= aM(b, 
ti)ti+vM(b, t0) and rM(b, t0)=½ aM(b, ti)ti
2+vM(b, t0)ti+rM(b, t0)). Until the inputs of the model are 
specified, the inclined plane model, therefore, does not instantiate a structure. Rather, it 
instantiates what, following van Fraassen (1980, p.44), we can call ‘a structure-type’. I call ‘structure-
tokens’ those structures that are instances of a certain structure-type. So, the inclined plane model 
instantiates a structure-token (i.e. a specific structure) only when a specific set of inputs of the 
model is specified. 
 Consider now the system composed by my daughters tobogganing down the hill. The system 
can be seen as instantiating a structure-type as well. Each token of that structure type is a 
structure of the form S=<ΩS={ΟS, TS, ℝ3, ℝ, ℤ+}, ΡS=∅, ΦS={rS, mS, fS, gS}>, where ΟS is a 
non-empty set of objects (which in this case contains (the mereological sum of) my daughters 
and their toboggan) and all other elements are defined analogously to the way they were defined 
for M, so that, for example, the functions rM and mM are used to represent, respectively, the 
position and the mass of my daughters on the toboggan and the functions fM and gM are used to 
represent the “internal” and “external” forces acting on my daughters and their toboggan. As in 
the case of the structure of the inclined plane model, we can also think of the structure of the 
tobogganing hill system as a structure-type. However, our reasons for doing so are different in 
the case of the system. In the case of the system, the reason to think of the structure as a 
structure-type is that we can “run the system” a number of times and, in all likelihood, the 
position and velocity of the toboggan and the forces acting on it will be different at different 
times.  We can therefore think of the value of the functions in each token of the structure-type 
of the system as representing the value of that quantity at a certain time on a specific (possible) 
ride down the hill. This means that in each token of the structure-type of the system the function 
rS(f(b), f(ti)) associates the toboggan with its exact position at the time denoted by ti on its n-th 
run (rS(f(b), f(ti))=rS(f(b), f(ti))n). I call this token of the structure-type S ‘Sn’. 
Since morphisms are only defined for structure-tokens, not structure-types, if we want to 
apply the notion of a morphism to a case like that of the inclined plane model and the 
tobogganing hill system, we have to make sense of the notion of a morphism between structure-
types. Here, I call ‘the inputs of the system’ those aspects of the system that correspond to the 
aspects of the model that I have called the inputs of the model. For example, since the inputs of 
the inclined plane model include the mass, initial position, and initial velocity of the box, the 
inputs of the tobogganing hill system will include the mass, initial position, and initial velocity of 
the toboggan. On each ride down the hill, these inputs will have definite values. Therefore, for 
each structure-token Sk, the functions, mS(f(b))k, the initial position, rS(f(b), f(t0))k, the initial 
velocity, vS(f(b), f(t0))k etc. will have certain specific values. The token of the structure-type of the 
inclined plane model that corresponds to the structure-token Sk, Mk, is the one in which the 
value of all the inputs of the model is set equal to the value of the inputs of the system in 
structure-token Sk (e.g. f(mM(b))=mS(f(b))k, f(rM(b, t0))=rS(f(b), f(t0))k, vM(b, t0)=vM(f(b), f(t0))k). The 
structure-type of the inclined plane model, M, and that of the tobogganing hill system are thus x-
morphic if and only if, for all Mk and Sk such that Mk is the token of the structure-type M that 
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corresponds to the token Sk of the structure-type S, Mk is x-morphic to Sk. This allows us to 
continue to talk of the relevant structure of the inclined plane model and that of the tobogganing 
hill system and of the intended morphisms among them even if these structures are actually 
structure-types and not structure tokens. 
As is probably already clear, no intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure-
type of the inclined plane model and the tobogganing hill system. Since in the standard 
interpretation of the model in terms of the system, the box denotes the toboggan, its position 
denotes the velocity of the toboggan, the external forces acting on it denote the “external” forces 
acting on the toboggan and so on, an intended morphism between the two structures would be 
one that associates the box with the toboggan and the elements of TM, ℝ3, and ℝ in the universe 
of the structure of the model with the same elements in the universe of the structure of the 
system (e.g. for every r∈ℝ, f(r)=r). The intended morphism between the two structures is an 
isomorphism only if, for every ti∈TM
 and every k∈ℤ+, f(rM(b, ti))=rS(f(b), f(ti)) and f(gM(b, ti, 
k))=gS(f(b), f(ti), f(k)) and f(gM(b, ti, k))=gS(f(b), f(ti), f(k)). In other words, the intended morphism 
is an isomorphism only if the position of the box and the forces acting on it at a certain time are 
identical to the position of the toboggan and the forces acting on it at the same time. 
Now, we needn’t analyse the situation in too much detail to realize that this cannot be the 
case. Consider, the “external” forces acting on the racer. First of all, unlike the gravitational force 
on the box in the model, the gravitational force that the Earth exerts on my daughters and their 
toboggan is not linear but increases as the square of the distance between the racer and the 
centre of mass of the earth decreases. Unlike the value of f(gM(b, ti, 1)), the value of gS(f(b), f(ti), 
f(1)), therefore, changes slightly as ti increases and the toboggan goes downhill. Since, for all t, 
f(gM(b, ti, 1))≠gS(f(b), f(ti), f(1)), the intended morphism, f, cannot be an isomorphism as it does 
not meet condition [20.6] of definition (20). 
Second, the normal force between the hill and the toboggan is likely to be different at 
different times. Unlike the inclined plane, the hill is not a perfectly straight slope and therefore 
the contact force the hill exerts on the toboggan is likely to change as a function of time. So, 
unlike the value of f(gM(b , ti, 2)), the value of gS(f(b), f(ti), f(2)) is likely to differ for different 
values of ti. Since, for most ti, it is likely that f(gM(b , ti, 2))≠gS(f(b), f(ti), f(2)), the intended 
morphism, f, cannot be an isomorphism as it does not meet condition [20.6] of definition (20).  
Third, in the inclined plane model, there are only two “external” forces acting on the 
toboggan. The value of the function gM(b, ti, k) for every k>2 is the zero vector. However, there 
are a number of other “external” forces acting on the toboggan that have no counterpart in the 
model, including air friction on my daughters and their toboggan, the friction between the snow 
on the hill and the toboggan, the gravitational force that any massive object in the universe (from 
the molecules of the air to distant galaxies) exerts on my daughters and their toboggan, and so 
on. So, for some k>2 and for every ti∈TM, f(gM(b , ti, k))≠gS(f(b), f(ti), f(k)).  
From the above considerations, it follows that the position of the box at each time ti∈TM 
after t0 are different from the position of the toboggan at that time; or, in symbols, f(rM(b, ti ))≠ 
rS(f(b), f(ti)), for all ti>t0. We can thus conclude that the inclined plane model is an inexact 
epistemic representation of the tobogganing hill system, where an epistemic representation is 
inexact if and only if, for some nFkV, o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, oiV denotes oiT and
 nFkV 
denotes nFkT and 
nFkV (o1V, …, onV)=oiV but 
nFkT (o1T, …, onT)≠oiT. 
This is far from being a peculiarity of this specific case. To a greater or lesser extent, 
approximation and idealization characterise most (if not all) scientific models. For example, no 
model of classical mechanics instantiates a structure that is isomorphic in the intended manner to 
that of any real system in the sense specified above, as usually classical models do not contain a 
counterpart for most of the forces that act on the objects in the system, and even those forces 
for which there is a counterpart are often only approximations of the forces in the system. As a 
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result, most models in classical mechanics are inexact epistemic representations of their target 
systems. 
7.7 WEAKER MORPHISMS: HOMOMORPHISM 
While most sympathizers of the structural account seem to agree that, in order to account for 
what I called partially faithful epistemic representation, we need to resort to morphisms weaker 
than isomorphism, there is little or no agreement as to which weaker morphism is the 
appropriate one. Homomorphism (see, e.g., Bartels 2006), Δ/Ψ-morphism (Swoyer 1989), partial 
isomorphism (see, e.g., French and Ladyman 1999 and da Costa and French 2003) are three 
candidates that have been defended in the literature. The rest of the chapter tries to determine 
whether weakening the isomorphism requirement solves the problem of accounting for partially 
faithful epistemic representation.  
The first morphism I consider is homomorphism. This gives rise to what I call ‘the 
homomorphism account of partially faithful epistemic representation’. According to it: 
(I) v is a partially faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(I.1) : 
(I.1.1) u takes v to denote t, 
(I.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
(I.2) an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of v 
relative to i°(v→t), T, and the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v→t), V. 
 
The problem with this proposal is that, although it can handle incomplete epistemic 
representations, it cannot deal with partially faithful epistemic representations that are incorrect 
or inexact. For example, since the old London Underground map is both incorrect and 
incomplete and the inclined plane model is inexact, the homomorphism account cannot account 
for the fact that both the old London Underground map and the inclined plane model are 
partially faithful epistemic representations of their respective targets. Therefore, I argue first that, 
if an intended homomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, the vehicle may be an 
incomplete epistemic representation of the target and then that, if an intended homomorphism 
holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the system, the vehicle must be a 
correct and exact epistemic representation of the target. As usual, I assume throughout that the 
user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. 
Incompleteness. According to (25), a vehicle is an incomplete epistemic representation of a target 
only if, for some oiT∈ΩT, oiV denotes oiT according to the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of 
the target, i°(v→t), and oiV∉ΩV or, for some nRkT, <o1V, …, onV>∉nRkV, even if <o1T, …, 
okT>∈
nRkT and o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT according to i°(v→t). 
However, an intended homomorphism can hold between the vehicle and the target even if, for 
some oTi∈ΩT, oiV denotes oiT and oiV∉ΩV or, for some 
nRkT, <o1V, …, onV>∉
nRkV, even if <o1T, 
…, okT>∈
nRkT and o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT. For an intended 
homomorphism to hold between the vehicle and the target, it is necessary that, for every object 
oiV in the universe of the relevant structure of the vehicle, the object denoted by oiV, oiT, is in the 
universe of the relevant structure of the target. However, an intended homomorphism can hold 
even if, for some object oiT in the universe of the relevant structure of the target, there is no 
object in the universe of the relevant structure of the vehicle that denotes oiT. Analogously, for an 
intended homomorphism to hold between the vehicle and the target, it is necessary that if nRkV 
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denotes nRkT and <o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV, <o1T, …, okT>∈
nRkT. However, it is not necessary that, if 
<o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT, <o1V, …, okV>∈
nRkV. So, if an intended homomorphism holds between the 
vehicle and the target, the vehicle may well be an incomplete epistemic representation of the 
target. 
Correctness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, the 
vehicle cannot be an incorrect epistemic representation of the target. According to definition 
(24), if the vehicle was an incorrect epistemic representation of a target, it would be the case that, 
for some oiV∈ΩV, oiV denotes oiT and oiT∉ΩT or, for some 
nRkV, <o1T, …, onT>∉
nRkT, even if 
<o1V, …, okV>∈
nRkV and o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT. If this was the 
case, however, no intended homomorphism could hold between the vehicle and the target 
because, according to definitions (19) and (23), if an intended homomorphism held between the 
vehicle and the target, then every object oiV∈ΩV would be associated with the object oiT∈ΩT 
denoted by it and, for every nRkT, if <o1V, …, okV>∈
nRkV , then <o1T, …, okT>∈
nRkT. So, if an 
intended homomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, the vehicle must be a correct 
epistemic representation of the target. 
Exactness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, the vehicle 
cannot be an inexact epistemic representation of the target. If the vehicle was an inexact 
representation of the target, it would be the case that, for some nFkV, o1V denotes o1T, …, onV 
denotes onT, and
 nFkV denotes 
nFkT and f(
nFkV (o1V, …, onV)≠
nFkT (f(o1V), …, f(onV)). If this were the 
case, however, no intended homomorphism could hold between the vehicle and the target 
because, according to definitions (19) and (23), if an intended homomorphism holds between the 
vehicle and the target, then for every nFkV, if o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, and
 nFkV denotes 
nFkT, f(
nFkV (o1V, …, onV) would have to be equal to 
nFkT (f(o1V), …, f(onV)). So, if an intended 
homomorphism holds between the vehicle and the target, the vehicle must be an exact epistemic 
representation of the target. 
The situation is reversed if, instead of a homomorphism between V and T, the account 
required what we might call ‘an inverse homomorphism’ to hold between them (i.e. a 
homomorphism between V and T). As it can be easily verified, this account would be able to 
handle epistemic representations that are incorrect, complete and exact, but not epistemic 
representations that are incomplete or inexact.  
Each of the two accounts of partially faithful epistemic representation that I have examined in 
this subsection can only account for one sort of unfaithfulness. However, neither can account 
for partially faithful epistemic representations that are both incorrect and incomplete, like the old 
London Underground map, or for partially faithful epistemic representations that are inexact, 
like the inclined plane model. Both accounts are therefore inadequate. 
7.8 WEAKER MORPHISMS: Δ/Ψ-MORPHISM 
Consider now a second candidate morphism—i.e. what Swoyer (1991) calls Δ/Ψ-morphism. For 
the sake of simplicity and consistency, here I modify and simplify Swoyer’s proposal slightly. 
Most of what I say, however, applies mutatis mutandis to Swoyer’s original proposal. The crucial 
notion of Δ/Ψ-morphism can be defined as follows. 
(27) A function, f, from A to B is a Δ/Ψ-morphism if and only if: 
[27.1] for all nRiA∈Δ⊆ΡA (Δ≠∅), if <o1A, …, okA>∈nRiA, then <f(o1A), …, 
f(okA)>∈RiB (f preserves all relations in Δ),  
[27.2] for all nRiA∈Ψ⊆ΡA, if <f(o1A), …, f(okA)>∈RiB, then <o1A, …, okA>∈nRiA (f 
counter-preserves all relations in Ψ). 
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The Δ/Ψ-morphism account of partially faithful epistemic representation maintains that: 
(J) v is a partially faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(J.1) : 
(J.1.1) u takes v to denote t, 
(J.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
(J.2) an intended Δ/Ψ-morphism holds between the relevant structure of t 
relative to i°(v→t), T, and the relevant structure of v relative to i°(v→t), V. 
 
In this section, I argue that the intended Δ/Ψ-morphism does not successfully account for 
partially faithful epistemic representation. A first, minor problem is that Δ/Ψ-morphism does 
not allow a certain kind of incomplete representation to be partially faithful epistemic 
representation. A Δ/Ψ-morphism is a function from ΩT to ΩV. This means that an intended 
Δ/Ψ-morphism associates every object in ΩT with the object that denotes it in ΩV. However, an 
epistemic representation can still be partially faithful even if some objects in ΩT are not denoted 
by any objects in ΩV. For example, some stations on today’s London Underground network 
have no counterpart on the 1930’s map, but nevertheless we consider the latter a partially faithful 
epistemic representation of the former. This problem can easily be avoided by modifying the 
definition of Δ/Ψ-morphism so that a Δ/Ψ-morphism is a function, f, from a non-empty subset of 
the universe of the relevant structure of the target. 
A second, more serious problem arises from the very notions of preservation and counter-
preservation of a relation. A relation among objects in the universe of the relevant structure of 
the target (e.g. the relation being connected by Metropolitan Line trains in the London Underground 
network) is preserved if and only if, for any two stations, if those stations are connected by 
Metropolitan Line trains, then the circles or tabs that denote those stations are connected by a 
maroon line; it is counter-preserved if and only if, for any two circles or tabs, if those circles or 
tabs are connected by a maroon line, then the stations they denote are connected by 
Metropolitan Line trains. So, if the relation being connected by Metropolitan Line trains is preserved, it 
is sound to infer that two stations are not connected by Metropolitan Line trains if the circles or 
tabs that denote them are not connected by a maroon line; if, on the other hand, the relation is 
counter-preserved, it is sound to infer that two stations are connected by Metropolitan Line 
trains if the circles or tabs that denote them are connected by a maroon line.  
According to the Δ/Ψ-morphism account, a vehicle is a partially faithful epistemic 
representation of a target only if some properties or relations in the target are counter-preserved. 
The rationale behind this requirement is that, if the Δ/Ψ-morphism holds, then it is possible to 
explain why some of the inferences performed by the user are sound—they are sound because if 
the relation holds among the objects in the vehicle, then the relation denoted by it also holds 
among the objects in the target that are denoted by those objects in the vehicle—and therefore 
why the epistemic representation in question is a partially faithful one. 
However, the requirement is too strong—an epistemic representation can be partially faithful 
even if no property or relation in the target is counter-preserved. On the old London 
Underground map, for example, the circles labelled ‘Aldgate’ and ‘Hammersmith’ are connected 
by a maroon line, but today the corresponding stations are not connected by Metropolitan Line 
trains. Therefore the relation being connected by Metropolitan Line trains is not counter-preserved by 
any intended Δ/Ψ-morphism between the relevant structure of the old map and that of the 
network. Nevertheless, one can perform many sound inferences from the fact that circles or tabs 
are connected by a maroon line to the fact that the stations denoted by them are connected by 
Metropolitan Line trains. So, one can perform sound inferences from the fact that a certain 
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relation holds among certain objects in the vehicle to the fact that the relation denoted by it 
holds among the objects they denote in the target, even if the relation is not counter-preserved. 
Even if no relation among objects in the target is counter-preserved, the vehicle may still be a 
partially faithful epistemic representation of the target if, for some objects in the vehicle, from 
the fact that a certain relation, R, holds among them, it is sound to infer that the relation denoted 
by R holds between the objects in the target that are denoted by those objects. 
Here it is important to recall that an account of partially faithful epistemic representation is 
meant to identify in virtue of what an epistemic representation is a faithful one, not by virtue of 
what the user comes to know or believe that it is a faithful one. A user may not be able to 
determine which of the inferences from the fact that circles or tabs are connected by a maroon 
line to the fact that the stations denoted by them are connected by Metropolitan Line trains are 
sound and which are not, but the representation is still faithful to some degree if some of the 
inferences from it to the target are sound. 
This intended Δ/Ψ-morphism account is not even successful in accounting for one of the 
cases that Swoyer seems to have in mind when introducing the notions of preservation and 
counter-preservation, namely the case of topographical maps. Swoyer correctly points out:  
[…] it is a basic geometrical fact that a two-dimensional projection of a sphere cannot depict all 
its features without distortion, so when we use flat maps to represent the Earth, something has to 
give. For sixteenth-century mariners, concerned to convert lines of constant compass bearing 
(rhumb lines) into straight lines on their maps, Mercator’s projection, which misrepresents scale, 
offered the best compromise; for other purposes equal area maps, which accurately represent 
scale but not shape, are preferable (Swoyer 1989, 470). 
Swoyer is right in claiming that some maps use projections that counter-preserve some 
properties or relations of the geographical area represented. For example, the Polar Azimuthal 
projection counter-preserves the distance of every point from the North Pole, but it does so at 
the cost of distorting shapes and areas.36 This is far from a unique case. Projections that counter-
preserve one property or relation do so at the cost of distorting other properties or relations. 
However, it is exactly for this reason that many of the projections that are most commonly used, 
such as the Lambert Conformal Conic projection, do not counter-preserve any property or 
relation; instead, they try to minimize the distortion of as many properties or relations as possible 
(see, for example, (Fisher and Miller 1944)). Since maps based on these projections do not 
counter-preserve any property or relation, the Δ/Ψ-morphism account cannot account for the 
fact that they are partially faithful epistemic representation of their targets. 
As the case of maps based on the Lambert Conformal Conic projection shows, a 
representation may be partially faithful even if none of the relations among objects in the 
universe of the target is counter-preserved by any intended Δ/Ψ-morphism. The Δ/Ψ-
morphism account of partially faithful epistemic representation is therefore inadequate as an 
account of partially faithful epistemic representation. 
7.9 WEAKER MORPHISMS: PARTIAL ISOMORPHISM 
In this section, I develop what I call ‘the partial isomorphism account of partially faithful 
epistemic representation’, which has been championed in some form or other by Newton Da 
Costa, Steven French, James Ladyman and their collaborators. While my formulation of the 
account differs from theirs in various respects, I hope it is an improvement on previous 
formulations. 
                                                
36 See (Fisher and Miller 1994), which is an excellent introduction to topographical map projections, or the more 
technical (Monmonier 1977) and (Maling 1992). 
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Here, I take the partial isomorphism account of partially faithful epistemic representation to 
claim that 
(K) v is a partially faithful epistemic representation of t (for u) if and only if: 
(K.1) : 
(K.1.1) u takes v to denote t, 
(K.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and  
(K.2)  an intended partial isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of v 
relative to i°(v→t), T, and the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v→t), V. 
 
Two structures, A and B, are partially isomorphic if and only if there are two partial substructures 
of A and B that are isomorphic. The best way to introduce the notion of partial substructure is, 
first, to introduce the notion of a substructure and that of a partial structure and, then, to combine 
the two together to get the notion of a partial substructure. 
 
(28) A (total) structure B is a substructure of a (total) structure A if and only if: 
[28.1] The universe of B, ΩB, is a subset of the universe of A, ΩA, 
[28.2] For every nRiA∈ΡA, there is nRiB∈ΡB such that nRiB =nRiA∩(ΩB)n. (More 
informally, for every relation in A, there is a relation in B whose extension is 
the subset of the corresponding relation in A that only contains the n-tuples 
of elements that are in the universe of B). 
[28.3] For every nFjA∈ΦA, there is a nFjB∈ΦB, such that, if dom(nFjA) is the domain 
of nFjA and codom(
nFjA) is the codomain of 
nFjA, dom(
nFjB) = dom(
nFjA)∩(ΩB)
n 
and codom(nFjB) = codom(
nFjA)∩(ΩB)
n. (More informally, for every function in A, 
there is a function in B whose domain is the subset of the universe of A that 
only contains the n-tuples of elements that are in the universe of B). 
A partial structure is an n-tuple P=<ΩP, ΡP, ΦP>, which is defined analogously to a total 
structure except for the fact that the relations in ΡP are partial relations on ΩP and the functions 
in ΦP are partial functions from (ΩP)n to ΩP. A partial relation, nRi
P, is a triple <sat(nRi
P), dissat(nRi
P), 
indet(nRi
P)>, where sat(nRi
P) is the set of n-tuples of elements of ΩP that satisfy the relation MRi
P, 
dissat(nRi
P) is the set of n-tuples of elements of ΩP that do not satisfy nRi
P, and indet(nRi
P) is the set 
of n-tuples of elements for which it is indeterminate whether or not they satisfy nRi
P. A total 
relation can be thus seen as a limit case of partial relation—a partial relation whose third 
component is the empty set. A partial function is a function that may not assign any value to some 
arguments within its domain (or, if you prefer, assigns a “null” value ‘†’).37 
We can now introduce the notion of partial substructure. 
 
(29) A partial structure B is a partial substructure of a total structure A if and only 
if: 
                                                
37 It is worth noting that my definition of a partial structure differs from the notion employed by da Costa, 
French, and their collaborators in one aspect, which will turn out to be crucial to my account. Da Costa and French 
restrict their analysis to structures that contain relations but not functions. Obviously, this is not a problem in itself. 
Any n-ary function can be construed as an (n+1)-ary relation whose first n relata are the arguments of the function 
and whose last relatum is the value of the function. In fact, a partial unary function, f(x), that does not assign a value 
to a certain argument, a, in its domain can be seen as a relation that is undefined for any ordered pair whose first 
component is a and whose second component is an element of the co-domain of the function. 
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[29.1] The universe of B, ΩB, is a (non-empty) subset of the universe of A, ΩA. 
[29.2] For every n-ary relation, nRiA∈ΡA, there is an n-ary relation, <sat(nRiB), 
indet(nRiB), dissat(
nRiB)>∈ΡB such that sat(
nRiB)⊆(
nRiA∩(ΩB)
n) and 
dissat(nRiB)∩
nRiA=∅. (Informally, a certain n-tuple of elements of the universe 
of B belongs to the set of n-tuples that satisfy a certain relation in B only if it is 
in the extension of the corresponding relation in A and it belongs to the set of 
n-tuples that do not satisfy that relation only if it is not in the extension of the 
corresponding relation in A.)38 
[29.3] For every n-ary function, nFjA∈ΦA, there is a partial n-ary function nFjB∈ΦB 
such, that, if dom(nFjA) is the domain of 
nFjA and codom(
nFjA) is the codomain of 
nFjA, dom(
nFBi)=(dom(
nFAi)∩(ΩB)
n) and codom(nFBi)=codom(
nFAi)∩(ΩB)
n and such 
that for every <o1B, …, okB>∈(ΩB)
n, either nFjA(o1B, …, okB)=
nFjB(o1B, …, okB) 
or nFjB(o1B, …, okB) is indeterminate. (Informally, for every function in A, there 
is a partial function in B whose domain is the subset of the domain of the 
function in A that only contains the n-tuples of elements that are in the 
universe of B and whose codomain is the subset of the domain of the 
function in A that only contains the n-tuples of elements that are in the 
universe of B and that either assigns to every n-tuple in the universe of B the 
same value the corresponding function in A assigns to that same n-tuple or it 
assigns an indeterminate value.) 
Since the isomorphism between the partial substructures of the relevant structure of the 
vehicle, V, and that of the target, T, is an intended isomorphism, all of the intended isomorphic 
partial substructures—i.e. all of their partial substructures, V* and T*, such that an intended 
isomorphism holds between them—must meet the following conditions: 
 
(i) If oiV denotes oiT, oiV* ∈ΩV* and o i T* ∈ΩT* only if oiV∈ΩV and oiT∈ΩT. 
(ii) If o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, nRkV denotes nRkT, o1V*∈ΩV*, …., onV*∈ΩV*, 
then: 
(ii.a) <o1V*, …, onV* >∈sat(nRkV*) and <o1T*, …, onT* >∈sat(nRkT*) only if <o1V, …, 
onV>∈
nRkV and <o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT, 
(ii.b) <o1V*, …, onV*>∈dissat(nRkV*) and <o1T*, …, onT* >∈sat(nRkT*) only if <o1V, …, 
onV>∉
nRkV and <o1T, …, onT>∉
 nRkT, and 
(ii.c) <o1V*, …, onV* >∈indet(nR kV*) and <o1V*, …, onV*>∈dissat(nRkV*) only if either 
<o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV and <o1T, …, onT>∉
nRkT, or <o1V, …, onV>∉
nRkV and <o1T, …, 
onT>∈
nRkT. 
                                                
38 Let me note that this is markedly different from how French and his collaborators define these concepts. For 
example, French and Ladyman (1999) claim that a certain n-tuple of elements of the universe of B belongs to the set 
of n-tuples that satisfy a certain relation in B if and only if it is in the extension of the corresponding relation in A; it 
belongs to the set of n-tuples that do not satisfy that relation if and only if it is not in the extension of the 
corresponding relation in A. However, this cannot possibly be what French and Ladyman actually have in mind 
because, according to this definition, the set indet(nRiP) would always be empty and therefore the set of partial 
substructures of A would be identical to that of the substructures of A. In order for B to be a (genuine) partial 
substructure of A it must be the case that indet(nRiP) is not empty. This is accomplished by the definition I have put 
forward here but not by the one that French and Ladyman propose. 
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(iii) If o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT, oiV denotes oiT, nFkV denotes nFkT, o1V*∈ΩV*, …., 
onV* ∈AV*, o1T*∈AT*, …., and onT*∈ΩT*, then: 
(iii.a) nFkV*(o1V*, …, onV*)=oiV* and nFkT* (o1T*, …, onT*)=oiT* only if nFkV(o1V, …, 
onV)=oiV and 
nFkT(o1T, …, onT)=oiT, and 
(iii.b) nFkV*(o1V*, …, onV*) and nFkT*(o1T*, …, onT*) are indeterminate only if nFkV(o1V, 
…, onV)≠oiV or 
nFkT(o1T, …, onT)≠oiT. 
 
Unlike the two other proposals I have considered, the partial isomorphism account of 
partially faithful epistemic representation can handle both incorrect and incomplete epistemic 
representations. 
Incorrectness. A vehicle is an incorrect epistemic representation of a target if and only if, either 
for some oiV∈ΩV, oiV denotes oiT and oiT∉ΩT; or else, for some 
nRkV, o1V, …, and onV, o1V denotes 
o1T, …, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT and <o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV, but <o1T, …, onT>∉
nRkT. 
However, an intended partial isomorphism can hold between the vehicle and the target even if, 
for some oiV∈ΩV, oiV denotes oiT and oiT∉ΩT or, for some 
nRkV, o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes 
onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT and <o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV, but <o1T, …, onT>∉
nRkT. For an intended partial 
isomorphism to hold between the vehicle and the target, an object can be an element of the 
universe of the relevant structure of the vehicle even if the object that denotes it is not in the 
relevant structure of the target—the first object will simply not be in the universe of the 
isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle. Analogously, for an intended partial isomorphism 
to hold between the vehicle and the target, it is not necessary that, if o1V denotes o1T, …, onV 
denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT, and <o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV, then <o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT. If <o1V, …, 
onV>∈
nRkV and <o1T, …, onT>∉
nRkT, it will simply be the case that <o1V*, …, onV*>∈indet(
nRkV*) 
and <o1T*, …, onT*>∈indet(
nRkT*). So, if an intended partial isomorphism holds between the 
vehicle and the target, the vehicle can be an incorrect representation of the target. 
Incompleteness. A vehicle is an incomplete epistemic representation of a target if and only if, for 
some oiT∈ΩT, oiV denotes oiT and oiV∉ΩV, or, for some 
nRkT, o1T, …, and onT, o1V denotes o1T, …, 
onV denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT and <o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT, but <o1V, …, onV>∉
nRkV. However, an 
intended partial isomorphism can hold between the vehicle and the target even if, for some 
oiT∈ΩT, oiV denotes oiT and oiV∉ΩV or, for some 
nRkT, o1V denotes o1T, …, onV denotes onT,
 nRkV 
denotes nRkT and <o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT, but <o1V, …, onV>∉
nRkV. For an intended partial 
isomorphism to hold between the vehicle and the target, an object can be an element of the 
universe of the relevant structure of the target even if the object that denotes it is not in the 
relevant structure of the vehicle—the first object will simply not be in the universe of the 
isomorphic partial substructure of the target. Analogously, for an intended partial isomorphism 
to hold between the vehicle and the target, it is not necessary that, if o1V denotes o1T, …, onV 
denotes onT,
 nRkV denotes 
nRkT and <o1T, …, onT>∈
nRkT, <o1V, …, onV>∈
nRkV. If <o1T, …, 
onT>∈
nRkT and <o1V, …, onV>∉
nRkV, it will simply be the case that <o1V*, …, onV* >∈indet(
nRkV*) 
and <o1T*, …, onT*>∈indet(
nRkT*). So, if an intended partial isomorphism holds between the 
relevant structure of the target and that of the vehicle, the vehicle can be an incomplete 
representation of the target. 
The partial isomorphism account is not only able to deal with cases of incorrect and 
incomplete representation such as that of the old London Underground and today’s network, 
but it also allows us to explain why the other structural accounts were successful (insofar as they 
were successful). Isomorphism, homomorphism, and Δ/Ψ-morphism are all limit cases of partial 
isomorphism. Isomorphism is the case in which the isomorphic partial substructures of the 
relevant structures of the vehicle and the target are the full structures themselves (i.e. the 
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universe of both structures are identical with the universe of their partial substructures and, for 
all relations, the set of n-tuples for which it is undetermined whether the n-tuples satisfy or do 
not satisfy the structure in question is empty). Homomorphism is the case in which the 
isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle is the full relevant structure of the vehicle. Δ/Ψ-
morphism is the case in which the isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle and the target 
contain some relations that are indeterminate for all n-tuples of elements. The partial 
isomorphism account is thus able to account why the isomorphism account, homomorphism 
account, and Δ/Ψ-morphism account were successful, insofar as they were.  
7.10 PARTIAL ISOMORPHISM AND INEXACTNESS 
As we have seen, the partial isomorphism account can handle both incorrectness and incompleteness. 
In this section, however, I argue that it is not equally successful at dealing with inexactness. 
Inexactness is particularly important for our purposes because it seems to be a pervasive sort of 
unfaithfulness in models from mathematized sciences. We have seen this to be the case with the 
case of the inclined plane model and the tobogganing hill. In that case, we had reason to believe 
that the model was inexact in the sense that, for example, some of the external forces acting on 
the box are not the same as the corresponding forces acting on my daughters and their toboggan 
(one example of this is air friction, which is zero on the box, but significant on my daughters and 
their toboggan).  
To be clear, the problem is not that the partial isomorphism account cannot somehow 
accommodate inexact epistemic representations, for the partial isomorphism account does have a 
strategy for dealing with inexact epistemic representations. The problem, I think, is that the 
strategy in question is inadequate. The strategy simply treats cases of inexactness as cases of 
incorrectness. One way to implement this strategy is to postulate that all functions with an 
indeterminate value have the same value, so that, if nFkV denotes 
nFkT, o1V denotes o1T, …, and onV 
denotes onT, but there is not an intended isomorphism such that f(
nFkV* (o1V*, …, 
onV*))=
nFkT*(f(o1V*), …, f(onV*)), then an intended isomorphism can still hold between partial 
substructures that assign indeterminate values to nFkV* (o1V*, …, onV*) and 
nFkT*(o1V*, …, onV*). 
The reason why this way of handling inexactness treats it as a kind of incorrectness is that an n-
ary function nFkA(o1A, …, onA)=oiA can be construed as an (n+1)-ary relation <o1A, …, onA, oiA 
>∈(n+1)RkA, and a partial function whose value is indeterminate for the arguments o1A, …, onA can 
be seen as a partial relation < o1A, …, onA, oiA >∈indet(
(n+1)RkA) for all oiA.  
However, while treating inexactness as a kind of incorrectness may be satisfactory in some 
cases of inexactness, it is not appropriate in all cases. In using scientific models, for example, it is 
convenient to distinguish between approximations and idealizations. While it is possible to think of 
idealization as a kind of approximation, the rationale behind approximations and idealizations 
seems to be slightly different. For example, the rationale behind not including in the inclined 
plane model a counterpart for forces such as the gravitational attraction of distant galaxies on the 
racer seems to be that their magnitude, while different from zero, is so close to zero that the 
effect of these forces on my daughters and their toboggan would likely be smaller than we are 
able to detect. Their influence, then, will be negligible, and these forces can be left out of the 
model. The rationale behind not including in the model a counterpart for forces such as the air 
friction, on the other hand, is that these forces, even if not negligible, are very complicated to 
model and, often, the gain in faithfulness that derives from including a counterpart for them in 
the model is not worth the effort it takes to do so.  
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Here I call cases of the first kind ‘approximations’ and cases of the second kind ‘idealizations’.39 
My contention is that, while treating inexactness as incorrectness may be satisfactory in cases of 
idealization, it is not satisfactory in cases of approximation. When it comes to approximations, it 
does matter that, even if f(nFkV (o1V, …, onV)≠
nFkT(f(o1V), …, f(onV)), f(
nFkV(o1V, …, onV) and 
nFkT 
(f(o1V), …, f(onV)) are nevertheless “close enough”. Suppose, for example, that I am comparing 
the standard inclined plane model with an inclined plane model with air friction. While both 
models might be inexact when it comes to air friction, the inclined plane model with air friction, 
which makes the force due to air friction proportional to the cross-sectional area of my seated 
daughters and to the square of their velocity, seems to be more faithful than the standard 
inclined plane model, which sets the external force for air friction to zero, for the former model 
better approximates the force my daughter would experience due to air friction. 
More generally, the reason for distinguishing between incorrectness and inexactness is that 
the latter comes in degrees while the former is an all-or-nothing matter. A user can draw 
conclusions that are strictly speaking false from inexact and incorrect epistemic representations 
alike. However, inexact epistemic representations, unlike incorrect epistemic representations, 
may allow their users to draw conclusions that are “closer to the truth” or “farther from the 
truth” (in the sense outlined in Section 2.2).  
An account of partially faithful epistemic representation that construes inexactness as a sort 
of incorrectness, however, would classify all inexact representations as equally unfaithful. If 
inexactness is construed as a species of incorrectness, for example, a model that gets the velocity 
of the toboggan almost completely right and one that grossly underestimates it would count as 
equally faithful epistemic representations, and a geographical map that employs the Lambert 
Conformal Conic projection (and thus distorts slightly most features of the territory) would be 
classified as being as unfaithful as one that grossly distorts most features of the same territory. 
The problem of inexactness, which is so crucial in the case of models (as well as in many other 
cases of epistemic representation), can only be dealt with adequately by an account that 
acknowledges the specific nature of inexactness and its distinctness from incorrectness. I develop 
such an account in the next chapter. Before moving on to that, however, I am going to argue 
that there is a more profound reason to be dissatisfied with the structural account of faithful 
epistemic representation—the reason is that the structural account fails to accommodate the fact 
that faithfulness is a matter of degree. 
7.11 HOW LITTLE FAITHFULNESS IS TOO LITTLE FAITHFULNESS? 
Even if, as I have argued in the previous section, the partial isomorphism account cannot 
account satisfactorily for inexact epistemic representations, it can account for partially faithful 
epistemic representation that are both incorrect and incomplete. One, however, might worry that 
the partial isomorphism account is successful in handling incorrect and incomplete epistemic 
representations only because it sets the bar for partially faithful epistemic representation so low 
as to make it almost impossible for a vehicle not to be a partially epistemic representation of a 
certain target. After all, a partial isomorphism would seem to hold between the relevant structure 
of the vehicle and that of the target even if their intended isomorphic partial substructures are 
substructures whose universes contain only one element each and whose properties, relations, 
and functions are all indeterminate (let me call this ‘a minimal partial isomorphism’). The worry 
is that, if the only intended partial isomorphism between the vehicle and the target is a minimal 
one, the vehicle would seem to be a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of the target 
(i.e. one such that no valid surrogative inference from it to the target would be sound). While I 
                                                
39 Obviously, I do not mean to offer an account of approximation or idealization; nor do I intend to offer a 
criterion to demarcate idealizations and approximations. I use ‘approximation’ and ‘idealization’ simply as two 
convenient labels to distinguish between two kinds of unfaithfulness. 
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think this worry is ultimately misguided, I think that it reveals a deeper flaw with the structural 
account’s approach to partially faithful epistemic representation.  
Suppose that as part of an elaborate practical joke a friend gives you a fake subway map of the 
Tokyo subway network. Since you have never been to Tokyo and you have never seen a map of 
the Tokyo subway network, you can’t tell that the map is a fake. But what would the fake map 
have to be like in order to be such that the only intended partial isomorphism that holds between 
it and the Tokyo subway network is a minimal one? Consider two possible answers. The first is 
that the map would have to be such that only one circle on the map corresponds to an actual 
station on the network (say, Shibuya station), while all other circles on the map stand for 
fictitious stations, none on the coloured lines on the map corresponds to a subway line on the 
network, etc. However, even if this map is almost a completely unfaithful epistemic representation 
of the network, it would still count as a partially faithful epistemic representation of the network, 
for one could still soundly infer from the map that one of the stations on the network is called 
Shibuya. 
 One might argue, however, that the case I have just described is not a case of minimal partial 
isomorphism, as the name of the station is a property of that station and, as such, it cannot be 
part of a minimal partial substructure like the one described above. If this view is correct (as I 
think it is), the only way for the partial isomorphism to be minimal would be for there to be only 
one circle on the map (for, if there were more circles on the map, then we could establish a 
partial isomorphism between the partial substructure containing those circles and some partial 
substructure on the network even if there were no correspondence between the properties of 
and relations among those circles and the properties of and relations among the stations on the 
network). Admittedly, the product would not look much like a subway map but, as far as I can 
see, it would still not be a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of the network. After all, 
one could still perform at least one sound surrogative inference from the minimal map to the 
network (i.e. the inference to the conclusion that there is at least one station on the network). 
While some may feel that this is not enough for the fake map to be considered a partially 
faithful epistemic representation of the Tokyo subway network, I think that we should draw a 
different lesson from this sort of case. The lesson is that that the partial isomorphism account of 
partially faithful epistemic representation (like the other accounts of partially faithful epistemic 
representation that I have considered in this section) focuses on the wrong sort of question. As 
far as I can see, what cases such as the one of the fake map reveal is that the crucial question 
about partially faithful epistemic representation is not ‘What makes a vehicle a partially faithful 
epistemic representation of a certain target (as opposed to a completely unfaithful epistemic 
representation of that target)?’ As we have just seen, it is unclear whether there are any completely 
unfaithful epistemic representations (let alone whether it is possible to draw a clear-cut line 
between them and partially faithful epistemic representations that are extremely unfaithful). The 
crucial question an account of faithfulness should try to answer is rather ‘What makes this 
vehicle a more faithful epistemic representation of a certain target than that other vehicle?’ One 
of the advantages of this approach is that it allows us to sidestep the question of whether there 
are any completely unfaithful epistemic representations (which likely would lead to stalemate). 
This approach allows us to claim that, while there might be less and less faithful (and more and 
more unfaithful) epistemic representations of a certain target, there might be no such thing as a 
completely unfaithful epistemic representation. Even if, when the amount of information about 
the target we can validly infer from the vehicle becomes vanishingly small, we might be more 
reluctant to call the vehicle ‘a faithful epistemic representation of the target’. Strictly speaking, 
however, a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of the target would have to be one 
from which no sound surrogative inferences can be validly drawn and, I suspect, no epistemic 
representation, no matter how unfaithful, can be so unfaithful as to meet such a stringent 
criterion.  
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I suspect that the reason why the structural account focuses on the wrong question when it 
comes to partially faithful epistemic representation is that morphisms are an all-or-nothing 
matter and, therefore, it is tempting to think that, if faithfulness is to be explained in terms of 
similarity of structure, faithfulness is also an all-or-nothing matter. However, as I have argued 
repeatedly, faithfulness is a matter of degree and not an all-or-nothing matter and our account of 
faithful epistemic representation should reflect this fact. In the next chapter, I develop and 
defend an account of faithfulness that does so—the structural similarity account of faithful 
epistemic representation. As its name suggests, the structural similarity account combines 
elements of both the similarity account and the structural account. The account is based on a 
notion, that of structural similarity, which uses some of the resources that I have developed in this 
chapter but reflects the fact that faithfulness is a matter of degree.  
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8 The Structural Similarity Account 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I develop what I call ‘the structural similarity account (of faithful epistemic 
representation)’. As its name suggests, the structural similarity account combines aspects of both 
the structural account and the similarity account. More specifically, it employs the technical 
resources of the structural account to articulate in a clear and precise manner the intuitions that 
underlie the similarity account. As I mentioned at the end of Chapter 6, the structural account 
can be construed as a version of the similarity account, for a morphism is just a way to specify a 
very abstract and “global” sort of similarity, which, for lack of better label, might be called 
‘structural similarity’. The structural similarity account, however, takes this idea one step further. 
As we have seen at the end of Chapter 7, one of the problems with the structural account is that 
morphisms are an all-or-nothing matter (either a certain x-morphism obtains between two 
structures or it does not) while faithfulness, on the other hand, seems to be a matter of degree. 
As I have argued in Chapter 7, any epistemic representation of any target is to some extent a 
faithful epistemic representation of that target; the crucial question is therefore not ‘What makes 
an epistemic representation of a certain target a faithful one (as opposed to a completely 
unfaithful one)?’ (for, as I have argued, there might be no completely unfaithful epistemic 
representations) but rather ‘What makes one of two epistemic representation of a certain target a 
more faithful epistemic representation than the other?’. If my arguments are correct, the 
structural account is therefore ill-suited to explicate the notion of faithfulness.  
The structural similarity account, on the other hand, tries to explain (overall) faithfulness in 
terms of what I call ‘(overall) structural similarity’. More specifically, the structural similarity account 
of faithful epistemic representation maintains that: 
(L) v* is (overall) a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than v (for u) if and only 
if:   
(L.1) : 
(L.1.1) u takes both v and v* to denote t, and 
(L.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and an 
interpretation of v* in terms of t, i°(v*→t),  
(L.2) v and v* have the same scope, and 
(L.3) the relevant structure of v* relative to i°(v*→t), V*, is (overall) (strictly) 
more structurally similar to the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v*→t), , 
T, than the relevant structure of v relative to i°(v→t) , V*, 
and that: 
 
(M) v* and v are (overall) equally faithful epistemic representations of t (for u) if and only if: 
(M.1) : 
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(M.1.1) u takes both v* and v to denote t, and 
(M.1.2) u adopts an interpretation of v in terms of t, i°(v→t), and an 
interpretation of v* in terms of t, i°(v*→t),  
(M.2) v and v* have the same scope, and 
(M.3) the relevant structure of v* relative to i°(v*→t), V*, is (overall) as 
structurally similar to the relevant structure of t relative to i°(v*→t) , T, as 
the relevant structure of v relative to i°(v→t), V. 
 
In conjunction with (H) (i.e. what I called the isomorphism account of completely faithful 
epistemic representation), (M) and (L) form what I call ‘the structural similarity account of faithful 
epistemic representation’. In the next section, I first define the notion of (overall) structural similarity 
and then that of the strength of a morphism. 
8.2 MORPHISM STRENGTH AND STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 
The two fundamental ideas that underlie the notion of structural similarity are that (i) morphisms 
between two structures can be (partially) ordered with respect to their strength (with 
isomorphism being the strongest possible morphism between them and what I called ‘a minimal 
partial isomorphism’ being possibly the weakest) and that (ii) the stronger the strongest 
morphism between two structures is, the more structurally similar they are. More formally, 
 
(30) A* is (overall) (strictly) more structurally similar to B than A if and only if: 
[30.1] All the strongest intended morphism between A* and B are stronger than 
any of the strongest intended morphism between A and B. 
 
All we need now is a general notion of the comparative strength of morphisms. I start by 
introducing the notion of a morphism being at least as strong as another and then I define 
the notion of two morphisms being equally strong, that of a morphism being (strictly) 
stronger/weaker than another, and that of the strongest morphism between two 
structures. I then discuss the role these definitions play in the structural similarity account. 
Here are the definitions: 
(31) A morphism between A* and B (f*: ΩA*→ΩB) is at least as strong as a 
morphism between A and B (f: ΩA →ΩB) if and only if: 
[31.1] For every oiA∈ΩA, if there is an oiB∈ΩB such that f(oiA)=oiB, then there is a 
oiA*∈ΩA
* such that f*(oiA*)=oiB, 
[31.2] For every oiA*∈ΩA*, if there is no oiB∈ΩB such that f*(oiA*)=oiB, then there 
is a oiA∈ΩA  such that there is no oiB∈ΩB such that f(oiA)=oiB, 
[31.3] The cardinality of the set of oiA∈ΩA for which there is no oiB∈ΩB such that 
f(oiA)=oiB is greater than or equal to the cardinality of the set of oiA*∈ ΩA* for 
which there is no oiB∈ΩB such that f*(oiA*)=oiB, 
[31.4] For every nRkA*∈ΡA*, nRkA∈ΡA, and nRkB∈ΡB, and every <o1A*, …, 
onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n, <o1A, …, onA>∈(ΩA)
n and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n such that 
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f(o1A)=o1B, …, and f(onA)=onB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, and f*(onA*)=onB, if <o1A, 
…, onA>∈
nRkA and <o1B, …, onB>∈
nRkB then <o1A*, …, onA*>∈
nRkA*, 
[31.5] For every nRkA∈ΡA, nRkA*∈ΡA*, and nRkB∈ΡB, and every <o1A, …, 
onA>∈(ΩA)
n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n such that 
f(o1A)=o1B, …, and f(onA)=onB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, and f*(onA*)=onB, if <o1A, 
…, onA>∉
nRkA and <o1B, …, onB>∉
nRkB then <o1A*, …, onA*>∉
nRkA*,  
[31.6] For every nRkA∈ΡA, nRkA*∈ΡA*, and nRkB∈ΡB, and every <o1A, …, onA 
>∈(ΩA)n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n such that 
f(o1A)=o1B, …, and f(onA)=onB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, and f*(onA*)=onB, if <o1A*, 
…, onA*>∈
nRkA* and <o1B, …, onB>∉
nRkB then <o1A, …, onA>∈
nRkA, 
[31.7] For every nRkA∈ΡA, nRkA*∈ΡA*, and nRkB∈ΡB, and every <o1A, …, onA 
>∈(ΩA)n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n, and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n such that 
f(o1A)=o1B, …, and f(onA)=onB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, and f*(onA*)=onB, if <o1A*, 
…, onA*>∉
nRkA  and <o1B, …, onB>∈
nRkB then <o1A, …, onA>∉
nRkA, 
[31.8] For every nFkA∈ΦA, nFkA*∈ΦA*, and nFkB∈ΦB, every <o1A, …, 
onA>∈(ΩA)
n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n, and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n, and every 
oiA∈ΩA, oiA*∈ΩA* and oiB∈ΩB such that f(o1A)=o1B, …, f(onA)=onB, and 
f(oiA)=oiB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, f*(onA*)=onB, and f*(oiA*)=oiB, if 
nFkA(o1A, …, 
onA)=oiA and 
nFkB(o1B, …, onB)= oiB, then 
nFkA*(o1A*, …, onA*)=oiA*, 
[31.9] For every nFkA∈ΦA, nFkA*∈ΦA*, and nFkB∈ΦB, every <o1A, …, 
onA>∈(ΩA)
n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n, and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n, and every 
oiA∈ΩA, oiA*∈ΩA* and oiB∈ΩB such that f(o1A)=o1B, …, f(onA)=onB, and 
f(oiA)=oiB and f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, f*(onA*)=onB, and f*(oiA*)=oiB, if 
nFkA*(o1A*, …, 
onA*)≠oiA* and 
nFkB(o1B, …, onB)=oiB, then 
nFkA(o1A, …, onA)≠oiA, 
[31.10] For every nFkA∈ΦA, nFkA*∈ΦA*, and nFkB∈ΦB, every <o1A, …, 
onA>∈(ΩA)
n, <o1A*, …, onA*>∈(ΩA*)
n, and <o1B, …, onB>∈(ΩB)
n, and every 
oiA∈ΩA, oiA*∈ΩA* and oiB∈ΩB such that f(o1A)=o1B, …, f(onA)=onB, and 
f*(o1A*)=o1B, …, f*(onA*)=onB, if 
nFkA(o1A, …, onA)=oiA,
 nFkA*(o1A*, …, 
onA*)=oiA*, and
 nFkB(o1B, …, onB)=oiB, then: 
[31.10.1] if f(oiA), f*(oiA*), and oiB are scalars, then (f*(oiA*)–oiB)2≤(f(oiA)–oiB)2,  
[31.10.2] if f(oiA), f*(oiA*), and oiB are vectors (and ‘||v||’ denotes the norm 
of v), then (||f*(oiA*)–oiB||)
2≤(||f(oiA)–oiB||)
2. 
(32) A morphism between A* and B (f*: ΩA*→ ΩB) and a morphism between 
A and B (f: ΩA→ΩB) are equally strong if and only if: 
[32.1] f* is at least as strong as f, and 
[32.2] f is at least as strong as f*. 
(33) A morphism between A* and B (f*: ΩA*→ΩB) is (strictly) stronger than 
morphism between A and B (f: ΩA→ΩB) if and only if: 
[33.1] f* is at least as strong as f and 
[33.2] f  and f* are not equally strong. 
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(34) A morphism between A and B (f: ΩA→ΩB) is (strictly) weaker than 
morphism between A* and B (f*: ΩA*→ ΩB) if and only if 
[34.1] f* is (strictly) stronger than f. 
Finally, 
(35) A morphism between A and B (f*: ΩA→ ΩB) is one of the strongest 
morphisms between A and B if and only if: 
[35.1] For any morphism between A and B (f: ΩA→ ΩB), f* is at least as strong as 
f. 
Since definition (31) plays a pivotal role here, let me give a brief informal explanation for each 
clause. Condition [31.1] and [31.2] require, respectively, that every object in B that has a 
counterpart in A also has a counterpart in A* and that every object in B that has no counterpart 
in A* also has no counterpart in A. These conditions are there to ensure that insofar as the 
universe of A “mirrors” the universe of B, so does the universe of A*, and that insofar as the 
universe of A* fails to “mirror” the universe of B, so does the universe of A. Condition [31.3] 
requires that the cardinality of the set of objects in A that have no counterpart in B is greater 
than or equal to the cardinality of the set of objects in A* that have no counterpart in B. This is 
to ensure that there is no more “excess structure” in A* than there is in A. Conditions [31.4], 
[31.5], [31.6], and [31.7] require that, insofar as the extension of a property (or relation) in B is 
“mirrored” by the extension of the corresponding property (or relation) in A, it is also 
“mirrored” by the extension of the corresponding property (or relation) in A* and that, insofar 
as the extension of a property (or relation) in B is not “mirrored” by the extension of the 
corresponding property (or relation) in A*, it is not “mirrored” by the extension of the 
corresponding property (or relation) in A either. Conditions [31.8] and [31.9] require that, insofar 
a function in A “mirrors” the corresponding function in B, so does the corresponding function 
in A* and, insofar as a function in A* fails to “mirror” the corresponding function in B, so 
does the corresponding function in A. Condition [31.10] requires that every function in B that 
takes a scalar or a vector as its value is approximated by the corresponding function in A* at 
least as well as the corresponding function in A.  
Before proceeding, let me note that condition [31.10], as formulated here, is likely to be 
neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently fine-grained for a fully satisfactory account of 
structural similarity. First of all, the condition only applies to scalar and vector quantities; 
however, many mathematical objects other than scalars and vectors are used to represent the 
behaviour of objects in mathematical models, so condition [31.10] is likely not sufficiently 
general to adequately account for all cases of approximation. Second, in many cases, the 
requirement is likely to be too coarse-grained for our purposes. As I have argued in Chapter 2, 
closeness to truth is not simply a matter of approximation. A floor plan that represents a 5.9m 
wide room as being 6m wide might be more accurate than one that represents it as being 5.5m 
wide but, if all we need to do is to figure out whether a 6m wide bookshelf fits in the room, then 
the former representation is no closer to the truth than the latter. So it might be advisable to 
formulate subcondition [31.10.1] as ‘if f(oiA), f*(oiA*), and oiB are scalars, then f(oiA)≥f*(oiA*)≥(oiB) 
or f(oiA)≤f*(oiA*)≤(oiB)’. Since making analogous adjustments to subcondition [31.10.2] would be 
much more complicated and would require an in-depth discussion of closeness to truth in 
relation to vector quantities and since condition [31.10], as formulated here, performs equally 
well in a large number of cases, however, I rely on [31.10] here. 
In this section, I have introduced all the notions that are needed to formulate the structural 
similarity account. In the next few sections, I make a few preliminary general comments on the 
structural similarity account, I illustrate how the account handles the two main examples of 
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epistemic representation I have discussed so far, and explain on some technical details of the 
above definitions.  
8.3 FAITHFULNESS AND STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 
Like the similarity account and unlike the structural account, the structural similarity account can 
account for the fact that faithfulness is a matter of degree and not an all-or-nothing matter. Like 
the similarity account, the structural similarity account does so by appealing to the notion of 
similarity, but, unlike the similarity account, the structural similarity account provides us with a 
clear definition of the notion of similarity involved. In doing so, the account vindicates the 
intuition that similarity plays a role in representation, while avoiding the pitfalls associated with 
the less sophisticated ways of expressing that intuition. In particular, the structural similarity 
account maintains that the relevant similarity is an abstract and “global” sort of similarity. What 
matters to faithful epistemic representation is not the nature of the things that are doing the 
representing or the nature of their properties and relations, but only their arrangement. 
The structural similarity account also accommodates the fact that the relation ‘x is overall a 
(strictly) more faithful epistemic representation of t than y’ is a partial order, for ‘x is overall 
(strictly) more structurally similar to t than y’ is also a partial order. This is due both to the fact 
that only epistemic representations of a target that have the same scope can be compared for 
both faithfulness and structural similarity and to the fact that it is possible for two epistemic 
representations of the same target with the same scope to be such that neither of them is strictly 
more faithful (or more structurally similar) to the target than the other or as faithful (or 
structurally similar) to the target as the other. When this is the case, it might still be the case that 
one epistemic representation of the target is still (overall) more faithful (or more structurally 
similar) to the target the other, even if it is not strictly so. The example of the two maps of Rome 
I discussed in Chapter 2 (in which one map is only a faithful epistemic representation of a small 
area of Rome but not a faithful epistemic representation of the rest of Rome and the other map 
is a faithful epistemic of the rest of Rome but not of the area in question), for example, is a case 
in point. Intuitively, the second map seems to be (overall) more faithful than the first map, but, 
nevertheless, neither map is strictly more faithful than the other. Analogously, the second map 
seems to be more structurally similar to the city of Rome than the other, and yet neither is strictly 
more structurally similar to Rome than the other. 
8.4 MAPS, MODELS, AND STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 
Let me now turn to how the structural similarity account handles the two main examples of 
epistemic representation I have discussed throughout this book. Consider first the case of the 
new and the old London Underground maps. Any satisfactory account of faithful epistemic 
representation should explain why the new map is a more faithful epistemic representation of 
today’s network than the old one. The structural similarity account does so by appealing to the 
fact that the strongest intended morphism that holds between the relevant structure of the old 
map and that of today’s network (which is a partial isomorphism) is weaker than the strongest 
intended morphism that obtains between the relevant structure of the new map and that of the 
network (which is an isomorphism). The intended isomorphism between the new map and the 
network must be at least as strong as the strongest intended morphism between the old map and 
the network, as isomorphism is the strongest morphism that can obtain between two structures. 
The morphism between the old map and the network, on the other hand, meets some of the 
conditions for being weaker than the one between the new map and the network. First, while all 
stations on the network have a counterpart on the new map, some of them (e.g. Borough 
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Station) have no counterpart on the old map (which means that the strongest intended 
morphism between the old map and the network does not satisfy [34.1] when compared to the 
strongest intended isomorphism between the new map and the network). Second, while all 
circles on the new map have a counterpart in the corresponding station on the network, some 
circles on the old map (e.g. British Museum Station) do not (which means that the strongest 
intended morphism between the old map and the network does not satisfy [34.2] when 
compared to the strongest intended isomorphism between the new map and the network). 
Third, while all relevant properties of and relations among stations have a counterpart in the new 
map, some do not have a counterpart in the old map. On the old map, for example, there is no 
connection between the circle marked ‘Stockwell’ and the one marked ‘Victoria’; however, 
Stockwell Station and Victoria Station are today connected by Victoria Line trains (which means 
that the strongest intended morphism between the old map and the network does not satisfy 
[34.3] when compared to the strongest intended isomorphism between the new map and the 
network). Fourth, while all relevant properties of and relations among circles on the new map 
have a counterpart in properties of and relations among stations on the network, some 
properties of and relations among circles on the old map do not. On the old map, for example, 
the circle on the red line between the circles labeled ‘Bank’ and ‘Chancery Lane’ is labeled ‘Post 
Office’, but the name of the station on the Central Line between Bank and Chancery Lane 
Stations is ‘St. Paul’s’ (which means that the strongest intended morphism between the old map 
and the network does not satisfy [34.4] when compared to the strongest intended isomorphism 
between the new map and the network).40 
Consider now the toboggan case. The inclined plane model is a partially faithful epistemic 
representation of the tobogganing hill system. In the model, there are only two forces acting on 
the box. The first is the gravitational force and the second is the normal force that the plane 
exerts on the box. As we have already noted, however, in the system, there are many more forces 
acting on the toboggan than just the gravitational pull of the Earth and the normal force that the 
hill exerts on the toboggan. This is one of the main reasons why the inclined plane model, 
overall, is not a particularly faithful epistemic representation of the tobogganing hill system. 
However, instead of the frictionless inclined plane model, one might use a model, which, overall, 
is slightly more faithful—i.e. the inclined plane model with drag. In the inclined plane model 
with drag, a third external force acts on the box, a force that stands for the air resistance that my 
daughters and their toboggan would experience on their downhill journey. In the model, we can 
set the magnitude of the force air resistance exerts on the box equal to –½dA(||vM*(b, 
ti)||)
2(vM*(b, ti)/|| vM*(b, ti)||), where A is the cross-sectional area of the box (perpendicular to 
the direction of motion), vM*(b, ti) is the vector that represents the velocity of the box at ti, and 
||vM*(b, ti)|| is its norm (so that ‘(vM*(b, ti)/|| vM*(b, ti)||’ denotes the unit vector in the 
direction of vM*(b, ti)),  d is a drag coefficient proportional to the air density. In the model, the air 
drag on the box is therefore an external force, whose direction is the opposite of the direction of 
the velocity of the box and whose magnitude is proportional to both the cross sectional area of 
the box and to the square of its velocity. So, in the inclined plane model with air friction, gM*(b, 
ti, 3)=–½dA(||vM*(b, ti)||)
2(vM*(b, ti)/||vM*(b, ti)||) (as opposed to gM(b, ti, 3)= 0 in the 
standard inclined plane model). This means that, in the model with drag, the box gains speed 
more slowly than it does in the standard inclined plane model and ultimately reaches a lower 
terminal velocity than the one reached by the box in the standard inclined plane model. 
Overall, the inclined plane model with drag would seem to be a more faithful epistemic 
representation of my daughters tobogganing down the hill than the inclined plane model without 
                                                
40 Here I assume that being labeled ‘Post Office’ and being named ‘St. Paul’s’ are properties of, respectively, the circle 
on the old map and the station in the network. When the old map was originally printed, the Underground station 
that today is known as ‘St. Paul’s’ used to be named ‘Post Office’. It seems to be natural to assume that, on the 
standard interpretation of the old map, the circle labeled ‘Post Office’ on the old map still denotes St. Paul’s Station 
while incorrectly attributing that station the property of being named ‘St. Paul’s’ 
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drag (or so I assume here). If my daughters were to go down the hill on their toboggan, the drag 
they would experience due to air resistance would be one of the main factors in determining how 
fast they would go and, although the inclined plane with drag represents the effects of that drag 
somewhat crudely, it is still an improvement on the standard inclined plane model, which does 
not take air friction into account at all. 
The structural similarity account of faithful epistemic representation vindicates the intuition 
that the inclined plane model with drag is a more faithful epistemic representation of my 
daughters tobogganing down the hill than the standard inclined plane model. According to the 
structural similarity account, this is due to the fact that the former is more structurally similar to 
my daughters tobogganing down the hill than the latter. The inclined plane model with drag 
trivially meets conditions [34.1]–[34.7] for being at least as structurally similar to my daughters 
going down the hill as the standard inclined plane model, for the relevant structures of the two 
models contain the same objects and do not contain any (v-relevant) properties or relations. 
Furthermore, the functions gM(b, ti, 1) and gM*(b, ti, 2), and gM(b, ti, 2) and gM*(b, ti, 2) trivially 
meet conditions [35.8]–[35.10] because the gravitational and normal forces acting on the box in 
the two models are the same. The inclined plane model with drag, therefore, meets the first 
condition ([35.1]) for being (strictly) more structurally similar to my daughters going down the 
hill than the inclined plane model without drag. It also meets the second condition (i.e. [35.2]) 
for being (strictly) more structurally similar to my daughters going down the hill than the 
standard inclined plane model without drag, as the latter fails to meet some of the conditions for 
being at least as structurally similar to the tobogganing hill system as the former. In particular, 
the standard inclined plane model fails to meet the conditions that require all its functions to 
approximate the functions in the system at least as closely as the inclined plane model with 
friction does. Clearly, this is not the case. Consider, for example, the vectors that represent the 
drag on the boxes in the two models (gM*(b, ti, 3) and gM(b, ti, 3)) and the one that represents the 
drag my daughters and their toboggan would experience at ti (gS(f(b), f(ti), f(3))). Since gM(b, ti, 3) 
is equal to 0 in the standard inclined plane model and since my daughters would experience a 
significant drag in their downhill journey, for all ti, gM*(b, ti, 3) would approximate gS(f(b), f(ti), 
f(3)) more closely than gM(b, ti, 3)=0 (or, more precisely, ||gM(b, ti, 3)–gS(f(b), f(ti), 
f(3))||2>||gM*(b, ti, 3)–gS(f(b), f(ti), f(3))||
2). As a result, the functions that represent the 
position, velocity, and acceleration of the box at ti in the inclined plane model with drag also 
approximate the position, velocity, and acceleration my daughters and their toboggan would have 
at ti more closely than the corresponding functions in the standard inclined plane model. In light 
of the above, we can conclude that inclined plane model with drag is more structurally similar to 
my daughters tobogganing down the hill than the standard inclined plane model, as we would 
expect to be the case pre-theoretically. 
I should note, once more, that the account I developed here is meant to be an account of 
overall faithfulness and not one of specific faithfulness. For my specific purposes (i.e. determining 
whether my daughters would reach a velocity that exceeds the velocity that I deem to be safe), 
even if one model is overall a (strictly) more faithful epistemic representation than the other, both 
might be equally specifically faithful epistemic representations of the situation, insofar as they 
both give a “good enough” answer to the question I happen to be interested in.  
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I developed and defended a structural similarity account of faithful epistemic 
representation. The structural similarity account, I believe, inherits the respective benefits of the 
similarity account and the structural account while avoiding their respective defects. In particular, 
like the similarity account and unlike the structural account, the structural similarity account can 
account for the fact that faithfulness is a matter of degree and not an all-or-nothing matter. Like 
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the structural account and unlike the similarity account, the structural similarity account can 
clearly define what it is for a vehicle and a target to be similar in the relevantly abstract and 
“global” sense that matters when it comes to epistemic representation. So, while faithful 
epistemic representation is a matter of similarity and, the more similar a vehicle is to a target, the 
more faithfully it represents it, the similarity in question is the abstract and “global” sort of 
similarity that I have called structural similarity, and not a concrete, “local” similarity, as we 
might initially have thought. In other words, our focus on certain sorts of epistemic 
representations might mislead us into believing that, say, a portrait is a faithful epistemic 
representation of its subject in virtue of certain concrete, “local” similarities. The shape of the 
area that represents the nose is similar to the shape of the nose and the colour of the area that 
represents the eyes is similar to the colour of the eyes. However, as I have argued, these “local” 
similarities do not obtain in all cases of epistemic representation, and what we should focus on 
instead are the abstract, “global” similarities between vehicles and targets (a sort of similarity that 
only emerges once we interpret the vehicle in terms of the target). 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this book, I have argued that the so-called “problem of scientific representation” is neither a 
single problem nor a problem about scientific representation in particular. Instead, what is often 
misleadingly labelled as the problem of scientific representation are, in fact, two general and oft-
conflated problems—i.e. the problem of what makes a certain vehicle an epistemic 
representation of a certain target and the problem of what makes a certain epistemic 
representation of a certain target a more or less faithful epistemic representation of that target.  
Most of this book was devoted to trying to solve these two general problems. According to 
the account of epistemic representation that I have defended (the interpretational account of 
epistemic representation), a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain 
user if and only if the user takes the vehicle to denote the target and she adopts an interpretation 
of the vehicle (in terms of the target). In this book, I have focussed exclusively on one specific 
kind of interpretation, which I have called analytic interpretation. Whether the account I have 
developed can be developed further into a general account of epistemic representation crucially 
depends on whether every possible interpretation can be reconstructed as an analytic 
interpretation. This is one of the crucial issues that are left open by this book and on which 
further work needs to be done.  
One of the main advantages of the interpretational account, I have argued, is that it sheds 
light on the relation between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning—the fact 
that a user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target (and takes the vehicle to 
stand for the target) is both that in virtue of which the vehicle is an epistemic representation of 
the target for her and that in virtue of which she can perform valid inferences from the vehicle 
to the target. Without the notion of an interpretation (or some analogous notion), the intimate 
relation between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning is unnecessarily 
mysterious. 
The notion of an analytic interpretation also plays a central role in the account of faithful 
epistemic representation. It directly contributes to the solutions of two crucial problems that 
have haunted the structural account of (faithful) epistemic representation and, indirectly, 
contributes to the solution of a third problem. The first problem is that of applying the notion of 
a morphism to objects that are not set-theoretic structures. As I have argued, the notion of an 
analytic interpretation provides us with a principled way to reconstruct the vehicle and the target 
as set-theoretic structures. 
The second problem is that of determining which morphisms need to obtain between the 
vehicle and the target in order for the vehicle to be a faithful epistemic representation of the 
target (to a certain degree), since a morphism may obtain between the vehicle and the target 
without the first being a faithful epistemic representation of the target (on a certain interpretation 
of it). The notion of analytic interpretation provides us with a principled way to single out some 
of the morphisms that may obtain between the vehicle and the target as the intended 
morphisms—i.e. the only ones that are relevant to the faithfulness of the epistemic 
representation in question.  
The third problem is that the notion of the faithfulness of an epistemic representation comes 
in degrees, whereas two structures are either x-morphic or they are not. However, the account of 
faithful epistemic representation that I have developed uses the notions of relevant structure and 
intended morphism to develop a third crucial notion, namely that of the structural similarity 
between the vehicle and the target (under a certain interpretation of the former in terms of the 
latter). Intuitively, the stronger the strongest intended morphism between the vehicle and the 
target is, the more structurally similar the vehicle and the target are. The central idea that 
underlies the structural similarity account is that the more structurally similar the vehicle and the 
target are, under a certain interpretation of the former in terms of the latter, the more faithful an 
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epistemic representation of the latter the former is under that interpretation. The account of 
faithful epistemic representation that I have developed, I think, vindicates the intuitions that 
underlie the main accounts of faithful representation but avoids the pitfalls that characterize the 
other versions of these views that I have considered. 
The account of epistemic representation and that of faithful epistemic representation that I 
have developed and defended in this book are more than just complementary—they are deeply 
interconnected. It is only when one attempts to develop some of the intuitions and ideas that can 
be found in the literature into a coherent whole that one can see how everything falls into place 
in the overall picture, and what might initially seem like rival attempts to solve a single problem 
are actually best interpreted as accounts of different notions of representation. In this book, I 
hope to have provided a good initial sketch of that picture. 
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